Massachusetts Disciplinary Cases – Client Funds Rule 1.15

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 405 (2007)-In the Matter of Thomas J. Lynch

At page 1
The respondent’s accounting records concerning his maintenance of the checking accounts for each trust were uniformly inadequate to document his receipt, maintenance and disbursementof the funds of each trust. He did not maintain check registers that included information onthe purpose of disbursements or a running balance after each entry. He also did not maintainand preserve adequate records supporting payments he made to himself for purported feesearned and expenses incurred on behalf of the trusts. The respondent’s failure to maintainadequate records concerning his receipt, maintenance and disbursement of trust funds was inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3 and 1.15(a) for conduct prior to July 1, 2004 and1.15(f) for conduct on and after that date. Each trust required the respondent to provide its beneficiary with annual accountings of the

At page 1 trust’s funds. The respondent did not provide any beneficiary with any annual accounting until 2004, when he provided one beneficiary with summary and incomplete accountings for 1996 through 2003. After repeatedly promising a lawyer for another beneficiary that he would provide accountings, he only provided that beneficiary with summary and incomplete accountings in 2005. The respondent’s failure to render annual accountings of his administration of the trusts was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3 and 1.15(b)for conduct prior to July 1, 2004 and 15(d)(1) for conduct on and after that date. As trustee, the respondent was responsible for filing required state and federal income tax

At page 2
After the respondent began representing the mother in the divorce, he transferred the trust’s funds to a joint checking account on which both he and the mother were signatories, and bothhe and the mother disbursed trust funds from the account. This was in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.7(a), 1.7(b) and 1.15(a) for conduct prior to July 1, 2004 and 1.15(b)for conduct on and after that date. The respondent also made substantial payments of trustfunds for the mother’s attorneys’ fees, including his own, in violation of the terms of thetrust. While the respondent made these payments with the understanding that the motherwould repay the trust if and when the marital home was sold, this loan arrangement wasundocumented and unsecured. This conduct was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a),1.7(a) and 1.7(b). Finally, on three occasions in 2001 and 2003, the respondent advanced funds from trusts,

At page 2 including two not otherwise involved in this matter, to cover debts or expenses of another trust. The respondent caused these advances to be repaid from the appropriate trust within weeks or months of the advance. These transfers were not authorized by any of the trust documents involved, and the respondent did not pay any interest when he caused the advances to be returned. The respondent’s misuse of trust funds for unrelated payments was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.7(a), 1.7(b), 1.15(a) (for conduct prior to July 1,2004; now 1.15(b)), 8.4(c) and 8.4(h). To the extent that the respondent advanced the funds as loans, his engaging in unauthorized loans and his failure to document the loans or pay interest were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.7(a) and 1.7(b). In aggravation, the respondent failed to file a timely answer to the Petition For Discipline.

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 600 (2011)-In the Matter of Peter C. McLaughlin

At page 1
misrepresentations to the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). By failing to promptly return his client’s file, the res pondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), and 1.16(c) and (d).

At page 3 return his client’s files upon request, the respo ndent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), 1.16(d), and 1.16(e). By making false statements of material fact to bar counsel in

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 495 (2003)-In the Matter of Bruce S. Wisner

At page 1
SUMMARY2 This matter came to Bar Counsel’s attention pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) as a result of receipt of a notice of dishonored check from the bank at which the respondent maintains hisIOLTA account.

At page 1
personal or business purposes with intent to deprive clients or third parties of the funds atleast temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting. The respondent’s conduct was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b) and 8.4(c) and (h).The respondent was under extreme financial stress as a result of acute family problems. He voluntarily ceased the practice of law with notice to all clients and provision for substitutecounsel and an orderly transition of files prior to February 13, 2001, the date on which he wasadministratively suspended for non-payment of his annual registration fee.

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Karen M. Bigley

At page 2
Counts One and Two, including an initial retainer paid in July 2017, a second payment in July 2017, and a third in October 2017. T he respondent failed to deposit any of these into her trust account, either depositing them into an operating account or spending them for her own purposes. The initial retainer was not completely earned, and the subsequent payments were not earned . This misconduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a) (clearly excessive fees) , 1.15(b)(1) (trust funds to be held in trust account) and (3) (advance fees to be withdrawn only as earned),

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 77 (2005)-In the Matter of Douglas M. Callaghan

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The respondent commingled client and personal funds, failed to account for the retainers, and converted the unearned portion of the retainers to his own use, in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(a) and (b), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004, (lawyer shall hold property of clientsseparate from the lawyer’s own property, maintain complete records of the receipt,maintenance, and disposition of such funds, promptly deliver to the client his funds, and shallpromptly render and full accounting of such funds) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) and (h)(conduct involving dishonestly, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and conduct adverselyreflecting on his fitness to practice law). The respondent’s failure to return the unearnedportion of the retainers was also in violation of the order of administrative suspension andS.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17, and therefore violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c) (lawyer shall notknowingly disobey an obligation under the rule of a tribunal) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (d) and(h) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Finally, the respondent’s failurewithout good cause to respond to bar counsel’s requests for information was in violation ofS.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17, and therefore violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(b) (lawyer shall notknowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from bar counsel) and Mass. R.Prof. C. 8.4(d) and (g) (lawyer shall not fail without good cause to cooperate with barcounsel). Bar counsel filed and served on the respondent a petition for discipline on June 20, 2005. As a

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 313 (2010)-In the Matter of Christine Cedrone Logan

At page 1
Bar counsel asked the respondent three times to bring her account records into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent did not do so until May 2010. The respondent’s conduct in failing to perform a three-way reconciliation of the account

At page 1 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). Her conduct in failing to keep an account ledger witha client identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction and running balanceviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individualclient ledgers with a list of every transaction and running balance and failing to keep a ledgeror other records of her personal funds for bank fees and expenses violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(C), and (D). The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds in the IOLTA accountviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and 1.15(b). On July 7, 2010, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline, and the parties filed the

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of David V Shablin

At page 1
disciplinary hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h). He further acknowledged that bar counsel would recommend that the Affidavit of Resignation be accepted as a disciplinary sanction. Bar counsel indeed made these

485 Mass. 807 (2020)-MATTER OF OLCHOWSKI

At page 3
unidentified client funds on deposit in an IOL TA account fall within the statutory definition of `abandoned property’ under G. L. c. 200A?"; (2) "Does Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, [as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015),] or any other rule of this court, govern the disposition of such funds?"; and (3) "Are any constitutional issues

At page 3
In the exercise of this superintendence authority , we have promulgated several rules, including S.J.C. Rule 3:07, as amended, 480 *81 1 Mass. 1315 (2018) (Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct), which governs the conduct of attorneys; S.J.C. Rule 4:01, which governs bar discipline and establishes the Board

At page 3
and protect clients from losses arising from defalcations by members of the bar .81 1 2. IOLTA accounts. Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct governs the safekeeping of property entrusted to an attorney . An attorney in possession of "trust property ," defined as the "property

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more than nominal and is to be held for longer than a short period of time, an attorney must deposit the money into an individual trust account. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(6). With an individual trust account, the identity of the beneficial owner should always be known because the account is held in a client’s name, with

At page 4 ll accruing interest paid to the client. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3), (6). But an IOL TA account is a "pooled account" that may hold deposits from multiple clients and third persons at the same time. Mass. R. Prof. C.

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responsible to "promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive," Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), an attorney is required to adhere to strict record-keeping and reconciliation requirements for an IOL TA account. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). An

At page 4
is required to prepare a reconciliation report no less than every sixty days to verify the balance for each client and third person. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C), (E), (F).812 Where an attorney fails to keep careful records and prepare periodic reconciliation reports, the risk arises

At page 4
keeping, financial institutions accepting IOL TA deposits must agree to report any dishonored checks on IOLTA accounts to the board. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(h)(1). Because a dishonored check in an IOL TA account may reflect an attorney’s failure properly to manage an IOL TA account, receipt of such notice may

At page 4
request for account documentation and reconciliation reports as part of that investigation. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(h). When an attorney is suspended from the practice of law , disbarred, or placed in disability inactive status, or

At page 5
might have caused him or her to suf fer losses arising from an attorney’s defalcation.814 Under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(g), the interest on IOL TA accounts is distributed to the IOL TA committee, whose members are appointed by this court to oversee the operation of the IOL TA program. The IOL TA

At page 5
charitable entities," in proportions ordered by this court, to improve the administration of justice and deliver legal services to those who cannot af ford them. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(g)(4)(i). But neither rule 1.15 nor any other rule promulgated by this court declares what happens to the principal in IOL TA accounts when a true

At page 8
standing advisory committee on the rules of professional conduct (standing committee) to propose amendments to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 to incorporate the following guidance into our rule. Just as a dishonored check in an IOL TA account is an indicator of a possible disciplinary violation by an

At page 8
only in financial institutions that agree to notify the board when a check is dishonored for insuf ficient funds. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(h). See also Go-Best Assets Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 463 Mass. 50, 60 (2012) . Such notification permits bar counsel to investigate the attorney to determine whether the

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200A, § 9; or the IOL TA committee, where the interest on IOL TA accounts is transferred, *823 which is in turn distributed pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(g) to entities that will deliver civil legal services to those who cannot af ford them or improve the administration of justice. Some States have chosen the first

At page 10
conclude that unidentified client funds on deposit in an IOL TA account do not fall within the statutory definition of "abandoned property" under G. L. c. 200A; that neither Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 nor any other rule of this court presently governs the disposition of such funds; and that such funds shall be transferred to

At page 10 incorporated in revisions to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.825 So ordered.

At page 10
facially qualify as abandoned property under the act absent some compelling factual or legal reason to the contrary . See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015). Aside from plain meaning, the Legislature intended the act to "set[] forth a comprehensive scheme governing the disposition of

At page 14
2000, c. 198. [10] The IOL TA committee contends that G. L. c. 200A, § 3, does not apply to IOL TA accounts because, under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(g) (2)(i), banks must remit interest to the committee no less than quarterly , so the account may never be presumed abandoned where G. L.

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IOLTA accounts meet the second set of required conditions in § 1A for the funds to be "presumed abandoned" under the statute. [12] This court’s standing advisory committee on the rules of professional conduct, in proposing amendments to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, may consider whether a dif ferent time period is more appropriate to accomplish our purpose for requiring such notification.

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Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-2 (1998); State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion No. RI-38 (1989); Mississippi Ethics Opinion No. 178 (1990); N.C. R. Prof. C. 1.15-2(r); W ashington Bar Association, Ethics F AQ ("What do I do with unclaimed trust account funds?"), citing W ash. Rev . Code § 63.29, https://www .wsba.org/for-legal-professionals/ethics/ethics-faqs#unclaimed [https://perma.cc/2R3H-

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[15] See, e.g., Ark. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c)(1)-(2); Colo. R. Prof. C. 1.15B(k); Ill. R. Prof. C. 1.15(i); La. R. Prof. C. 1.15(g)(7)-(8), (h); N.J. Court Rule 1:21-6(j); N.Y . R. Prof. C. 1.15(f); Pa. R. Prof. C. 1.15(v). [16] Where the owner of the IOL TA funds has been identified but cannot be located, the Board of Bar Overseers shall publish the name

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 464 (2020)-In the Matter of Josiah Weiss

At page 1
lawful objectives); 1.3 (diligence); 1.4(a) and (b) (keep client informed, explain matters , respond to client’s reasonable requests for information); 1.15(b) (segregate trust funds), (b)(1) (trust funds to be held in trust account), (b)(2) (commingling), (b)(3) (retainer to be deposited into trust account and withdrawn as earned), (b)(4) (safeguard trust property); 1.15(c) (prompt notice and delivery of trust funds); 1.15(d)(1) (full accounting on final distribution of trust funds); 1.15(d)(2) (accounting on

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withdrawal from trust to pay fees); 1.15(e)(4) (withdrawals from trust must be identified, not in cash or by atm) ; 1.15(f)(1)(C) (individual client records, no negative bala nces); 1.16(d) (steps to protect client on termination of representation, including refunding advance fees and surrendering property); 1.16(e) (making property available to client on termination of representation); 8.4(c) (dishonesty, deceit, misrepresentation, or fraud); 8.4(h) (other conduct reflecting adversely on fitness to practice) ;

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 445 (2011)-In the Matter of Peter M. Heintzelman

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On July 1, 2011, bar counsel filed a petiti on for discipline setting forth the above misconduct and alleging that the respondent ha d violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2) by depositing personal funds in an IOLTA account; Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(b) and 8.4(g) by

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 7 (2018)-In the Matter of Sybil Helena Barrett

At page 19
them. The respondent’s actions, therefore; are not properly categorized as a violation of Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, and the presumptive sanctions for

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imposed in cases of negligent misuse of client funds under Rule 1.15 be applicable to what the hearing officer incorrectly concluded was negligent misuse of client funds with respect to

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clients were the buyers, not the sellers. The buyers paid no money towards the outstanding tax bills. Therefore, Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Misconduct, involving

At page 21 Moreover, Rule 1.15 of the North Carolina Rules of professional conduct is not entirely equivalent to the

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in her trust account were not client funds to which the presumptive sanctions of S.J.C. Rule 1.15 apply, if the funds had been her clients’ funds, and the respondent negligently

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 455 (2005)-In the Matter of John C. McBride

At page 4
On Count Two, the hearing committee and the board found violations of DR 1-102 (A)(4), (5) and (6); DR 2-106 (A); DR 7-101 (A)(1), (2) and (3); DR 9-102 (A), (B) and (C); and, for thoseviolations occurring after January 1, 1998, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and 8.4 (c). c. Count Three. Count Three stems from McBride’s representation of Yves Felix ("Felix"), who

452 Mass. 1012 (2008)-Desy v. Board of Bar Examiners

At page 2
composition of the board are also meritless. Each member of the board was duly appointed by this court. Finally , as we have pointed out, "[e]ven if the board’s *1015 proceedings were defective in some way , [Desy] would still have to convince this court that he possesses the moral character necessary to practice law in

At page 2 his Commonwealth. This he has not done." Strigler v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra .1015

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Michael M. Yalovenko

At page 1
three count petition for discipline. Count 1 charged him with recordkeeping violations, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B) -(E). Count 2 charged him w ith intentional misuse of a retainer in an immigration matter, and a failure to remit to his client an itemized bill before taking fees from a retainer ,

At page 1 ith a late but eventual refund of unearned fees, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (3), 8.4(c) and 8.4(h), 1.15(d)(2) and 1.16(d). Count 3, also an immigration matter, charged incompetence,

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 527 (2016)-In the Matter of Ariel J. Strauss

At page 5
board found, that the respondent’s conduct is violated Mass. R. Prof, C. 1.15(f)(1)(B) and 1.15(f)(1) (H). The respondent asserts, and bar counsel does not dispute,

At page 5
performing three-way reconciliations, and that his current process conforms with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1,15. Count 2. Count 2 of the petition asserts that with respect

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The petition for discipline states that this conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 .(b)(1) (failing to keep client funds in a trust account)) Mass, R. Prof, C. 1,15(c) (failing to

At page 8 romptly pay client); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d) (failing to provide notice of withdrawal of fee and amount of fee, itemized

At page 8
Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C) (causing negative balance in IOLTA accOunt); Mass. R, Prof, C, 1.15(0)(3) (paying client in cash); Mass. R. Prof, C, 8.4(0) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

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settlement check arrived too late to convert it to cash to deliver to the client. Rule 1.15 (e) (3) of the rules of professional conduct, however, prohibits withdrawal of funds from

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counsel quarterly on the status of the respondent’s compliance with the record keeping requirements of Mass, R. Prof. C. 1.15, By the Court

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 6 (2004)-In the Matter of Maureen V. Andricopouos

At page 2
In all five of these matters, the respondent’s commingling and intentional misappropriation of trust funds is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b) and 8.4(c),(h). In all but thefourth matter, the respondent intended to deprive the parties of the funds at leasttemporarily and actual deprivation resulted. In the first matter, the respondent’s failure todeposit the client’s funds to an individual trust account with interest payable to the client isalso in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e). In the second matter, the respondent’s falserepresentations on the settlement statement that funds had been paid to the credit unionoutside of the closing is additional conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c),(h). The respondent was also charged with failing to cooperate with Bar Counsel. After providing

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 409 (2016)-In the Matter of Mark David Modest

At page 3
fee-and unused expenses· to the clients, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (3)1 1.15 (c)·, and1.16 (d); failureto account upon the client’s request for funds·received and

At page 3 Mass/ R. Prof1 C. 1.4(a) and (b), and 1.15(d) (2); termination of the representation of the clients without giving them reasonable

At page 10
counsel also requested that the respondent provide ~opies of trust. account records as s~t forth in Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). In a letter dated July 20, 2014, the respondent submitted

919 NE 2d 698, 455 Mass. 722 (2010)-Matter of Finneran

At page 9
institution other than a court. See Matter of Doyle, 429 Mass. 1013 (1999) ; Matter of Kennedy , 428 Mass. 156 (1998) ; Matter of Ogan, 424 Mass. 1015 (1997); Matter of Nickerson, 422 Mass. 333 (1996) . [15] See, e.g., Matter of Labovitz, 425 Mass. 1008 (1997); Matter of McCarthy , 18 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 380 (2002); Matter of

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 263 (2004)-In the Matter of Francis X. Jackman

At page 2
with lawyers, lawyer with direct supervisory authority shall make reasonable effortsto ensure person’s conduct is compatible with lawyer’s professional obligations (sixviolations); (5) Rule 1.15(a) – lawyer shall hold client property separate from lawyer’s property, shall safeguard client property and maintain complete records regarding clientfunds or property (three violations);

At page 2 6) Rule 1.15(b) – upon receiving funds in which client or third person has an interest, lawyer shall promptly notify such person (two violations);

At page 2 7) Rule 1.15(d) – all client funds shall be deposited in IOLTA account or client funds account;

At page 2 8) Rule 1.15(e) – all client funds shall be deposited in pooled IOLTA account or individual client account with interest payable to client

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 810 (2006)-In the Matter of F. Christopher Zacharer

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to render a full accounting and to timely pay over the balance of the retainer due the clients violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and (d). The respondent’s conductin failing to withdraw as counsel upon being discharged violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(a)(3),and his failure to timely return the file and to timely refund an unearned fee violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.16(d) and (e). Count Two arose from the respondent’s failure to cooperate with bar counsel’s investigation in

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 552 (2016)-In the Matter of Luke Sweeney

At page 4
respondent did not keep the required check register, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) (1) (B); did not maintain individual,client records, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) (1) (C); did not keep a

At page 4 P"rof. C. 1.15 (f) (1) (D); and did not perform ·three-way reconciliations of the account every sixty days, as was required

At page 5
the amount of Leguerre’s funds remaining in the account. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1:15(b) (1). The. respondent admitted to the hearing committee’that, in undertaking these actions, he misused

At page 7
promptly _to notify Leguerre of the r.eceipt of the funds, and to pay him the amount due, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), and his intentional misuse of the funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

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failure to maintain Jane’s funds in a trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (1); hi’s failure to provide proper notice and itemized bills violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d); his

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individual client accounts to result in negative balances violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) (1) (C); and his intentional misuse of Jane’s funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).

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respondent’s misuse resulted in deprivation., or that he failed to make prompt payment, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c).

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 115 (2002)-In the Matter of Craig R. Cellitti

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to seek the clients’ lawful objectives, failure to provide diligent representation, and failure to maintain reasonable communications with the clients in thesecases violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3 and 1.4. The respondent’s failure to withdraw fromrepresentation or take adequate measures to protect the clients’ interests after ceasing workand failure timely to return client files and unearned fees violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)and 1.16(a)(1) and (2), (c), (d) and (e). In the third and fourth cases, the respondent’sintentional misrepresentations violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). During the investigation of his misconduct, the respondent repeatedly failed to reply to bar

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 523 (2008)-In the Matter of Osamwonyi E. Osagiede

At page 1
As a consequence of these practices, the respondent misused the funds of at least four clients, and he eventually paid those clients by using other clients’ funds as they weredeposited. The committee found this misuse to have been “at least negligent.” Thecommittee ruled that these actions violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), as then in effect, andMass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). The committee deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the misusewas intentional or had caused deprivation because of its finding, under the fifth count(discussed below), that the respondent had intentionally misused a client’s funds with intentto deprive and with deprivation resulting. Count two

At page 1
opened at the Bank of America in August of 2004. Again, the respondent failed to maintain adequate records of receipts and disbursements in the account, and the committee foundviolations of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), as in effect after June 30, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C.8.4(h). Count three

At page 2 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 1.15(f), as then in effect, and 8.4(h). Count four concerns the respondent’s handling of a second Bank of America business account,

At page 2 account, and he failed to maintain adequate records. The committee found violations of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (f), as then in effect, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). Count five

At page 2
The committee believed the client, not the respondent. It found that the respondent had knowingly and intentionally misappropriated the client’s settlement proceeds for his ownpurposes, and that the client was deprived of his funds at least from April 19 until the clientcashed the check on April 28. Such conduct, the committee found, violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.2(a), 1.4, 1.15(c) & (d), and 8.4(c) & (h). Sanction

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 461 (2015)-In the Matter of John G. Molloy

At page 1
August 31, 2013, the respondent had brought his IO LTA account records into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.

At page 1 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). His conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with a client identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction and running balance violated

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individual client ledgers with a list of every tr ansaction and running balance violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s cash withdrawals from the IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3). By depositing a nd withdrawing earned fees into and from the

At page 1 C. 1.15(b)(2). On August 13, 2015, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline, and the parties filed the

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 522 (2018), 479 Mass. 294 (2018)-In the Matter of Ariel J. Strauss

At page 2
board (committee) agre ed that the conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f) (1) (B) and (E), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004 ).

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Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1), as app earing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004); (2) failed to pay the client the proceeds of her

At page 3 ettlement promptly , in violat ion of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), as appearing in 440 Mass . 1338 (2004) ; (3) failed to provide the

At page 3
the client’s funds left in the account, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d ), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) ; (4) authorized distributions that caused a negative balance in his

At page 3 lient trust account , in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f) (1) (C), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) ; and (5) engaged

At page 6
insufficient funds, bar counsel was notified. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (h), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).
After approximately two weeks abroad, the client returned

At page 16
date of the order of indefinite suspension. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (2) (b), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009).
So ordered.

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Michael James Kelley

At page 2
C. 1.4 (a), (b); (3) failed to transmit within a reasonable time the file of two other clients to successor counsel, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15A (b) (effective Sept. 1, 2018), 1.16 (d), and 1.16 (e) (as in effect prior to September 1, 2018); and (4) failed to transmit another client’s file to the client or successor counsel, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15A (b) (effective September 1, 2018, 1.16 (d), and 1.16 (e) (as in effect prior to September 1, 2018).

At page 12
timely transfer to clients or successor counsel , Attorney Deborah Butler, his complete files. The hearing committee concluded that the respondent’s delays and incomplete transfer violated Mass. R. Prof. 1.15A (effective September 1, 2018) and 1.16(d) and (e) (as in effect prior to September 1, 2018) . We agree.

At page 17
respondent delayed transferring to successor counsel. (Counts Three and Four). Our case law does not support a finding of potential harm as a factor in aggravation when considering a delayed file transfer under Rule 1.15A (formerly Rules 1.16(d) and (e). Fourth and last, the hearing committee found in aggravation uncharged misconduct

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 334 (2016)-In the Matter of Franklin H. Levy

At page 7
The board found that the respondent misused a client retainer in violation of rule 1.15 (b) (segregation of trust property) and (c) (prompt delivery of trust

At page 11
both matters to Duane Morris in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (segregat ·ion of trust property), 1.15 {c) {prompt delivery of trust property to client or third

At page 14 were "trust property" subject to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015)~0

At page 14
~0 The board did not specify which version of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 that ~t analyzed in its memorandum dated March 9, 2016. The rule was amended March 26, 2015. See

At page 19
check were "trust property" subject to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015). "Trust property" is defined as "property of clients or third

At page 20
whether as trustee, agent, escrow agent, guardian, executor, or otherwise. 11 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 {a) {1) . A retainer that is paid to an attorney for anticipated

At page 20 Prof. C. 1.15 {b) {3) . The rule does not require a flat fee to be deposited in a trust account . Mass. R. Prof. C.

At page 20
retainer of unearned client funds, and that the provisions of rule 1.15 did not apply to either the Mongelluzzi payment or the CAG check because neither were 11trust

At page 20
trust funds in a client trust account .11 Matter of Sharif, 459 Mass. 558, 564 {2011), citing Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. 14 As noted by the petitioner, the amended petition

At page 20
client until earned and indisputably subject to the requirements of rule 1.15. If the funds were a flat fee, they would have belonged to Duane Morris and the respondent

At page 20 property" under rule 1.15. In either case, the respondent intentionally misled Duane Morris as to the capped nature

At page 21 Assuming without deciding that rule 1.15 did not apply to these funds, the respondent knew that the Mongelluzzi

At page 21
or not the Mongelluzzi funds were a 11flat fee" or the respondent’s law firm was a "third party" under rule 1.15, the evidence supports the board’s finding that the

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 601 (2013)-In the Matter of Gerald S. Shulman

At page 2
interest, and failing to promptly deliver to his client funds that it was entitled to receive, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c).

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 210 (2015)-In the Matter of Jeffrey N. Formica

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct of retaining earned fees in his IOLTA account is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The respondent’s failure to diligently research the reasons for the uncleared transactions and hi s failure to resolve the unpaid items with

At page 2 violation of Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.3 and 1.15(e)(5). In aggravation, the respondent was expe rienced in the subject area of the law

At page 2
engage a consultant to conduct periodic accoun tings of transactions in respondent’s IOLTA account in accordance with rule 1.15.
The respondent was admitted to the bar of the Commonw ealth on December 17,

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 341 (2009)-In the Matter of Brian B. Ky

At page 2
The Hearing Committee found that by failing to obtain the knowledge necessary to redeem the U.S. savings bonds, failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in carrying out hisduties as executor, failing to deposit the checks on receipt, misplacing some of the checks forover two years, and failing to hold estate funds in an interest-bearing account, Kydd violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.15 (a), and 1.15 (e). By intentionally misrepresentingthat he had sent the necessary information to the U.S. Treasury Department, he violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) and (h). By failing to file timely accountings with the probate court asrequired by G. L. c. 206, § 1, Kydd violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 3.4 (c) , and 8.4 (d).Finally, by failing to cooperate with bar counsel’s investigation, Kydd violated Mass. R. Prof. C.8.1 (b), (d), (g), (h), and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3. The board adopted these conclusions of law. The hearing committee recommended that Kydd be suspended for three months or until he

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Abby R Williams

At page 10
In Count Three, bar counsel charged the respondent with violations of the trust accounting rules in Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent admitted the allegations in her Answer to the Petition for Discipline.

At page 12
– that the respondent intentionally misused client funds and misrepresented to her clients the facts concerning the costs incurred on their cases. In doing so, the respondent violated: ( i) Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (as in effect before and after July 1, 2015) (segregation and safekeeping of trust property); (ii) 1.15(c) (failure to pay client funds held in trust when due); (iii) 1.15(d)(1) (failure to render full accounting on final distribution of funds); (iv) 1.15(d)(2) (failure to render accounting on withdrawal from trust to pay on legal fees); (v) 1.15(f)(1)(C) (negative balance in

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 635 (2007)-In the Matter of Nancy J. Sardeson

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to maintain all guardianship funds in individual guardianship accounts earning interest for the estates is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (e) of

At page 2 turned eighteen in 2002, and the respondent’s failure after being removed in March 2004 toremit guardianship funds to the successor guardian for the other ward until November 2004,is, for conduct prior to July 1, 2004, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) of the rule ineffect through June 30, 2004 and, for conduct on and after July 1, 2004, in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) of the current rule. The respondent’s failure to prepare and file interim accounts as guardian before 2004, and

At page 2 er failure in and after 2004 to file either conforming interim accounts or final accounts, allas ordered by the probate court and resulting in a finding by the court of contempt that todate has not been purged, is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 3.4(c) and 8.4(d)and (h). In addition, for conduct prior to July 1, 2004, the respondent is in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) of the rule in effect through June 30, 2004, and for conduct on and afterJuly 1, 2004, the respondent is in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d) of the current rule. On October 15, 2001, the respondent as guardian received a distribution of $40,000 from the

At page 2
The respondent’s misappropriation of guardianship funds is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) of the rule in effect through June30, 2004. The respondent’s failure to account for $40,000 in guardianship funds is, for conductprior to July 1, 2004, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) of the rule in effectthrough June 30, 2004 and, for conduct on and after July 1, 2004, in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15 (b) and (d) of the current rule. After the matter was referred to bar counsel by the probate court, the respondent failed to

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 360 (2004)-In the Matter of Stephen Charles Maloney

At page 3
By commingling and intentionally misappropriating the escrow funds that he was holding for the benefit of his client, with intent to deprive her of the funds at least temporarily and withactual deprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) – (d); and 8.4(c)and (h). On June 29, 2004, the respondent submitted his affidavit of resignation from the practice of

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 46 (2014)-In the Matter of Daniel P. Byrnes

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to open a separate inte rest bearing account in the estate’s name and his failure to deposit estate funds into a separate account, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), and (d). His failure timely to pay the beneficiar ies the funds they were due and timely to pay the

At page 1 state’s taxes violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15 (c), and (d). The respondent’s intentional conversion of the funds violated 8.4(c).

430 Mass. 232, 717 NE 2d 246 (1999)-In the Matter of Watt

At page 3
of Watt, 701 A.2d 319 (R.I. 1997) . [3] This conduct was found to violate art. V , Rules 1.15(a) and 1.16(c) of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct.

At page 3 4] This conduct was found to violate art. V , Rule 1.3 and 1.15(b). [5] This conduct was found to violate art. V , Rule 8.4(c).

15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 560 (1999)-In the Matter of Harland L. Smith, Jr

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to timely return his client’s file upon request was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e). The respondent’s failure to promptly account to his client uponrequest was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a). In connection with the two complaints investigated by Bar Counsel, the respondent failed to

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 2 (2005)-In the Matter of Melvin F. Albert

At page 2
deliver to the client the funds to which she was entitled, and his failure to promptly render an accounting of these funds upon request constitute a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and(b) of the rule in effect prior to July 1, 2004 (now Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), and (d)). Therespondent’s intentional conversion of the client’s funds to his own use with the intent todeprive the client of these funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resultingconstitutes a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) of therule in effect prior to July 1, 2004 (now Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)). The respondent’sintentional misrepresentations to bar counsel in his correspondence and in person and therespondent’s submission of fabricated evidence in the form of an altered check register pageto bar counsel constitute violations of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(b), 8.1(a), and 8.4(c) and (h). In the second matter, on November 12, 2003, the respondent deposited a check dated

At page 2
The respondent’s use of trust funds for his own personal use or the use of other clients unrelated to the trust between November 12, 2003, and February 6, 2004, and his failure totimely deliver those funds to the life insurance company on behalf of the trust constitute aviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) of the rule in effect prior to July 1, 2004 (nowMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c)). In the third count, a client paid the respondent $2000 in February 2004 to seek a guardianship

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 478 (2009), 453 Mass. 1001 (2009)-In the Matter of Osamwonyi E. Osagiede

At page 1
Background. Bar counsel filed with the Board of Bar Overseers (board) a petition for discipline alleging that Osagiede had intentionally misused a client’s funds, intentionally deprived theclient of the funds, and misrepresented the status of settlement to the client; negligentlymisused other clients’ funds and deprived the clients of the funds; commingled personal,business, and client funds; failed to pursue his clients’ goals and to keep them informed;failed to keep required records for several accounts holding trust funds; and failed to renderaccountings. A hearing committee found in substance that bar counsel had proved thepetition’s allegations, and that Osagiede violated a number of the Massachusetts Rules ofProfessional Conduct, including Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998); Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.4, 426 Mass. 1314 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (c), as amended, 432 Mass. 1301 (2000);Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998); and Mass. R. Prof. C.8.4 (c) and (h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998). The committee recommended that Osagiede beindefinitely suspended and that his reinstatement be conditioned on his attending, in the yearpreceding his petition for reinstatement, a continuing legal education course, of bar counsel’schoosing, in trust accounting. The board agreed. The board filed an information that washeard by a single justice, who issued an order of indefinite suspension. The petition for discipline filed by bar counsel contained five counts. Three of those counts

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 252 (2010), 457 Mass. 844 (2010)-In the Matter of Stephen Hrones

At page 7
The sanction for similar cumulative misconduct in previous cases has varied, depending on the severity of the misconduct. In Matter of Jackman, 444 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2004), this courtstated that "with respect to the misconduct involving fee splitting, inadequate supervision ofnonlawyers, and assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, a term suspension iswarranted." See Matter of Luongo, 416 Mass. 308, 311 (1993) ("standing alone, the attorney’sknowing participation in the practice of law with [a nonlawyer] warrants at least a suspensionfrom the practice of law, where the attorney obtained financial gain from the association andclients were defrauded"). Jackman was suspended for two years for his improper associationwith nonlawyers and negligent misuse of client funds, each of which caused harm to clientsand warranted a term suspension. Matter of Jackman, supra at 1014-1015. As noted by boththe respondent and bar counsel, the misuse of client funds as a result of Jackman’s inaction isa significant difference between Jackman and the respondent’s case. See Matter of Wysocki,16 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 437 (2000) (two-year suspension for assisting disbarred lawyer’spractice [without fee split or financial benefit], taking cases from disbarred lawyer withoutconsent, neglect, commingling, and record-keeping violations); Matter of DiCicco, 6 Mass.Att’y Discipline Rep. 83, 89 (1989) (two-year suspension for assisting in unauthorized practiceof law by paralegal, including representing that paralegal was "of counsel," neglect of cases,and other misconduct). Conversely, the respondent’s infractions were less egregious,particularly in light of his belief, albeit misguided, that all of Porter’s actions were sanctionedby the MCAD. Accordingly, we conclude that a suspension of less than two years isappropriate, as the cases imposing a two-year suspension involve conduct more severe thanthe respondent’s actions in this case. The respondent relies on cases where the sanction for similar misconduct was less than one

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 218 (2002)-In the Matter of Stephen R. Follansbee

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to provide a full and prompt accounting of client funds at the request of the client and of Bar Counsel from April 2001 to January 2002 was in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The parties stipulated that the appropriate sanction was a public reprimand conditioned on

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 575 (2006)-In the Matter of William F. Mullen

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in writing checks drawn on his client account to a fictitious payee with the intent to further conceal the fact that the buyers brought no cash to the closing, andcausing these funds to be transferred to a personal or business account and then redepositedto the client account, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a) as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04. Count TwoIn or about November 6, 2000, the respondent acted as settlement agent and conducted a

At page 3
The respondent’s negligent misuse of $2500 of the borrower’s proceeds from the November 2002 closing, with actual deprivation resulting, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b) as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04, and Mass.R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). The respondent’s preparing and causing to be executed a HUD-1 settlement statement for the

At page 5
The respondent’s commingling and inadequate and improper record keeping was conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3, and of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b) and (d) asappearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04, and of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c) and (f) of the rule in effect as of 7/1/04. The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 421 (2019)-In the Matter of Charles M Maguire

At page 1
counsel opened a complaint file , the respondent brought his IOLTA account records into compliance with Ma ss. R. Prof. C. 1.15.
The respondent’s failure to pe rform a three-way reconciliation of the account violated

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). The respondent’s failure to m aintain a chronological check register with client identifiers for every transaction and a ru nning balance violated Mass. R. Prof.

At page 1 . 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s f ailure to keep a l edger for bank fees and charges with a list of

At page 1 ance violated Mass. R. Prof. C . 1.15(f)(1 )(D). On March 20, 2019, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline , and the parties filed the

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 620 (2009)-In the Matter of Robert E. Weiner

At page 1
By failing to keep complete records of his receipt, maintenance, and disposition of deposited funds that he undertook to hold for the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a) (for conduct prior to July 1, 2004). By failing, once he understood that the client disputed his right to the $15,500 fee, to return

At page 1 he funds to a trust account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and (d)(2) (forconduct prior to July 1, 2004) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii) (for conduct on and afterJuly 1, 2004). By failing, upon the termination of the representation, to refund the unearned portion of the

At page 2 is now maintaining his trust accounts in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on an agreed recommendation for

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Clifford Ginn

At page 1
funds, provided him with an accounting and engaged with him in negotiations concerning his fee, he did not remit the amount he owed to the client until May 2020. His violations of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct included 1.15(a), (b) and (d) and 8.4(a)(c) and (d).

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 12 (2003), 439 Mass. 134 (2003)-In the Matter of F. Lee Bailey

At page 10
had gone bankrupt when their products either did not work, or could not win FDA approval,"and his brief acknowledges that the "volatility of small biopharmaceutical companies isnotorious." Bailey could not claim to own (and spend) the value of any "appreciation" thatmight well evaporate by the time of his final accounting. [16] Rule 4-1.15 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar expressly provides that "[a] lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer’s own property, funds and property of clients orthird persons that are in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation." Similarly,Rule 5-1.1(b) provides: "Money or other property entrusted to an attorney for a specificpurpose, including advances for fees, costs, and expenses, is held in trust and must be appliedonly to that purpose."

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 60 (2016)-In the Matter of Marcia Rose Calcagni

At page 2
During 2013 and 2014, the respondent faile d to maintain and/or preserve a chronological check register, as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15( f)(B). She also failed to maintain an accurate client le dger, as required by Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(f)(C); and failed to

At page 2 reate and maintain three-way reconciliation reports of trust funds that she was holding, as is required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(E).

At page 2 she had not earned those funds, the respondent failed to hold trust funds in a trust account, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1); and intentionally misused trust funds, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).

At page 2
a statement of the client’s balance after the withdrawal, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d) (2).
By failing to promptly render to her client a full written accounting of his retainer funds

At page 2 pon his request, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1).
By failing to refund the unearned portion of the retainer at th e termination of the

At page 2
check register, individual client records, a bank fee ledger and reconciliation reports, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B),(C), (D) and (E).
The parties stipulated to the facts and ru le violations set forth above and agreed to a

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 180 (2012)-In the Matter of Raymond T. Delaney

At page 1
the respondent’s failure to file any accountings with the proba te court and to provide an accounting upon request of the beneficiary viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 1.15(d), 3.4(c), 8.4(d) and (h). Bar couns el also alleged that the res pondent failed to cooperate with

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 507 (2018)-In the Matter of Anthony J. Scola

At page 1
error because, both bef ore and after the w ithdrawal, he did not reconcile the IOLTA account as required by Mass. R. Prof. C . 1.15(f)(1)(E). The respondent then forgot that he had withdrawn the funds. His chec k was dishonored when he attempte d to withdraw the funds a

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in f ailing to perform a three-way rec onciliation of the account violated Mass. R. P rof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of John Thomas Gosselin

At page 3
account on or before the date of withdrawing the respondent’s fees, the respondent violated Rule 1.15(d)(2). The respondent was admit ted to practice in 1994 and had no prior disciplinary history. In

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 185 (2011)-In the Matter of Paul C. Dick

At page 1
,.-The respondent’s conduct in failing to perform a three-way reconciliation of the account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). His conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with a client identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction

At page 1 nd running balance violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individual client ledgers· with a list of every transaction and running

At page 1
and expenses violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C), and (D). The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds in the-IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b ). On February 3, 2011, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline, and the parties

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 621 (2008)-In the Matter of Dennis M. Ryan

At page 3
The hearing committee concluded that the respondent: violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (d)(2), as in effect before July 1, 2004, by failing to remove earned fees from his IOLTA account and thus commingling personal and clientfunds;

At page 3 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) by failing to pay the client her share of the settlementwithin a reasonable time after receipt of the funds; violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(c) by failing to provide the client with an accounting of hersettlement funds upon conclusion of the contingent fee matter;

At page 3 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), and (d) by negligently misusing the client’s funds;and violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) and (h) by misrepresenting to bar counsel inMay and August 2003 that he was holding $25,000 in settlement funds on behalf of theclient when he was not.

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 373 (2003)-In the Matter of Bruce G. Rosen

At page 1
By personally signing or causing someone else to sign the client’s name and former counsel’s name to a settlement check without authorization and then presenting the check to the bankfor payment, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) and (e). By intentionallyconverting trust funds with intent to deprive the client and her former attorney of the use ofthe funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c), (h). In the second matter, the respondent settled a personal injury claim for a client for $5,000 in

At page 2 Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c), (h). In or around March 2001, Bar Counsel opened a file as a result of receipt of a notice of a

At page 2
By failing to maintain client funds in his IOLTA account, and failing to maintain adequate financial records regarding those funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) and(d). On June 30, 2003, the respondent submitted his affidavit of resignation from the practice of

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 8 (2015)-In the Matter of Ross A. Annenberg

At page 1
he has not repaid the clients a nd that his intentional misuse of client funds with continuing deprivation is in violatio n of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4( c) and (h). The respondent stated he understood that a judgment of disbarment woul d likely result if the ma tters were litigated.

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 222 (2003)-In the Matter of David A. Kiernan

At page 2
By failing to deposit the client’s funds in a properly identified and maintained individual trust account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e). Byfailing to maintain complete and accurate records of his receipt, maintenance, and dispositionof client funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. Rule 1.15(a). By failing to promptlydeliver the funds which the client was entitled to receive and by failing to render a fullaccounting for funds held on behalf of the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.Rule 1.15(b). By making intentional misrepresentations to the client about the disposition ofhis funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c)and (h). By converting the client’s funds to his own use and to pay unrelated expenses, therespondent violated Mass. R. Prof. Rules C. 1.15(a) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). On December 9, 2002, the Board of Bar Overseers voted to accept the parties’ stipulation and

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 440 (2014)-In the Matter of Michael D. Weisman

At page 7
The hearing committee found that the respondent’s conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (segregate and safeguard trust funds); 8.4(c) (disponesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); 8.4(h) (conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law); 1.4

At page 11
conduct, with harm, manifest here. 3 We are faced here not only with intentional Rule 1.15 misconduct, 4 but also with a Rule 1.8(a) violation that, by undermining the trust and confidence between lawyer and

At page 11
4 We agree with the hearing committee that bar counsel’s decision not to plead intentional misuse of the retainer is not dispositive, because intent to misuse is not an element of a Rule 1.15 violation but, rather, a consideration on disposition. Matter of Murray, 455 Mass. 872, 887, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 406, 424

At page 13
Standards 9.22(c) and (d)). In choosing a sanction, we are mindful of the intentional Rule 1.15 violation, the dishonest Rule 1. 8 violation, and the additional diverse breaches of the rules found by the hearing committee. Bearing in mind that the purpose of the

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 610 (2008)-In the Matter of John D. Roberts, Jr

At page 1
The respondent’s commingling and intentional misappropriation of client funds, with intent to deprive the client of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, isconduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). In October 2007, bar counsel received an overdraft report from the bank at which the

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 451 (2004)-In the Matter of Kenneth J. Perlow

At page 1
Between March 21, 2000, and September 18, 2002, the respondent failed to appropriately safeguard client funds in his IOLTA account. The respondent failed to maintain adequate orcomplete records of the receipt, maintenance and disposition of client funds, failed toreconcile the account, made disbursements from the account before supporting deposits werecredited, commingled personal or business funds with trust funds by allowing earned fees toaccumulate in the account and withdrew fees in round amounts without reference toparticular client matters. The respondent’s commingling of personal and business funds withtrust funds and his inadequate and improper record keeping was in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(a). In July 2001 the respondent received settlement proceeds but failed to notify his client.

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to promptly notify his client of receipt of client funds and his failure to promptly deliver to his client the client’s funds was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and1.15(b). The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds, without intent to deprive but withactual temporary deprivation resulting, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b). In an unrelated matter, in October of 1998, two sisters retained the respondent to pursue a

At page 2
The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds, without intent to deprive, and without any deprivation resulting, as described above, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b). The respondent also failed to cooperate with the investigation of the above matters, requiring

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 163 (2011)-In the Matter of Jennifer L. Dexter

At page 1
C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s failure to account adequately for all those funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1) and 8.4(d). Her fail ure to keep required trust account records of all the funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1).

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 250 (2008)-In the Matter of Tracy Dorene Dudevoir

At page 2
By failing promptly to notify the client of her receipt of the proceeds checks, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) as in effect throughJune 30, 2004. By failing promptly to deposit the proceeds checks to a trust account, therespondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d) and (e) as in effect through June 30, 2004. Byfailing promptly to deliver the proceeds due the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(b) as in effect through June 30, 2004. By failing to give the client an itemized bill or other written accounting of the services

At page 2 endered, written notice of the date and amount of the withdrawal, and a written statementof the balance held after the withdrawal of the $5,000 fee payment and failing to render afull accounting upon distribution of the remaining proceeds, the respondent violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1) and (2) as in effect since July 1, 2004. By failing to return the disputed feepayment to a trust account pending resolution of the dispute, the respondent violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii) as in effect since July 1, 2004. In aggravation, the respondent had a vulnerable client who was prejudiced by the substantial

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 439 (2017)-In the Matter of Joseph Stecewycz

At page 1
adequately communicate with c lient), 1.1 (duty of com petence), 1.3 (duty of diligence) , 1.15(b) (segregation of trust property) and (e) (maintaining proper records of trust p roperty), and 8.1(b) (duty to cooperate with lawful demands for informati on from disciplinary

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 533 (2008)-In the Matter of Steven L. Ostrovitz

At page 2
unintentionally misusing those funds for unrelated purposes, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). By failing to perform the services for which he was paid, by failing to pay over monies due to

At page 2
his medical bills or to advise the client that he had not paid the medical bills and had used$4093.73 of the client’s funds for other purposes, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.4(a) and 1.4(b). By depositing personal funds in his IOLTA, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b).On April 26, 2007, the respondent was administratively suspended for failure to register and pay registration fees. On the same date, the S.J.C. issued an order and sent notice of theorder to the respondent. The order required the respondent to take various steps to suspendhis practice, including closing any IOLTA account, and to file an affidavit of compliance withthe Court on or before May 17, 2007.

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 842 (2011)-In the Matter of Karl F. Stammen, Jr

At page 1
Beginning at least in July of 2004 through January of 2008, the re spondent failed to maintain his IOLTA records in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f), specifically: By failing to maintain chronological check registers for each of the IOLTA accounts,

At page 1 after every transaction, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). By failing to keep individual client ledge rs for each IOLTA account with a list of

At page 1 1.15(f)(1)(C). By failing to perform a three-way reconcilia tion for each of the IOLTA accounts, the

At page 1 espondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).
By April of 2008, the respondent stopped usi ng the Bank of Americ a IOLTA account.

At page 1
Office of Bar Counsel that required the respondent to maintain hi s Sovereign Bank IOLTA account in compliance with Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.15 and to submit a certification of compliance and compliant IOLTA r ecords to bar counsel two week s prior to the expiration of

At page 1
thereby violating S.J.C. Rule 4:01 sec. 3(1)(d) and 8.4(h). The respondent also failed to perform a three-way reconciliation for the So vereign Bank IOLTA account throughout 2009, thereby violating Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). In mitigation, the respondent has brought his IOLTA records in to compliance with

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. In aggravation, the re spondent received a prio r admonition for failing to pay a stenographer’s bill afte r becoming aware that a capias had been issued for him.

At page 1
reports to document that his tr ust account records continued to conform to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent also agreed to attend bar counsel’s trust account training program and an MCLE ethics program.

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 691 (2013)-In the Matter of Warren E. Woo

At page 1
c) With respect to a trust account es tablished for an indi vidual client, the respondent did not keep a ledger reflecting bank fees or charges or an accurate check register that included bank char ges, all as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B) and (D), resulting in a nominal but unnoticed charge for printing checks that caused the dishonor of a $48,000 check refunding escrow funds in a transactional matter; and

444 Mass. 1002 (2005)-IN THE MATTER OF JOHNSON

At page 1
either an IOL TA or designated trust account. He thereby commingled funds in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (d), and (e), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998). The respondent then used a portion of his clients’ funds to pay his own personal and business expenses, "with the intent to deprive [his client] of the funds at least

At page 1 emporarily and with actual deprivation resulting," in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998), Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (g), as amended, 427

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 785 (2011)-In the Matter of Anthony J. Scola

At page 1
With respect to Count One, the hearing committee found that, by depositing personal funds to his IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2), as in effect on and after July 1, 2004; by depositing personal funds into his IOLTA account between January 7,

At page 1 002 and July 1, 2004, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (d), as in effect

At page 2
to PayPal for his own personal use and his condu ct in using client funds to purchase items through PayPal violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15( b) and 8.4(h). The respondent’s conduct in making withdrawals of fees or reimbursement of expenses from the account by payments to

At page 2
1.15(e)(4). By authorizing transa ctions from his IOLTA account that caused a negative balance in an individual client ledger, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C).

At page 2
list of every transaction and running balance, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B); by failing to keep individual client ledgers with a list of every transaction and running balance, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C); by failing to keep a

At page 2 balance, the respondent violated Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D); and by failing to perform a three-way reconciliation of the acco unt at least every sixty days, the respondent violated Mass.

At page 2 . Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).
The hearing committee found, in aggravation, that the respondent’s testimony in the

At page 2 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. However, the committee also noted that the respondent agreed at the hearing to have an audit by LOMAP to assist hi m in setting up proper bookkeeping procedures.

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 714 (2008)-In the Matter of Sergio P. Vespa

At page 2
period that he represented the client, the respondent also deposited personal funds in his IOLTA account, thereby violating Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). In 2006 and 2007, the client attempted to contact the respondent approximately fifteen to

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in depositing and maintaining personal funds in the IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). The respondent’s failure promptly to notify the client and DOR that funds had been received

At page 2 or their benefit and his failure promptly to distribute the funds due to them violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(c). The respondent’s conduct in signing the client’s name to the checks without notice to the

At page 3
The respondent’s failure to account to the client for the settlement funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(c), last paragraph, and 1.15(d)(1). The respondent’s failure to keep complete and accurate records of his maintenance and

At page 3 istribution of the settlement funds, his false entry in his records concerning the identity offunds in his IOLTA account, and his conduct in providing the register with the false entry tobar counsel violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(F) and (f)(3), 8.1(a), and 8.4(c). The respondent’s false statements to bar counsel under oath violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(a)

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 249 (2011)-In the Matter of Peter S. Farber

At page 5
·. :>. ·;,. t~; 1.15 (a) (i), ·.as ar:Ypeartng .in 440 Mass;. 1:33’8 (20D3l (‘i’t:tust· ·•·· . .funds". defiried as_ any funds belonging t6. ¢lierit but he~1a by ·

At page 6
client1S funds in the trust account after the withdrawal." Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d) (2), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003). Where the client disputes the bill, the att.orney

At page 6
·-until the dispute is resolved. See Mass. R. Prof. c. 1.15 (b) {2) (ii). If the attorrtey has already withdrawn the amount billed and the client within a reasonable time after

At page 6

:t agree with the board 1 s conclusion that Farber violated ;MA~§. ~-Prof. C. 1.15(b), (d) (1), & (d) (2) by depositing the advanced fee in his. busines.s account before providing the client

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 299 (2015)-In the Matter of Sandra C. Howar

At page 2
comply with the probate court orders to re nder accounts violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 1.15(d)(1) and 8.4(d) and (h). In addition, the respondent failed to file income tax returns and recover a tax refund

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 99 (2020)-In the Matter of Jonathan D. Crowley

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to hold the rental income in a trust account, and his commingling of it with his personal and business funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1). By applying rental income pursuant to the arrangement with the client father that was not expressly agreed with the daughter after the father’s death, the respondent negligently misused the funds with resulting deprivation, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). By failing to make mortgage payments with the rental income provided for that purpose, thereby aggravating the loan default he was engaged to avoid, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a). By

At page 2
respondent failed to maintain a chronological check register with client identifiers for each transaction, to keep individual ledgers for each client matter, to keep an individual ledger for bank charges, and to perform three-way reconciliations at least every sixty days, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C), (D), and (E), respectively.
On September 14, 2020, the Board voted to accept the respondent’s stipulation for

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 458 (2016)-In the Matter of George Phili

At page 3
As the hearing committee concluded, the respond ent’s intentional misuse of the client’s funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (2) as then in effect , 8.4(c) and 8.4(h). His presentation of an intentionally false and inflated invoice and in tentional misrepresentations to

At page 3 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b) as then in effect and 1.15( d)(1). His conduct in charging and collecting clearly il legal and clearly excessive post- conviction fees violated Mass.

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 458 (2013)-In the Matter of Julie C. Molloy

At page 1
earned fees in her IOLTA acc ount to avoid an Internal Revenue Service levy against her personal accounts and operating a ccount. This conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2) and 8.4(c) and (h).

At page 1
withdrawals and internal debits from the IOLTA account that did not identify the recipient or source of the funds, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3) and (4); made payments from her IOLTA account from personal funds and earned fees directly to creditors or vendors for

At page 1 er personal expenses, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4); and did not maintain a ledger for each client matter th at listed all transactions fo r the client and the balance

At page 1 emaining for the client after each transaction, in violation of Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C).
In addition, from at least March 2012 through at least December 2012, the respondent

At page 1
calculated incorrect balances. The respondent did not maintain and retain any reconciliation reports. This conduct was in viola tion of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 299 (2010)-In the Matter of John F. Lamon

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct of commingling personal or business funds in the account was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), and the respondent’s conduct in disbursing checks fromthe account that when paid created negative balances was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(C). In a second matter, on April 12, 2004, the respondent received a bank check from a client in

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misuse of funds, with deprivation resulting and continuing, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). In a third matter, on November 7, 2008, the respondent was settlement agent for a refinance

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to promptly pay off the mortgage as he was obligated to do was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). The respondent’s intentional misuse of funds with actualdeprivation resulting, at least temporarily, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c)and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). On September 21, 2009, the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County entered an order of

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 339 (2003)-In the Matter of Edward J. O’Connell

At page 2 By his conduct, as described above, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C., 1.2, 1.15, and 8.4 (c) and (h).

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 229 (2001)-In the Matter of Joseph P. Gargolinski

At page 2
On March 9, 2001, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline alleging that the respondent’s representing both the buyer and the seller in the sale of the condominium without theirinformed consent violated Canon Five, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A), (B), and (C); his failure tomaintain adequate records of his maintenance of the escrowed violated Canon Nine,Disciplinary Rule 9-102(B)(3); and his commingling and negligent use of the escrowed fundsviolated Canon Nine, Disciplinary Rules 9-102(A) and (B), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b),and (d). The petition also alleged that the respondent’s failure to close his client fundsaccount and file an affidavit of compliance violated Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 17,Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:03, and therefore Canon One, Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(5)and (6). The respondent did not file an answer to the petition for discipline, and the allegations in the

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 596 (2015)-In the Matter of Laurence M. Starr

At page 4
· Bar· co~ns .el · stated that this· conduct was .in violation .of. Mass.’ R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) · (trust property to be held’separately), (c) {prompt notice and delivery of funds), .· {e) (making cash

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 656 (2006)-In the Matter of John Alan Roberts

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in converting $160,000 of the client’s funds without authority for his own purposes, with deprivation resulting to the client and his estate, was in violation ofCanon One, Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) and (6), and Canon Nine, Disciplinary Rules 9-102(A)and (B), and, for conduct on and after January 1, 1998, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(c), 8.4(c)and 8.4(h). The respondent’s conduct in failing to file the client’s will with the probate court within thirty

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 204 (2013)-In the Matter of Henry Michael Downey

At page 1
(h). The respondent’s failure timely to give the heirs the funds due them heirs violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a) and 1.15(c ). The respondent’s failure to hol d the estate funds in a separate, interest-bearing trust account and failure to main tain all the funds in trust violated Mass. R.

At page 1 rof. C. 1.15(b) and (e)( 5). His failure to give the client the required bill or accounting upon each fee withdrawal violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2).

At page 2
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 3.4(c), and 8.4(d) . His failure to account accurately for the estate funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b), 1.15(d)(1), and 8.4( d). The respondent’s failure to render competent and diligent services violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3, and his

At page 2
excessive in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a) , as then in effect. His failure to restore the disputed fees to a trust account viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii). Case II. In 2009, a client engaged the respond ent to provide legal services in developing

At page 2
were clearly excessive. The respondent failed to give the client a writte n bill or accounting with the information required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d) (2) at or before each fee withdrawal. The respondent disbursed the remaining proceeds as directed by the client but failed to render a

At page 2
and (h). The respondent’ s failure promptly to remit all funds due the client violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a) and 1.15(c). The respondent’s failure to hold all the funds in a segregated, interest-bearing account and failure to maintain all the funds in trust violated Mass. R. Prof.

At page 2 . 1.15(b) and (e)(5). His failure to give the client the requir ed bill or accounting upon each fee withdrawal and failure to account for all the funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b)

At page 2 nd 1.15(d)(1) and (2). The respondent’s failure adequately to explain to the client the scope of the

At page 3
respondent’s failure to hold those funds in a sepa rate, interest-bearing tr ust account and failure to maintain the funds in trust viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) a nd (e)(5). His failure timely to remit the balance of funds due th e client and account adequately for the funds violated Mass. R.

At page 3 rof. C. 1.2(a) and 1.15(c).
The respondent’s failure to give the client a bill or accounting upon each fee withdrawal

At page 3 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2). His ch arging and collection of clearly excessive fees violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a), as then in effect.

At page 3
chronological check registers, individual ledgers, and reconciliation reports. The respondent’s failure to maintain those required records violat ed Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(E). In violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4), the respondent failed to make all his fee withdrawals

482 Mass. 1012, 121 NE 3d 1280 (2019)-Matter of Chapman

At page 3
The rights granted to victims of crime under G. L. c. 258B do not alter the fundamental rule that it is the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth alone, *1015 that prosecutes criminal cases and commitment petitions and defends discharge petitions. By enacting the victims’ bill of rights, the Legislature gave victims

At page 3
See also H.T. v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 101 1, 1012 (2013) ; Carroll, petitioner , 453 Mass. 1006, 1006 (2009).1015 Standing is not a mere legal technicality . The principles governing standing in criminal cases and, as here,

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 2 (2006)-In the Matter of John Francis Adams

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct constituted conversion of client’s funds in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c) and dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). 1 The complete Order of the Court is available by contacting the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 588 (2015)-In the Matter of Lawrence M. Slater

At page 3
agreement had been reached wit h, opposing counsel regarding disposition of the proceeds, or without first obtaining a court order, the respo ndent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c), and 8.4(c) and (h). By intentionally misappropriating at least $19,929 of the real estate

At page 3 scrow proceeds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c), and 8.4(c) and (h).

At page 3
sixty days. The respondent’s failure to reco ncile his IOLTA accounts and maintain required records for the accounts violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(E). In a second matter, a client retained the respondent in about July 2007 to represent her

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 459 (2001)-In the Matter of Chrisopher Pilavis

At page 3
Count Five. When the respondent’s IOLTA account went into overdraft, his bank notified the Office of Bar Counsel. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). The respondent failed to respond to inquiries by Bar Counsel, ignored the threat of a subpoena and, when a subpoena was issued, failed to produce all subpoenaeddocuments or to give a complete answer to Bar Counsel’s inquiries.

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 31 (2011)-In the Matter of Roseline Jeanne Bazelais

At page 1
From April 23, 2008 through at least Novemb er 10, 2010, the respondent failed to maintain the following account records required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f): a) a check register showing in chronologi cal order the date and amount of each

At page 2
Starting on or about July 7, 2010, bar counsel made requests for the respondent to bring her records into compliance with Rule 1.15. The respondent br ought her records into compliance on or about January 24, 2011, when she began to maintain her IOLTA account

At page 2 nd account records in full co mpliance with Rule 1.15. After bar counsel initiated her investigation, the respondent attended both trust accounting school and ethics school.

At page 2
the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1. 15(e)(4). By failing to maintain the required account documentation records, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(A). By failing to maintain a trust account check regist er that recorded all deposits and records of

At page 2
1.15(f)(1)(B). By failing to ma intain the required individual client records and subsidiary ledgers, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). By failing to prepare and retain reconciliation reports on a regular and periodic basis but no less frequently than every

At page 2 ixty day, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). By failing to retain account documentation and records of all deposits, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(F). By failing to pr omptly withdraw earned f ees from her IOLTA account, the

At page 2 espondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2 )(ii). By depositing client funds advanced for expenses into her operating account but disbursi ng these advances using earned fees she had

At page 2 1.15(b). The matter came before the board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and a

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 237 (2013)-In the Matter of William E. Fallon

At page 1
Overseers. The respondent’s conduct in paying his registration fee directly from his IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4). In addition, the respondent failed promptly to withdraw all his earned fees and expense reimbursements in violation of Mass. R. Prof.

At page 1 . 1.15(b)(2). Between July 2004 and 2012, the respondent failed to make and maintain all records

At page 1
all client matter balances. The respondent’s failure to reconcil e his IOLTA account and maintain required records for that account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15( f)(1)(B)-(E).
On several occasions between about 2005 and 2009, the respondent held back funds from

At page 1
IOLTA account until 2012. His failure promptly to remit the undisbursed funds to the medical providers violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c).

At page 2
The respondent stopped using his existing IO LTA account and opened a new account for which he established and maintained reco rds in compliance with Rule 1.15. The matter came before the Board of Bar Over seers on the parties’ stipulation of facts

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 544 (2001)-In the Matter of David P. Swan

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misuse of client funds for his own personal or business expenses with the intent to deprive the client of the funds, at least temporarily, and with actualdeprivation resulting is in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) and Mass. R. Prof. C.8.4(c) and (h). In mitigation, the respondent suffered severe affective or mood disorder during the time that

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 393 (2015)-In the Matter of Charles L. Lonardo

At page 6
various activities, assisting with their homework, and spending time helping them practice tennis for their school tennis team. (Ex. 1, BBO pg. 6; Tr. 83:20-23; 84:1-15) Though these are conventional activities, commonly occurring in many families, they were activities that the

At page 11
his commencement of the practice oflaw, he will report that his law office financial records are in full compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15; (2) consult with LOMAP (Lawyer Office Management Assistance Program) and confirm with the Office of Bar Counsel that he has done

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 244 (2018)-In the Matter of Howard M. Lewis

At page 3
refund unearned fees and/or turn ove r client files in a timely manner in the first, fourth, and fifth matters, the respondent violate d Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and 1.16(e). By threatening unfounded criminal charges in the f ifth client matter, the resp ondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 155 (2001)-In the Matter of Thomas J. Cotter

At page 1
directly to him and not to the law firm. The respondent never delivered these payments tothe firm and wrongfully deposited them to his own account despite being a salaried associateof the law firm. Approximately $12,500 was converted in this manner. The respondent’s conduct violated the Mass. R. of Prof. C. 1.15(a) and 8.4 (c) and (h).On January 4, 2001, the respondent resigned from the practice of law pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 15. On March 16, 2001, a single justice accepted the resignation and entered an orderof disbarment, retroactive to March 22, 2000, the date of the temporary suspension.

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 509 (2018)-In the Matter of Paul H. Senese

At page 1
By negligently misusing the clien t’s funds, the respondent viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3 and 1.15(b) (l) and (c) as then in effect. By failing to inf orm the company promptly of his receipt of all fu nds collected and failing time ly to remit all the funds due the

At page 1 ompany, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) as t hen in effect. By failing to account adequately for all the cl ient’s funds, the respondent v iolated Mass. R. Prof. C.

At page 1 all the funds violated Mass. R . Prof. C. 1.15(1)(B)-(E) as then in effect. The respondent engaged in additio nal misconduct with other clie nts in the course of

At page 1
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15( c) as then in effect. In viola tion of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1) as then in effect, the respondent failed to accou nt adequately to all clients for all their funds. The respondent on occasion claimed false or o therwise unwarranted cost

At page 1
violating Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2( a) and 8.4(a), (c) and (h) as t hen in effect. The respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (2) and (f)(1)(B )-(E) by depo siting earned fees and other personal or business funds to an IOLTA account, failing promptl y to withdraw all his earned

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2019)-In the Matter of Claude D Grayer

At page 8
By failing to comply with the client’s request to provide an accounting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015). By failing, upon termination of the representation, to return any unearned

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 302 (2001)-In the Matter of Shirley A. Hoak

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in commingling trust funds with personal funds and in converting funds belonging to clients or beneficiaries, with intent to deprive the clients or beneficiariesof the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, violated (for conductprior to January 1, 1998) Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6); Canon Nine DR 9-102(A),(B)(3),(4); and Canon Seven DR 7-101(A)(1), (2), and (3); and (for conduct afterJanuary 1, 1998) Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(b), (c), (d), and (h); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a); andMass. R. Prof. 1.2(a). On June 23, 2001, the respondent submitted her affidavit of resignation from the practice of

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 156 (2002)-In the Matter of Carmen R. Corsaro

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to maintain a segregated IOLTA account, commingling of client funds with his own funds, occasional negligent and temporary misuse of client funds without anydeprivation, and failure to maintain adequate records for all those funds violated Canon One,DR 1-102(A)(6) [conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law], Canon Nine, DR 9-102(A) and (B)(3), and, after December 31, 1997, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (d) [failure tosafeguard and segregate client or fiduciary funds; failure to keep adequate records of funds]. The respondent was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 1975. He has no history of

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 354 (2011)-In the Matter of Richard John Gabriel

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in negligently issuing checks from his IOLTA account prior to the deposit of funds to cover the checks violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3. The respondent’snegligent misuse of funds in his IOLTA account to temporarily pay debts of the estate violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.15(b) and 8.4(h). This matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on the parties’ stipulation of facts and

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 52 (2019)-In the Matter of Robert H. Car

At page 1
refund of his retainer. By his c onduct, the respondent violate d Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.15(b), 1.15(d), 1.16(d), 5.5(a) , 8.4(c), and 8.4(h ), as well as S.J.C. Rule 4:01, Section 10.

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Roy D Toulan Jr

At page 1
refund any portion of the $750 retainer. This conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15A(b), 1.16(c), and 1.16(d). Count Two of the petition charged the respondent with failing to cooperate with bar counsel’s investigation. He did not respond to any of bar counsel’s requests for

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 105 (2020)-In the Matter of Neil J. DePaul

At page 2
By failing to hold the client ’s retainer funds in his IOLTA or other client trust account until they were earned, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). By failing to return the unearned portion of such funds at the conclusion of the representation, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d). By intentionally misusing the client’ s retainer and depriving the client

At page 2 f its use, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 8.4(c) and 8.4(h).
Count Two

At page 3
the case between August 27 and September 24, 2019, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a)(3) and (4). By failing to hold the client’s retainer in an IOLTA or other trust account until earned, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). By failing to return such funds at the conclusion of the representation, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d). Finally, by intentionally misusing the unearned retainer and depriving the client of its use, the respondent

At page 3 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 1.16(d), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h).
Count Three

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 372 (2004)-In the Matter of William Francis Markley

At page 1
By failing to reasonably return the client’s wife’s telephone calls, and failing to provide information about the status of the adversary proceeding, the respondent failed to keep hisclient reasonably informed of the status of a matter, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1. 4(a).The respondent’s rudeness and verbal abuse of his client’s wife violated Mass. R. Prof. C.8.4(h). By failing to provide the client with an accounting of his retainer, the respondentviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b).

At page 2
The respondent’s misplacement of the client’s Form 1099 constituted an unintentional failure to preserve his client’s property, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, and his failure toadequately defend his client against the motion to dismiss, constituted a failure to seek thelawful objectives of his client, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a). The respondent’s failureto inform the client that the trustee had filed a motion to dismiss her bankruptcy, and thatthe trustee had not received the required documentation of the ERISA status of her 401(k),violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.4(a) and (b). Count IVOn August 18, 1999, the client retained the respondent to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 58 (2020)-In the Matter of Cynthia Lee Andersen

At page 1
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 (competence) , 1.2 (a) (pursue the lawful goals of the client), 1.3 (diligence) , 1.4 (a ) and (b) (communication with clients) , 1.15A (b) and (c) (storage and disposition of client files) , and 8.4 (h) (other conduct reflecting adversely on fitness to practice).

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 81 (2005)-In the Matter of Michael S. Callahan

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to diligently pursue the client’s claims or to communicate adequately with the client, and his failure to appear in court on March 18, 2004, caused harm to theclient, and constituted violations of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4(a). The respondent’sfailure to provide the client with a copy or notice of the specific provisions of the court’sFebruary 27, 2004 order requiring the client to get back up counsel constituted a violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3 and failure to obey the rules of a tribunal in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 3.4(c). The respondent’s failure to account for the client’s retainer and return the fileto the client promptly upon being discharged as counsel constituted a violation of Mass. R.Prof. 1.15(d) and 1.16(d). This matter came before the Board on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary violations and a

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 494 (2005)-In the Matter of Joseph T. Moriarty

At page 3
2 Specifically, the hearing committee found that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) (safekeeping of client or third person property), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (prompt delivery of property to client or third person which that person is entitled to receive), Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a) (acting within scope of representation), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 (acting withreasonable diligence), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a) (communication to keep client reasonablyinformed), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (b) (reasonable explanation of matter to client), Mass. R.Prof. C. 4.1 (a) (knowingly making false statement of material law or fact to third person),Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) (professional misconduct to engage in conduct involving dishonesty,fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (h) (professional misconduct toengage in any other conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law).

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 92 (2019)-In the Matter of Peter Lawrence Eleey

At page 1
The respondent admitted that a h earing committee, the Board an d the Court would conclude that he had violated M ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and Mas s. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).
On September 9, 2019, the Board of Bar Overseers voted to reco mmend that the affidavit

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 507 (2013)-In the Matter of Michael J. Pasterczyk

At page 15
J.VIass. R. Prof. C. l.lS(b) (segregation of trust property) and J.VIass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) (prompt notice and delivery of trust

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 467 (2018)-In the Matter of Anthony K. Ortiz

At page 1
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a s one of the listed payees, the amount of the funds it claimed to be owed, the respondent viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, and 1.15(c).
In a second matter, the respondent agreed to represent the defe ndant in two criminal cases

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 457 (2014)-In the Matter of Kevin P. Whitaker

At page 1
estate of her late husband. The respondent further admitted that a hearing committee, the Board and the Supreme Judicial Court would conclude that he violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), and (d), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8 .4( c) and (h).

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 435 (2001)-In the Matter of Stephen J. Milstein

At page 1
The respondent’s misappropriation of client funds for personal use and his failure to account for client funds violated Rules 8.4(c) and 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of ProfessionalConduct. On January 10, 2001, the respondent executed a consent to disbarment in which the

At page 1 espondent acknowledged that sufficient evidence existed to warrant findings that the factssummarized above could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and that thisevidence was sufficient to establish violations of Rules 8.4(c) and 1.15 of the Massachusetts

877 NE 2d 249, 450 Mass. 165 (2007)-IN THE MATTER OF JOHNSON

At page 2
respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 (a), 426 Mass. 1322 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9 (c) (1) and (2), 426 Mass. 1342 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) – (c), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16 (d), 426 Mass. 1369 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), (d), and (h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998); and S.J.C. Rule

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 242 (2018)-In the Matter of William Clarence Leonar

At page 1
respondent deposited advance fee payments to the same money mar ket account. Those advance fee payments were trust funds w ithin the meaning of Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(a)(1). By depositing the advance fee payments to his money market account rather tha n to a trust account, the

At page 1 espondent violated Mass. R. Pro f. C. 1.15(b)(1) as then in eff ect. The respondent also had an IOLTA account and used that account for client funds. From

At page 1
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) for his IOLTA account. His failure t o do so violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(E ) as then in effect. The respondent was admitted t o the Massachusetts bar in 2004. He had no history of

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 421 (2013)-In the Matter of Paul Alan Mano

At page 2
probation, during which [Manoff’s) trust accounts shall be reviewed for compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 not less than once every six months by an accountant" who is

At page 3
individual client ledgers, and bank statements as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) (1) (E), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004); and failed to maintain a chronological ~heck register

At page 4
termination of the representation as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). He has since completed a trust account{ng course designated by bar counsel and changed his banking and accounting

At page 5
3 The hearing committee concluded that Manoff did not intentionally violate Mass. R. Prof C. 1.15(c), which declares that a "lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client . . any

At page 5
an intent to postpone payment beyond what constitutes prompt payment" to establish a violation of rule 1.15(c), but noted that 11 [t]he issue here is not so much ‘promptness’. as

At page 6
Manoff’s conduct in depositing client settlement funds into the joint account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). His deposit of personal funds into and his issuance of personal

At page 6 1.15(e)(4). Additionally, Manoff failed to appear at payment review

At page 12
period of accounting probation, during which his trust accounts will be reviewed for compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 not less than once every six mon:ths.by an accountant reasonably

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 532 (2007)-In the Matter of Bernard D. Pemstein

At page 4

  1. That the petitioner’s financial record-keeping be monitored for twelve months by a CPA, who will submit to Bar Counsel the reconciliation reports required of the petitioner underMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.
  2. As a precondition to reinstatement, the petitioner shall enroll in two courses in substantive

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 344 (2004)-In the Matter of Christopher F. Long

At page 2 Prof. C. 1.15(b). In 2000, the respondent was suspended from the practice of law for three months for

969 NE 2d 155, 462 Mass. 430 (2012)-IN THE MATTER OF BOTT

At page 3
with the exception of employment as a paralegal subject to conditions and limitations set forth in S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (3), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009): *435 "[N]o lawyer who is disbarred or suspended, or who has resigned or been placed on

At page 6
pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 13, as amended, 453 Mass. 1307 (2009), and who seeks to engage in employment as a mediator , may , in accordance with the time frames of such requests set forth in S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (3), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), seek leave from the court to engage in such employment.

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 123 (2016)-In the Matter of Frank M. Dimaria

At page 1
respondent admitted that a hearing committee, the Board of Bar Overseers and the Supreme Judicial Court would conclude that he violated Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(b), (c), and (f) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c), (d), (g), and (h).

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021), 486 Mass. 1011 (2021).-In the Matter of Steven A. Ablitt

At page 4
Donovan how to perform the three- way reconciliation required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015) .5
Given that there were insufficien t funds in the IOLTA accounts

At page 4
emphasized to the respondent that the lawyers must comply with their professional obligations under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.
Despite the warning, the respondent took no steps to comply with

At page 7
were deposited into IOLTA account s, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (segre gation of trust funds) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f) (1) (trust account documentation).

At page 11
handling of client funds. In such cases, a term suspension has been imposed. See Matter of Jackman, 444 Mass. 1013 , 1014-1015 (2005) (two-year suspension, with prohibition on civil practice

At page 12
respondent’s failure to keep IOLTA records that complied with the requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and the dishonored checks drawn on IOLTA accounts also warrant public discipline.

At page 12
suspension has been imposed for similar misconduct. See Matter of Hass, 477 Mass. 1015, 1017 -1019 (2017) (two-month suspension for falsely representing that client settlement not already

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 315 (2007), 450 Mass. 165 (2007)-In the Matter of Barbara C. Johnson

At page 2
The board adopted the hearing officer’s conclusions that by engaging in the foregoing activities, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 (a), 426Mass. 1322 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9 (c) (1) and (2), 426 Mass. 1342(1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) – (c), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998); Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.16 (d), 426 Mass. 1369 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), (d), and (h), 426Mass. 1429 (1998); and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 10, as appearing in 425 Mass. 1313(1997). iii. Count three. In 1995, in connection with representing a plaintiff in a wrongfultermination action in the District Court, the respondent filed motions forleave to depose nonparty witnesses out of the presence of defendants’counsel. The judge denied the motions, found that they lacked a legal orfactual basis and were filed in bad faith, and ordered that the respondent orplaintiff pay the defendants’ legal fees incurred in opposing the motions.When the payments were not made, the judge imposed civil penalties on therespondent and found the respondent and the plaintiff in contempt, warningthem that failure to pay the fees would lead to dismissal of the plaintiff’saction. Following further nonpayment, judgment entered dismissing theplaintiff’s action and ordering costs to be paid to the defendants. Therespondent did not file a notice of appeal following the dismissal but filed amotion for retransfer of the case to the Superior Court. The motion wasstruck with instructions to the respondent that an appeal from the dismissalwas the proper avenue of relief. Following the entry of an amended finaljudgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action, the respondent again sought toretransfer the case to the Superior Court rather than appeal from thedismissal; the request for retransfer was again struck. The respondent filed anotice of appeal from the order striking the motion for retransfer. TheAppeals Court dismissed the appeal as frivolous.

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 188 (2020)-In the Matter of Hugh J Flynn

At page 1
time records but merely estimated, on a monthly basis, what he thought he was owed and then paid himself that amount from the client’s accounts. The respondent never sent invoices to the client before paying himself. He also failed to maintain complete records of the receipt, maintenance and disposition of fiduciary funds in his client fund accounts and failed to perform three-way reconciliations pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). He further admitted that bar counsel could prove that he violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a) (charging a clearly excessive

At page 1 expenses ), 1.15(d)(2) ( foreach withdrawal, failing to give the client a written itemized bill or accounting, showing the services rendered and the amount to be withdrawn, the amount and date

At page 1 f withdrawal, and the remaining balance) and 1.15(f) (failing to keep complete accounting records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of trust property).

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 455 (2004)-In the Matter of Lunsford Dole Phillips

At page 1
On April 15, 2004, the respondent was suspended by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court for one year and one day effective May 14, 2004, for violations of Rules 1.15(b), (c), (d), and (f) and 8.4(a)of the Hawai‘i Rules of Professional Conduct. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Phillips, 2004WL 1066812 (HI 2004). On May 3, 2004, bar counsel filed a petition for reciprocal discipline inthe Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County. The respondent waived hearing and assented toan order of reciprocal discipline. On June 9, 2004, the county court entered an ordersuspending the respondent for one year and one day effective upon entry of the order. 1 The complete Order of the Court is available by contacting the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 611 (2013)-In the Matter of James E. Small, Jr

At page 1
deliver the proceeds due the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b) and 1.15(c).
The checks became stale and non-negotiable. After four years, the insurance company

At page 1
clearly excessive fee. He also failed to provide the written notice to the client required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2).
The general contractor had retained th e $30,000. The client, through other counsel,

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 127 (2011)-In the Matter of Brian P. Cassidy

At page 1
to cover his obligations by the time payment was due. By July 2010, the respondent had brought his IOLTA account record keeping into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15.
The respondent’s conduct in failing to perf orm a three-way reconciliation of the account

At page 1 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). His conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with a client identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction and running balance violated

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individual client ledgers with a list of every tr ansaction and running balance violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

At page 1
trust account, and transactions that created a nega tive balance for individual clients in the IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8 .4 (h) and 1.15(b) and (f)(1)(C).
On November 7, 2011, bar counsel filed a petitio n for discipline, and the respondent filed

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 551 (2019)-In the Matter of Richard G Sheehan

At page 2
Beginning at least in 2017, the r espondent failed to maintain r ecords for his client trust account that were required by Ma ss. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1), the refore violating both that rule and also Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). B y agreeing to settle his clien t’s matter without her knowledge or

At page 2
accomplished, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a)( 2), (a)(3), and (a)(4). By intentionally misusi ng his client’s funds, t he respondent viola ted Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and 8.4(c). By signing his client’s na me on the release and the ch eck without her knowledge and

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 265 (2002)-In the Matter of Morris M. Goldings

At page 1
The crimes to which the respondent pled guilty are felonies and thus are “serious crimes” as defined by Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, §12(3). As to conduct prior to January 1, 1998,the conduct of the respondent was in violation of S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon One, DisciplinaryRule 1-102(A)(4),(6) and Canon Nine, Disciplinary Rule 9-102(A)-(C). As to conduct on andafter January 1, 1998, the conduct of the respondent was in violation of Supreme JudicialCourt Rule 3:07, Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(b),(c),(h) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d). On March 15, 2002, the respondent submitted his affidavit of resignation from the practice of

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 119 (2015)-In the Matter of Richard A. Dalton

At page 1
The respondent’s misuse of estate funds is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). His continued representation of the estate following his suspension in January 2013 constitutes unaut horized practice of law in violation of

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 275 (2012)-In the Matter of Peter L. Eleey

At page 1
November 2004 and August 2010, causing temporary de privation to the clients, and that he failed to maintain IOLTA account records in co mpliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent made restitution in full in all matters.

At page 1
From and after January 1, 2009, the respondent failed to keep records of funds for his IOLTA account as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Among other things , the respondent did not keep a chronological check register showing each deposit and disbursement with client

At page 2 The respondent’s conduct in converting trust funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s conduct in making distributions from his IOLTA account that

At page 2 reated negative balances on behalf of clients violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s conduct in failing to promptly distribute funds upon receipt to clients violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep a chronological check

At page 2
prepare reconciliation reports, and failing to keep deposit records with client identifiers violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C), (D), (E), (F)(ii) and (iii). The matter came before Court, Gants, J ., on a stipulation of facts and a joint

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 49 (2007)-In the Matter of Terrence E. Burke

At page 3
informed about status of matter and promptly comply with requests for information) and (b) (lawyer to explain matter to extent reasonably necessary to enable client to make informeddecisions about representation); 1.15(d)(1)-(2) (lawyer shall provide full accounting uponrequest, deliver itemized bill, provide written notice of withdrawal and statement showingbalance of client funds); and 8.4 (c) and (h). On May 31, 2007, the Board of Bar Overseers filed an Information with the Supreme Judicial

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 200 (2020)-In the Matter of Richard William Gannett

At page 3
of the check into the respondent’s IOLTA account or any of the subsequent disbursements to him from the proceeds of that check, and the funds have not been restored to his IOLTA account. B ar counsel subsequently filed a petition for discipline against the respondent , alleging that he held trust funds in his IOLTA account against which Lee Bank ‒ a third party ‒ had made claims, and that he withdrew the funds and used them before the dispute about the funds was resolved, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (2) (ii). 2 The respondent answered the

At page 3

2 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (2) (ii) provides: "Trust funds belonging in part to a client or third person and in part currently or potentially to the lawyer shall be deposited in a trust

At page 6
not keep the full amount of the check, he should not have been found to have violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (2) (ii) . He is mistaken. See Matter of Pemstein , 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 339,

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 109 (2009)-In the Matter of Linda G. Champion

At page 1
The respondent’s recording of the Brockton mortgage and her disbursement of funds related to the sale of the property prior to verifying that the loan had been funded violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), and 1.3. The respondent’s negligent misuse of funds in her conveyancingaccount to pay costs and expenses unrelated to the Brockton closing violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.3 and 1.15 (f)(C).

At page 2 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.15 (c) and 8.4(h). Her continuing to represent lenders at real estate closings when her representation would result in the violation of rules of

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 232 (2004)-In the Matter of Paul Joseph Healy

At page 1
By commingling trust funds with his own personal funds and by intentionally misappropriating assets belonging to the three trusts, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b),and 8.4(c) and (h). By failing to file annual accountings of the testamentary trust with theProbate and Family Court, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c), and 8.4 (d) and(h). By failing to provide an accounting of his maintenance of the two inter vivos trusts to thebeneficiary, to her attorney, and to the other trust beneficiaries, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The lawyer for the beneficiary sent a letter to the Office of Bar Counsel requesting an

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 31 (2007)-In the Matter of John M. Beatrice

At page 1
The occasion for Bar Counsel’s examination of the respondent’s records was a dishonored- check report. After receiving the report, Bar Counsel determined that the dishonored checkswere honored on re-presentment and that there was no evidence of any commingling ormisuse of clients’ funds. However, the respondent’s records had multiple deficiencies andfailed to conform to the requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f), specifically: The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain chronological check registers that showed

At page 1 he current balance in each IOLTA account after each deposit or withdrawal violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain check registers that specified for each

At page 1 eposit and withdrawal the identity of the client matter for which funds were deposited ordisbursed violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain a chronological ledger for each client or

At page 1 hird person for whom the law firm received trust funds documenting each receipt anddisbursement of the funds of the client or third person, the identity of the client matter forwhich funds were deposited or disbursed, and the balance held for the client or third personviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)C). The respondent’s failure to maintain client ledgers documenting that he had not disbursed

At page 1 unds from the trust account in amounts that would create a negative balance with respect toany individual client violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain reconciliation reports at least every sixty

At page 1 ays showing three-way reconciliation of the IOLTA accounts violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(E). Bar Counsel informed the respondent of the deficiencies in his record-keeping practices and

At page 2 the allegations in the Petition for Discipline were accurate and submitted additional trustaccount records to Bar Counsel. Bar Counsel verified that the newly-submitted recordsconformed to the requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct and agreed to theimposition of a Public Reprimand and a period of probation during which the respondentagreed to provide periodic reports to document that his trust account records continued toconform to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). On June 11, 2007, the Board voted to accept the parties’ stipulation and to impose a public

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 684 (2008)-In the Matter of Gail M. Thalheimer

At page 5
telephone number Thalheimer had written in Odufuwa’s file. 4 The committee found Thalheimer violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), (d), and (e) as then in effect, 1.2(a), 1.4, 8.1(a), and 8.4(c), (d) and (h).

At page 5 Respondent’s conduct specifically violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), (d), and (e), as then in effect, and 8.4(c), (d) and (h).

At page 5 Specifically, Thalheimer violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) an d 1.15(f)(1)(C)- (E) as in effect since July 1, 2004.

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 199 (2010)-In the Matter of Marc Daniel Foley

At page 3
By failing to maintain individual client records accurately documenting each receipt and disbursement of the lenders’ funds, failing to keep an accurate check register for the IOLTAaccount, and failing to reconcile accurately or make and maintain accurate reconciliationreports for the IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C) and(E). By failing adequately to supervise the paralegal, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.5.3(a) and (b). In aggravation, the respondent engaged in multiple violations of the disciplinary rules. There

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 74 (2009)-In the Matter of Daniel Boyce

At page 2
The hearing committee concluded that: the respondent’s intentional conversion of the clients funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) (misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty); hisissuance of the payoff check to GreenPoint when he knew there were insufficient funds in theIOLTA account to cover it violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f) (1) (C) (records required forindividual client trust funds; prohibition on negative balances) as well as rule 8.4 (c); therespondent’s withdrawal of funds from the IOLTA accounts payable to "cash" violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15 (e) (3) (prohibiting withdrawal from trust account by check payable to "cash");his intentionally false representations to bar counsel violated rule 8.4 (c) as well as Mass. R.Prof. C. 8.1 (a) (knowingly false statement of material fact in connection with disciplinarymatter); and his knowing failure without good cause to cooperate in the investigationconducted by bar counsel violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1 (b) (knowingly fail to respond tolawful demand for information from disciplinary authority), 8.4 (d) (conduct prejudicial toadministration of justice), 8.4 (g) (failure without good cause to cooperate with bar counsel),and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3 (1) (failure without good cause to respond to requests forinformation by bar counsel). Considering factors in mitigation and aggravation, the hearing committee declined to accept

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 347 (2015)-In the Matter of Richard Bartlett Johansen

At page 2
By intentionally misusing trust funds, th e respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). By failing to maintain the trust f unds in a separate interest- bearing account, the respondent violated Mass . R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5)(ii). By knowingly

At page 2
By intentionally misusing estate funds, th e respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). By failing to maintain the estate funds in a separate interest- bearing trust account, the respondent viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5)(ii).

At page 2
and a statement of the balance of client funds left in the account. This conduct was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1) and 1.15(d).

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 46 (2001)-In the Matter of Robert H. Avaunt

At page 3
In the Gildard case, Mr. Avaunt advised his firm of guardianship/conservator fees he paid himself on check # 121 for $62.50 dated January 18, 1996, on check # 127 for $50 datedFebruary 12, 1996, and on check # 135 for $125 on March 16, 1996. On April 16, 1996 at MaineTire, however, he negotiated check # 140 to himself for 100forguardianship/conservatorfees,whichhedidnotdisclosetothefirm.Hedisclosedtothefirmfeesof100 for guardianship/conservatorfees, which he did not disclose to the firm. He disclosed to the firm fees of 1215 on check #170 dated November 14, 1996. The six checks issued between November 24, 1994 and April 16, 1996 which Mr. Avaunt paid to

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 637 (2012)-In the Matter of Benjamin J. Murawski, Jr

At page 4
4:01, § 15, and in particular the requirements of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 1 15 (c) that bar counsel contends are lacking. Assistant bar· counsel asserts also that it will be bar

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 74 (2008)-In the Matter of Diane P. Caggiano

At page 3
The respondent’s substantial delay in filing a petition for bankruptcy on behalf of the client was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3 and 8.4(h); her failure to maintainreasonable communication with the client about the status of her case were in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and 8.4(h); her failure to pay the filing fee for the client’s petition,thereby causing the petition to be dismissed, and her failure to seek relief from the dismissal,were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3 and 8.4(h); and her failure to return tothe client the funds she had advanced for the filing fee were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(c), 1.16(d), and 8.4(h). In the third matter, a client retained the respondent in July of 2004 to represent her on

At page 4
The respondent’s failure to file the client’s claim with the MCAD and her failure to advise the client of the applicable statute of limitations were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a),1.3 and 8.4(h); her failure to maintain reasonable communications with the client about thestatus of her case to allow the client to make informed decisions regarding the representationwas in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a), 1.4(b) and 8.4(h); her failure to return the unusedportion of the client’s fee payments promptly upon request and her failure to provide theclient with a full written accounting of her fee payments were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(c), 1.15(d)(1), 1.16(d) and 8.4(h); and her failure to provide the client with her file uponrequest was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e) and 8.4(h). The respondent failed to cooperate with bar counsel’s investigations of the above client

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 265 (2014)-In the Matter of Rudolph F. Miller

At page 1
From at least January 1, 2011, through Oc tober 2013, the respondent failed to keep records for his IOLTA account in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent did not keep (1) a check regist er with a chronological list s howing for each transaction the

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to reconcile his IOLTA account a nd maintain required records for the account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(E ). The respondent’s failure to hold trust property separate from th e lawyer’s own property in the IOLTA account

At page 2 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). By depos iting earned fees to the IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15( b)(2). By making cash withdrawals from the

At page 2 OLTA account, the respondent violated Mass . R. Prof. C. 1.15(e )(3). By making withdrawals from the IOLTA acco unt for the purpose of paying f ees to the respondent that

At page 2 1.15(e)(4).
The respondent’s trust account violations did not result in any misuse of client funds.

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 221 (2017)-In the Matter of Michael R. Hugo

At page 1
Net of his own share, the responde nt intentionally misused at least $94,486 of estate funds, with continuing deprivati on resulting, in violation of M ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent failed to p romptly dispense estate fun ds when due in violation of Mass.

At page 1 . Prof. C. 1.15(c) and 8.4(c). Count Two The respondent was represented by Florida counsel in probating his father’s estate

At page 2
Despite having sufficient assets to satisfy the tax lien, the r espondent knowingly failed to satisfy the lien. The lien has never been satisfied and continues to accumulate interest. The respondent knowing failure to satisfy the federal tax lien with estate assets was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C . 1.15(c) and 8.4(c), (d) and (h).
Count Four

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 136 (2013)-In the Matter of Peter B. Cliffor

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in failing to pe rform a three-way reconciliation of the account at least every sixty days violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). His conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with a client identifier after every tr ansaction and a list

At page 1 f every transaction and running balance viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). His conduct in failing to keep individual client ledgers with a list of every transaction and

At page 1 bank fees and expenses violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C), and (D). The respondent’s conduct in failing to deliver to the client an itemized bill or other account

At page 2 Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2). His conduct in faili ng to promptly render a full written accounting regarding the retainer to the client upon the client’s request violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 520 (2011)-In the Matter of Gerald M. Kirby

At page 2
remit to successor counsel his client’s file upon discharge and upon her request, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e). Finally, the respondent’s failure to safeguard original documents in his client’s file, was in violati on of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(3).
In an unrelated matter, a woman died inte state in March of 2006, survived by six sons

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 584 (2011)-In the Matter of Lawrence F. McCarthy

At page 2
Count One : Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(c), 1.15(b)(1) and (2), 1.15(c) and (d), and 1.15(e)(5).

At page 2 ount Two : Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1) Count Three : Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d) and (e), 3.4(c), 8.1(b), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g).

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 426 (2015)-In the Matter of A. Justin McCarthy

At page 8
following ways:4 • Rules 1.15(b) (failure to segregate trust funds), 8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and (h) (other conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice

At page 8 • Rules 1.2 (a) (failure to seek client’s lawful objectives); 1.15( c) failure promptly to deliver funds due a third person); 1.1 (lack of competence); 1.3 (lack of diligence);

At page 8
disburse funds, and his charging an excessive fee; • Rules 1.15(d), (e) (5), and (f) (1) (B)-(F) by mishandling IOLTA funds; and 4 The committee found no violations under Count 2, pertaining to advance fee payments and fee withdrawals.

At page 11
11 Specifically, bar counsel asks that we add the conclusion that the respondent’s negligent use of estate funds to pay fees before they were earned violated rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.15(b), and 8.4(h). She asks that we fmd a violation of rule 1.15(d)(l) (failure to account for trust funds) because the respondent’s accountings were inaccurate. Finally, she

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 92 (2007)-In the Matter of Gregory John Curcio

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in failing to file the amended tax returns violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3. The respondent’s conduct in falsely representing to the clients that he had filed amendedtax returns on their behalf violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). The respondent’s failure tosafeguard the clients’ file, to deliver to the clients their file and to return the unearnedportion of his fee violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d). The respondent failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel’s investigation resulting in an

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 65 (2020)-In the Matter of Michael Bedar

At page 1
Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) that the respondent had violated New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.8, 1.15, 3.3, and 8.4(a). It imposed on the respondent a two-year suspension with the second year stayed.

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 567 (2015)-In the Matter of Pamela J. Schaefer

At page 1
either earned or refunded the retainers wh en the case ended. By November 1, 2013, the respondent had brought her IOLTA account records in to compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.

At page 1 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E), as in e ffect prior to July 1, 2015. Her conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with a client identifier after every transacti on and list of every

At page 1 ransaction and running balance violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), as in effect prior to July 1, 2015. The respondent’s con duct in failing to keep individual client ledgers with a list of

At page 1 very transaction and running balance violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C), as in effect prior to July 1, 2015. The respondent’s deposit of re tainer funds in her operating account violated

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2), as in effect prior to July 1, 2015.
On July 29, 2015, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline, along with the respondent’s

860 NE 2d 656, 448 Mass. 1007 (2007)-IN THE MATTER OF FRANCHITTO

At page 1
client’s (the mortgage lender’s) fraud, but nonetheless that he violated the good funds statute, G. L. c. 183, § 63B, and record-keeping provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998). The committee also concluded that Franchitto had engaged in conduct involving

484 Mass. 1050, 144 NE 3d 294 (2020)-MATTER OF LEO

At page 1
In 2017, the petitioner filed a petition for reinstatement in the county court, which was transmitted to the Board of Bar Overseers (board).[ 3 ] See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(4), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). A hearing panel of the *1051 board, as the fact finder , heard the testimony of four witnesses, including the

At page 3
their respective decisions. That is incorrect. The hearing panel served as the fact finder . Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), we are required to accept those findings if supported by substantial evidence. In this case, after review , the board adopted the hearing committee’s report and its recommendation. The single justice did the same.

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 392 (2017)-In the Matter of Barry Wayne Plunkett, Jr

At page 1
intentionally misused the payoff monies for his own personal use. The Board of Bar Overseers found that the respondent’s actions violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and additional provisions of the Massachusetts Rules of Prof essional Conduct. His misconduct is summarized below.

At page 2 purposes with actual deprivation resulting violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and 8.4(c) and (h).
The respondent’s false representations about his failure to mak e the timely payoff violated Mass.

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misuse of trust funds for his own personal or business purposes with actual deprivati on resulting violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and 8.4(c) and (h).

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misuse of trust funds for his own personal or business purposes with actual deprivation resulting violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s false representation to bar counsel about payi ng off the loan violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(a) and 8.4(c), (d) and (h).

At page 3
Needham refinancing matter. The respondent’s intentional misuse of trust funds for his own personal or business purposes with actual deprivation resulting violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s false representation to bar counsel about no longer misusing trust funds and having made all of the necessary payof fs violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(a) and 8.4(c), (d) and (h).

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 603 (2001)-In the Matter of Randall B. Warren

At page 2
of another attorney, and in intentionally using those funds for his own personal or business purposes without the knowledge or authorization of the clients, with the intent to deprive theclients of use of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, violatedSupreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07, Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5) and Canon Nine, DR 9-102(B)(3) and (4), and also Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) and 8.4(c) and (d). Therespondent’s conduct in placing client funds in bank accounts that were not client trustaccounts violated Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07, Canon Nine, DR 9-102(A) and Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(d). On May 30, 2001 the respondent submitted his resignation from the practice of law. On June

486 Mass. 1011 (2021)-IN THE MATTER OF ABLITT

At page 3 how to perform the three-way reconciliation required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015).[ 5 ] Given that there were insuf ficient funds in the IOL TA accounts to reconcile them, however , a

At page 3
counsel closed its investigation in May 2012, she emphasized to the respondent that the lawyers must comply with their professional obligations under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Despite the warning, the respondent took no steps to comply with that obligation.

At page 4
IOLTA accounts, and failing to ensure that only client trust funds were deposited into IOL TA accounts, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (segregation of trust funds) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1) (trust account documentation). By failing to keep clients reasonably informed about *1015 their cases, the

At page 4 clients).1015 b. Count two: fee factoring agreement. The petition’s second count alleged that the respondent made

At page 6
nonlawyer’s handling of client funds. In such cases, a term suspension has been imposed. See Matter of Jackman, 444 Mass. 1013, 1014-1015 (2005) (two-year suspension, with prohibition on civil practice on reinstatement where attorney failed to supervise nonlawyer , resulting in commingling and conversion of

At page 7
addition, the respondent’s failure to keep IOL TA records that complied with the requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and the dishonored checks drawn on IOL TA accounts also warrant public discipline. See Matter of Beatrice, 23 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 31 (2007).

At page 7
represented that pledged assets had not been previously encumbered. A term suspension has been imposed for similar misconduct. See Matter of Hass, 477 Mass. 1015, 1017-1019 (2017) (two-month suspension for falsely representing that client settlement not already encumbered); Matter of Goodman, 22

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 529 (2012)-In the Matter of George Forrest Leahy

At page 2
divorce. ‘l’ha.t judgment wa.s uph.eld hy an unpublished decision of the Appeals Cou:r.t.. Le<:!hY-v. IJ.eahy:, 72 Maas. App. Ct. 1115 (2008) (table of unpublished decisions) . The board determined, and the

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 132 (2009)-In the Matter of Joyce M. Collins

At page 2
By failing to make sure that her office had in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that her employee’s conduct was compatible with her professional obligations, the respondentviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3(a). By failing to make reasonable efforts to ensure that heremployee’s conduct was compatible with her own professional obligations, the respondentviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3(b). By failing to maintain complete and accurate records of hertrust accounts and to reconcile her accounts, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004, and 1.15(f), as in effect on and after July 1, 2004.By failing to safeguard client funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), as ineffect prior to July 1, 2004, and 1.15(b), as in effect on and after July 1, 2004. By failing to adequately supervise her employee, enabling her employee to misappropriate

At page 2 iduciary funds between 2003 and 2005, and by failing to have measures in place to ensurethat the fiduciary funds were kept intact, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3(a) and(b), 8.4(d) and (h), 1.15(a), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004, and 1.15(b), as in effect on andafter July 1, 2004. By signing blank checks and failing to ensure that the fiduciary accountswere properly billed for services rendered and expenses incurred, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 1.5(a), and 8.4(d). By failing to take adequate steps promptly todetermine the extent of the shortages in the fiduciary accounts, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, and 8.4(d). By failing to maintain fiduciary funds in client trust accounts and by failing promptly to turn

At page 2 he funds over to the persons entitled to receive them when due, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (c) and 8.4(d). By failing to ensure that the amounts chargedfor legal fees accurately reflected the fees to which she was entitled and by charging andcollecting fees to which she was not entitled, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1,1.5(a), and 8.4(d). By failing to hold estate funds in an interest-bearing bank account with theinterest payable to the estate, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(ii), as ineffect prior to July 1, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5)(ii), as in effect on and after July1, 2004. By knowingly failing to timely file guardianship and estate accounts on an annual basis, as

At page 2 equired by M.G.L. c. 206, § 1, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 3.4(c) and8.4(d). By failing to render her accounts as trustee on an annual basis, as required by thetrust, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, and 8.4(d) and (h). By failing torender an account upon the final distribution of the trust property, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1). The respondent was admitted to practice on June 10, 1987, and had no record of discipline.

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 418 (2011)-In the Matter of William R. Hammatt

At page 5
The committee found that the respondent’s conduct under count two violated . Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e), which requires attorneys to hold trust funds that are not nominal in amount, or that are to be held for more than a short period, in a separate

At page 5
respondent had failed to perform the three-way reconciliations required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(£)(1 )(E). Finally, the committee found that the respondent had failed to take reasonable measures to ensure that actions taken by his office staff complied with his

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 803 (2006)-In the Matter of Mark S. Williams

At page 2 designated trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c) and (d); and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s conduct in failing to file a petition for bankruptcy on behalf of his clientviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3. The respondent’s failure to keep his client reasonablyinformed about the status of his case and his misrepresentations about the status of hisbankruptcy case violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c).

474 Mass. 1001, 46 NE 3d 1024 (2016)-IN THE MATTER OF WEISS

At page 1
court in 2013, and he was given leave to reapply for reinstatement on or after January 1, 2014. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (8), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). He filed a second petition for reinstatement on June 25, 2013. The single justice denied the petition without prejudice to filing a new petition on or after

At page 2
not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar , the administration of justice, or to the public interest." S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). See Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 456, 460 (1975) . See also Matter of Fletcher , 466 Mass. 1018, 1020 (2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 80

At page 3
deference. The subsidiary findings of the hearing committee, as adopted by the board, "shall be upheld if supported by substantial evidence," see S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), and the hearing committee’s ultimate "findings and recommendations, as adopted by the board, are entitled to deference, although they are not binding on this court." Matter of Ellis, 457

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 550 (2005)-In the Matter of Edson H. Rafferty

At page 2
By failing in 1995 to place the balance of the minor client’s settlement funds into an interest- bearing escrow account, and by distributing funds to the mother and her creditors in August1996, the respondent violated a court order, in violation of Canon Seven, DR 7-106 (A), andCanon One, DR 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6), as set forth below. The respondent also violatedCanon Seven, DR 7-101 (A) (1), (2), and (3), as set forth below. By distributing to the motherand her creditors, at the direction of the mother, settlement funds belonging to the minorclient, the respondent violated Canon Five, DR 5-107(B). By failing to maintain the funds in aseparate interest-bearing account, the respondent also violated Canon Nine, DR 9-102(C) (forconduct before January 1, 1998), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (e)(5) (for conduct on and afterJanuary 1, 1998). By failing to maintain adequate records of the handling, maintenance anddisposition of the minor client’s settlement funds, and failing to render appropriateaccountings of those funds to the mother of the minor client, the respondent violated Canon9, DR 9-102(B)(3) (for conduct before January 1, 1998), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) (forconduct on and after January 1, 1998), and Canon Six, DR 6-101(A)(3) (for conduct beforeJanuary 1, 1998), and Mass R. Prof. C. 1.3 (for conduct on or after January 1, 1998). Byeffectively losing track of the settlement funds for several years, the respondent violatedCanon Six, DR 6-101(A)(3) (for conduct before January 1, 1998), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 (forconduct on and after January 1, 1998). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation and joint

945 NE 2d 922, 459 Mass. 558 (2011)-IN THE MATTER OF SHARIF

At page 4
legal fees have been earned, the fees advanced, often referred to as a retainer , belong to the client until earned by the attorney and must be held as trust funds in a client trust account. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003) ("trust funds" defined as any funds belonging to client but

At page 4 eld by lawyer in connection with representation); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003) (lawyer must hold client trust funds in trust account separate from lawyer’s own property).

At page 4 fees, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (2) (ii), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003), but the attorney may not do so before delivering to the client "in writing (i) an itemized bill or other accounting showing the

At page 4 balance of the client’s funds in the trust account after the withdrawal." Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) (2), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003).[ 6 ] Where the client disputes the bill, the attorney may not withdraw the

At page 4 isputed funds from the trust account until the dispute is resolved. *565 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (2) (ii). If the attorney has already withdrawn the amount billed and the client within a reasonable time after

At page 5
not yet belong to her .[ 1 0 ] While even an error of timing is a serious disciplinary violation and should not happen where an attorney complies with the accounting procedure set forth in rule 1.15 (d) (2), it is dif ferent in severity from the misuse of client funds that will never belong to the attorney .

At page 5
advance fee retainer belong to the client and must be held in a trust account on a client’s behalf until the fees are earned, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) (1); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1) and (2) (ii), *569 classic retainers are considered earned by the attorney when paid because the attorney "gives up the possibility of

At page 6
account until earned but permit funds advanced for the payment of expenses to be held in an attorney’s operating or business account, even though both are considered client trust funds. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1) ("T rust funds shall be held in a trust account, except that advances for costs and expenses may be

At page 7
to permit informed decision regarding representation); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a), as amended, 432 Mass. 1301 (2000) (charging or collecting excessive fees); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003) (failure to hold client property in trust account); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003) (failure to render full accounting of client trust property);

At page 7 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) (2), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003) (failure to provide notice of withdrawal, accounting of services rendered, and statement of balance of client’s funds on withdrawal from trust account); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1 (a), 426 Mass. 1427 (1998)

At page 7
[6] Monies advanced by a client to pay for future expenses, such as filing costs or experts’ fees, are also client trust funds but need not be deposited in a trust account. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1) ("T rust funds shall be held in a trust account, except that advances for costs and expenses may be held in a business account"). These client trust funds may be used by an attorney to pay the expenses for

At page 7 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) (2). [7] While the rules governing trust funds have been frequently amended, we have long considered monies paid as an advance for legal

At page 7 ervices to be client trust funds that must be kept in a trust account until earned. See, e.g., S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) ("lawyer shall hold property of clients … separate from the lawyer’s own property"; "[c]omplete records of the receipt,

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 416 (2013)-In the Matter of James P. Long

At page 6
The board found the r~spondent’s failure to maintain the residuary trusdunds ‘in a separate individua l interest-bearing account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (e) (5), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) (separate interest-bearing account reqqired for certain trust funds), and

At page 6 hat the respondent’s intentional misuse of the residuary trust’s funds violated rule 1.15 (b) (segregation of trust p~operty), Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (dishonesty,

At page 6
board concluded that the respondent should be requ.ired to demonstrate his fitness at a reinstatement hearing under S.J.C .. Rule 4:01, .§ 18 (5), as appearing in ~53 Mass. 1315 (2009). 2. Discussion. In reviewing a bar discipline matter, this court affords substantial

At page 8
to the board’s jurisdictional authority. Relatedly, and contrary to the respondent’s suggestion, he properly may be found to have violated the charged provisions of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, even though he was handling the trust funds in his capacity as trustee rather than as an attorney

At page 8
lawyer whenever he holds property in a fiduciary capacity –"whether as trustee, agent, escrow agent, guardian, executor, or otherwise." Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a).3 . The respondent contends that the hearing committee improperly denied his motion to

At page 8
committee indeed considered separately the merits of the present disciplinary complaint. and the 3 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)(l) defines "trust property" to mean "property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation … includ[ing]

At page 8 agent, escrow agent, guardian, executor, or otherwise." The comments to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 indicate that the rule is intended to apply to all situations where an actively practicing attorney

At page 8 R. Prof. C. 1.15 cmt. 2 ("In general, the phrase ‘in connection with a representation’ includes all situations where a lawyer holds property as a fiduciary, including as an escrow agent. For

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Jennifer J.R. DeFeo

At page 2
funds in the account. The respondent’s misconduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C) (individual client ledgers); 1.15(f)(1)(E) (three -way reconciliations); 1.15(f)(1)(D) (ledger for funds held for bank

At page 2 ees and expenses); 1.15(b)(2) (commingling). This matter came before the Board at its meeting on Ju ly 12, 2021 on the stipulation of

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 353 (2015)-In the Matter of Lee Samuel Kaplan

At page 2
insufficient funds. By drawing on other client funds and by depositing personal funds into his IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C) and 1.15 (b)(2).

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 321 (2010)-In the Matter of Ellen M. Mackay

At page 1
On December 29, 2009, the respondent submitted an affidavit of resignation to the Board of Bar Overseers in which she acknowledged that the facts and rule violations contained in anaccompanying statement of disciplinary charges could be proven by a preponderance of theevidence. The statement of disciplinary charges asserted that the respondent had commingledclient funds with personal funds in her business account in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b); converted client funds to pay her own personal and business expenses in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), and 8.4(c) and (h); failed to inform clients and third persons thatshe had received funds on their behalf in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 and 1.15(c); failedto keep an accurate, chronological check register, individual client ledgers, and to reconcileher IOLTA account at least every sixty days in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(E);issued IOLTA checks directly to herself in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3); and paidbusiness and personal obligations directly from her IOLTA account in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(e)(4). The respondent also failed without good cause to respond to requests forinformation from bar counsel made in the course of processing a complaint in violation ofS.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3(2) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(b) and 8.4(g); and failed to comply with therequirements of an order of administrative suspension in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c)and 8.4(h). On February 5, 2010, the respondent asked the Board to accept her resignation and

445 Mass. 452, 838 NE 2d 1197 (2005)-In the Matter of Cobb

At page 10
See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 930 (2002) (rule 8.2); Idaho State Bar v. Topp, 129 Idaho 414 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1 155 (1997) (rule 8.2); Matter of T erry, 271 Ind. 499 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Terry v. Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Comm’n, 444 U.S. 1077

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Danilo Avalon

At page 2
investigation, the respondent brought his IOLTA account records largely into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.
The respondent’s failure to maintain a compliant IOLTA check register with a client

At page 2 dentifier after each transaction violat ed Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) (1)(B). The respondent’s failure to maintain individual client ledgers violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The

At page 2
1.15(f)(1)(D). Th e respondent’s failure to perform a three-way reconciliation every sixty days and maintain reconciliation reports violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).
On May 4 , 2022, bar counsel and the respondent filed a stipulation in which the parties

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 263 (2013), 466 Mass. 1018 (2013)-In the Matter of Patricia Jean Fletcher

At page 2
administration of justice, or to the public in terest." S.J.C. Rule 4: 01, § 18(5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). See Matter of Pool, 401 Mass. 460, 463 (1988). As to those criteria, we accept the board’s factual findings, provided they are supported by substantial

At page 3
actions," Matter of Hiss, supra at 452, or that she presentl y has the necessary competency and learning in law. Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(8), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), the petitioner may renew her applic ation or reapply for reinstatement or

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 346 (2008)-In the Matter of David Hitchman

At page 1
On May 27, 2008, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline alleging that the respondent’s deposit of personal funds into his IOLTA account and his payment of checks from that accountto “cash” or to Eastern Bank violated Mass R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2) and (e)(3) and that his failurewithout good cause to respond to bar counsel’s letters and requests for information and tocomply with the terms of his suspension from the practice of law violated S. J. C. Rule 4:01,§§ 3 and 17, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c), 8.1(b), and 8.4(d), (g), and (h). The respondent didnot file an answer to the petition for discipline, and the allegations in the petition weredeemed admitted pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8(3).

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 435 (2008)-In the Matter of James P. Long

At page 2
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7(b) by representing Glynn in the closing when hisrepresentation was materially limited by responsibilities to other clients, to third parties,and by his own interests, all without obtaining the consent of each client afterconsultation. In support of this ruling, the committee noted that he had threatened, inderogation of his duties as counsel to Glynn, to withhold distribution of the proceeds ofthe condominium closing in order to secure payment of the Alliance loan. The hearing committee rejected bar counsel’s contentions that the respondent had alsoviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(b), which prohibits criminal conduct that reflects on a lawyer’shonesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, as well as charges that he violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 8.4(c), which prohibits conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, ormisrepresentation. The committee viewed respondent’s conduct – failing to make theappropriate filing with the Attorney General – as flowing from a negligent error of law, notfrom any dishonesty, deceit, or untrustworthiness. Finally, the committee rejected a chargethat he had interfered with the “prompt[] deliver[y]” of client funds in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15 by threatening to withhold the proceeds from the condominium sale until theloan was paid because, the committee found, the funds were delivered promptly once theclosing proceeds were ripe for disbursement. Count Two

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 307 (2012)-In the Matter of Jose A. Espinosa

At page 9
collecting a non-refundable fee that was not earned; • violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(l) (prompt written accounting due on final disposition of trust property) by failing to provide the client with an accounting of his use ofher

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 228 (2019)-In the Matter of Paul R. Gormley

At page 2
trust funds in a separate inte rest-bearing trust account, the r espondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5)(ii) (as in e ffect before July 1, 2015).

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 119 (2003)-In the Matter of Lucille R. Di Pietro

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct of intentionally using client funds for her own personal or business purposes with intent to deprive her client of the funds at least temporarily, and with actualdeprivation resulting, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) – (d) and 8.4(c) and (h). This matter came before the Board on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary violations and a

483 Mass. 1013, 134 NE 3d 1133 (2019)-IN THE MATTER OF GRAYER

At page 2
plea counsel to cooperate." The judge found that "[i]t has been clearly demonstrated that plea counsel is uncooperative. Plea counsel failed to attend the hearing. The *1015 court credits the detailed af fidavit of efforts made to obtain cooperation and of plea counsel’s failure to cooperate." The client spent six months

At page 2 n ICE detention before he was released.1015 On appeal, the respondent contends that he adequately communicated with the client concerning the

At page 5
*1018 By failing to comply with the client’s request to provide an accounting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015). By failing, upon termination of the representation, to return any unearned portion of the prepaid fees, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof.

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (2004)-In the Matter of Douglas R. MacDonla

At page 2
The respondent’s failing to reply to the client’s communications, to provide her with her file and to provide her with an accounting of his services was conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.4, 1.15 (b) and 1.16(e). In addition to his misconduct in both of these matters, the respondent failed to reply to bar

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 388 (2020)-In the Matter of John Earl Quigley

At page 2
balance of the client’s funds i n the trust account after the wi thdrawal, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 1.15(d)(2), 8.4(c) and 8.4(h). By f ailing to seek the lawful objectives of his client and to perform the c ontracted services with reaso nable diligence, the respondent

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 441 (2006)-In the Matter of Leonard S. Lakin

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of funds of the trust, with intent to deprive the beneficiaries of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, isconduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). On August 14, 2006, the Board of Bar Overseers voted to recommend that the affidavit of

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 442 (2012)-In the Matter of Kurt M. Hayes

At page 2
respondent made cash withdrawal s from his IOLTA account in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3), made cash withdrawal s from his IOLTA account in payment of legal fees, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4), made a w ithdrawal of a legal fee that was not

At page 2 ayable to the respondent or his firm, in violat ion of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4),maintained an IOLTA account that was in ne gativebalance for a short time, in violation of Mass. R. Prof.

At page 2 . 1.15(f)(1)(C), failed to keep an individual cl ient ledger for a clie nt and for bank service charges and fees, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C) and (D) and failed to

At page 2
1.15(f)(1)(E). No client was deprived of funds and after August 2011, the respondent’s IOLTA records were in complian ce with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. There were no factors in aggravat ion or mitigation of discipline.

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 540 (2008)-In the Matter of Matthew Anthony Pellegrino

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to inform the client of his receipt of her settlement proceeds, his commingling of client funds with personal funds and his intentional misuse of the client’sfunds were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 1.15(c), 8.4(c) and 8.4(h). Therespondent’s intentional misrepresentations to the client that he had not received hersettlement funds were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and 8.4(h). On August 22, 2007, bar counsel received a request from the client for an investigation into

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 529 (2015)-In the Matter of Elisa M. Pollar

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misuse of mort gage loan proceeds from August 28, 2012, until August 26, 2013, violated Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(b), and 8.4(c) and (h).
By issuing checks that created negative bala nces for clients, the respondent violated

At page 2 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f)(1)(C). By depositing personal funds into her IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R.

At page 2 rof. C. 1.15(b). By making intentional misrepresentations to the seller’s attorney to cover up her failure

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 390 (2009)-In the Matter of David A. Molle

At page 1
The respondent is a sole practitioner admitted to the bar in 2001. Between 2007 and 2008, the respondent failed to withdraw earned fees from his IOLTA account at the earliestreasonable time after his interest became fixed, thereby commingling his own funds withclients’ funds. His conduct in this regard was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). Commencing at least as of 2007 and continuing through 2008, the respondent failed to

At page 1 aintain complete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of client funds in theIOLTA account in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(f). During the same time period, therespondent failed to prepare and maintain a check register as required by Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f) (1) (B); failed to prepare and maintain a chronological ledger as required by Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(f) (1) (C); and failed to prepare and maintain reconciliation reports at leastevery sixty days as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) (1) (E). In August of 2007, as a result of his inadequate records, the respondent mistakenly drew out

At page 1 ore fees than he was owed. This negligent misuse of trust funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f) (1) (C). On September 27, 2007, the respondent’s bank telephoned him and informedhim that he did not have sufficient funds in his IOLTA account to pay a client’s check. Therespondent rectified the deficiency by depositing $2,000 in personal funds to his IOLTAaccount the same day. The client’s check cleared the following day and no deprivationoccurred. The respondent took no steps thereafter to determine the source of the deficiency or to

At page 1 orrect his record-keeping procedures until directed to do so by bar counsel in 2008. InFebruary 2009, the respondent brought his IOLTA account into compliance and is keepingIOLTA account records as required by the Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. On April 3, 2009, the parties filed a stipulation jointly recommending that the respondent a

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 238 (2017)-In the Matter of Peter A. Kachajian, Jr

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to promptly pay to the seller the closing proceeds for transaction violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) . The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b)(1) and (3), as in effect prior to Ju ly 1, 2015. The respondent’s failure

At page 1 sixty days violated Mass R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 446 (2006)-In the Matter of Sidney Lansky

At page 1
The board concluded that, with respect to the second estate, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 (diligence and promptness), and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to administrationof justice), due to his failure to render estate accounts as required by G. L. c. 206, § 1; Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.2(a) (obligation to seek lawful objectives of client), and 1.3 (diligence andpromptness) due to the delay, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e) (trust account violations) due tohis failure to deposit the client’s funds into the estate’s account. The respondent does not contest the findings of the board, but contends that a term

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 299 (2001)-In the Matter of Randy M. Hitchcock

At page 1
SUMMARY1 Pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f), Bar Counsel on August 6, 1998 received notice from the bank in which the respondent maintained his IOLTA account that check no. 1329 in theamount of $3592, and drawn on the respondent’s IOLTA account, had been dishonored.Payment of this check would have caused an overdraft in the amount of $195.

At page 1
The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds without intent to deprive and with no deprivation resulting, his commingling of client funds with personal or business funds, and hisinadequate and improper record keeping was conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a).

594 NE 2d 861, 413 Mass. 33 (1992)-IN THE MATTER OF PALMER

At page 1
*34 1. Facts. We summarize the facts as found by the hearing committee, as modified by an appeals panel of the board, and as accepted by the board. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8, as amended, 41 1 Mass. 1315 (1991). The respondent, W alter E. Palmer , was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 1957. In 1984, Palmer

At page 3
misrepresentation by an attorney in which a single justice has ordered a private reprimand rather than a more serious sanction. See Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney , 3 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 1 15 (1983); Matter of the Discipline of Attorneys A & B, 2 Mass. Att’y Discipline *39 Rep. 123 (1981). Both of these

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 507 (2012)-In the Matter of Sherwin L. Kantrovitz

At page 1
By April 1, 2012, the respondent had brought his IOLTA account record keeping into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15.
The respondent’s conduct in failing to perf orm a three-way reconciliation of the account

At page 1 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). His conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with a client identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction and running balance violated

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individual client ledgers and a ledger for bank fees and expenses with a list of every transaction and running

At page 1 alance violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C) and (D). The respondent’s commingling of firm funds with client funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b).

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 221 (2018)-In the Matter of Peter R. Kaplan

At page 1
and the Supreme Judicial Court w ould conclude that he violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(b), (d), (e) and (f) , and 8.4(d) and (h), among other s. On September 17, 2018, the Board of Bar Overseers voted to rec ommend that the

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 581 (2001)-In the Matter of Paul J. Wahlberg

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct of intentionally converting client funds, with intent to deprive his clients of the use of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, wasin violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4 (c) and (h). The respondent’s conduct oftendering checks to his clients representing funds that the clients were entitled to receive,knowing or having reason to know that the checks would not be honored, was in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s unauthorized endorsements of checkspayable to his clients and his unauthorized settlement of his client’s case was in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent also failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel’s investigation resulting in his

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 214 (2018)-In the Matter of Michael A. Johnson

At page 1
business funds belonging to the respondent. The respondent was unaware that Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 required tr ust funds held for a short pe riod of time to be maintained in an IOLTA account and instead understo od, incorrectly, that IOLTA a ccounts were for trust funds

At page 1
account, and negligently misusing those funds, the respondent v iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1). By failing promptly t o disburse his client’s share of the settlement funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c).

At page 1
that the respondent agree to a f inancial probation for a period of one year and that he submit records compliant with Mass. R . Prof. C. 1.15 (f)(1) to bar cou nsel for review, every three months. On September 17, 2018, the B oard of Bar Overseers vote d to adopt the parties’

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 588 (2011)-In the Matter of Matthew J. McCarthy

At page 1
the amount that should have been on deposit. By his conduct, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 1.15(c), 1.15(e)(3) and (4), 1.15(f)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h).

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 313 (2015)-In the Matter of Daniel M. Hutton

At page 15
149-151. Capparella asked Krieger ifhe was the legal representative on the case, and Krieger confirmed that he was. Tr. 1:151-152 (Capparella); Ex. 18, p. 14. He asked this

At page 16 clarification. Tr. 1:152-153 (Capparella). · Lipis is Terminated

16 Mass. 94 (2000)-In the Matter of Reuben S. Dawkins

At page 3
Mr. Dawkins took no action after receiving payment. (Tr. 1:49, 147) Harvey called the Board of Bar Overseers on November 25, 1997, to investigate Mr. Dawkins’ "track record." (Tr. 1:147)He learned from the Board that Mr. Dawkins was indefinitely suspended. Harvey called Mr.Dawkins, advised him that he knew Mr. Dawkins had been suspended, and demanded hismoney back. (Tr. 1:149-150) Mr. Dawkins said that he was not practicing law and offered tofind a lawyer for Harvey. (Tr. 1:150-1:151) Harvey refused this offer, and Mr. Dawkinsreturned the money, in cash. (Tr. 1:149-151)

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 275 (2018)-In the Matter of Patrick G. Lyle

At page 1
acknowledged that there was su fficient evidence to prove by cle ar and convincing evidence that he had violated Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 and 8.1. The underlying matters involves the respondent’s misuse of client funds that h ad been deposited to his

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 197 (2001)-In the Matter of George A. Fairbanks, III

At page 1
Between 1992 and 1999, the respondent misused funds entrusted to him by clients in two unrelated matters for his own personal or business purposes, with actual deprivation resulting.In addition, the respondent failed to maintain complete records of the handling, maintenance,and disposition of the funds and failed to promptly and accurately account for themaintenance of the funds. In one matter, the client was finally repaid in 1999. In the other,the respondent still has not accounted for over $10,500.00 and has not made any restitutionto the client. The respondent’s conduct in these matters was in violation of Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(6), Canon Nine, DR 9-102(A) and 9-102(B)(3) and (4), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). In three other cases, the respondent neglected legal matters entrusted to him, in violation of

At page 1 anon Six, DR 6-101(A)(3), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3. In one of the cases, an appeal that hadmerit was dismissed as a result of the respondent’s failure to pursue his client’s objectives, inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2. In that same case, the respondent failed to adequatelycommunicate with the client, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4. In another of the cases, therespondent failed to account for or refund the unearned portion of the client’s retainer andfailed to promptly deliver the client’s file upon request in violation of Canon Two, DR 2-110(A)(3) and (4), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e). In three additional cases, the respondent failed to account for retainers received or to refund

At page 1 ny unearned retainers after the termination of his representation of the clients. Therespondent’s conduct in these matters was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) and (b)and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d). The respondent’s failure to acknowledge his obligation to thoseclients or to make any good faith effort to pay any portion of those obligations adverselyreflected on his fitness to practice law, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). In one of thecases, the client obtained a judgment against the respondent for the full amount of theretainer that she had paid, plus costs. The respondent failed to comply with the terms of thejudgment and failed to make any effort to pay any portion of the judgment, in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(d). In two of the cases, the respondent failed to communicate with theclients regarding the status of their claims, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4. In one ofthose matters, the respondent also failed to return the file upon request after his serviceswere terminated, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e). In two more cases, the respondent failed to promptly return client files upon request after his

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 596 (2001)-In the Matter of Alan G. Warner

At page 1
agreement in writing, in failing to provide a written statement of outcome to the client,and in failing to provide the client with an accounting of fees and expenses; 2. KRPC 1.15 (1999 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 342) (safekeeping property) in failing to makeprompt delivery of funds to a third party; and 3. KRPC 8.4(c) (1999 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 399) (misconduct) by representing he wouldreimburse the travel expenses of a witness and then refusing to do so.

At page 3 VIOLATIONS OF KRPC 1.15 KRPC 1.15 provides in pertinent part:

At page 3
same was for the payment of Gleason’s travel expenses. Respondent argues Gleason came toTopeka only to visit her injured son. The evidence before the panel clearly supports its findingthat the money was delivered to respondent by the client for payment to Gleason. The panel’s finding of a violation of KRPC 1.15 is supported by the evidence. VIOLAT1ONS OF KRPC 8.4(c)

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 736 (2011), 460 Mass. 400 (2011)-In the Matter of William J. Pudlo

At page 1
fee to Barbuto. The third count alleged that by August 1, 2008, the respondent had yet to maintain any of the IOLTA records required by the July 1, 2004, amendment to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).

At page 3
bill on or before the date that an attorney withdraws his fees from a client trust account. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii) and (d)(2), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004). Nevertheless, under the pre-2004 rules in effect at the time of the respondent’s violation, the respondent was clearly obligated to keep client

At page 4
conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a), 426 Mass. 1315 (1998) (charging excessive fees); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) (failure to render promptly full accounting of funds received); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16

At page 4 payment); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) (effective July 1, 2004) (failure to maintain required records of funds in IOLTA accounts).

At page 4
reasonable inquiries, explain matters for client decisions); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(b), 426 Mass. 1315 (1998) (communicating basis for fee where lawyer has not regularly represented client); S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4), as appearing in 382 Mass.

At page 4
FN3. The hearing committee found no mitigating or aggravating factors. FN4. Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) ("lawyer shall hold property of clients … separate from the lawyer’s own property"; "[c]

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 417 (2013)-In the Matter of Alfred A. Macchi

At page 1

The respondent’s conduct in depositing trust funds into his business operating account was in violation of Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.15(b). The res pondent’s failure to

At page 2
funds and to render a full writte n accounting to his client wa s in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. Rule 1.15(f) and (d).

At page 2
respondent’s failure to properly reconcile hi s account is conduct in violation of Mass R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).

At page 2
In mitigation, the respondent’s current trust account records are in compliance with the requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 51 (2012), 462 Mass. 430 (2012)-In the Matter of Anthony Raoul Bott

At page 2
with the exception of employment as a paralegal subject to conditions and limitations set forth in S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(3), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009): "[N]o lawyer who is disbarred or suspended, or who has resigned or been placed on disability inactive

At page 6
mediator, may, in accordance with the time frames of such requests set forth in S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(3), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), seek leave from the court to engage in such employment.

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 163 (2014)-In the Matter of Martin J. Gately

At page 1
the evidence and that a hearing committee, th e board and the Supreme Judicial Court would conclude that he had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h) by intentionally misusing client funds, with deprivation. On January 6, 2014, the Board of Bar Overseers voted to recommend that the affidavit of resignation be accepted and that the respondent be disbarred.

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Douglas A Parigian

At page 2
The petitioner, Douglas A. Parigian, seeks reinstatement to the bar pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), following the expiration of a three-year suspension. A hearing panel (panel) of the Board of Bar Overseers (board) recommended that the petition be denied, and that petitioner be permitted to reapply for reinstatement in six months. The board adopt ed the panel’s recommendation that the petition be denied, but rejected

At page 3
which was transmitted to the board . See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (4), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). A three -member panel held an evidentiary hearing, at which it received exhibits and testimony from the petitioner as the sole witness. The panel thereafter filed a report, in which it recommended that the petition be denied on the grounds that the petitioner failed to

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 672 (2006)-In the Matter of Peter L. Schofiel

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of client funds, with intent to deprive the client of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, is conduct inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and 1.15(b) and (c). The affidavit of resignation was filed with the Board of Bar Overseers on April 25, 2006. On

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 258 (2017)-In the Matter of Michael R. Levin

At page 7
respondent’s misconduct constituted violations of: Mass R. Prof. C. 1.15{c); Mass R. Prof. C. 1.15{d) (1); and Mass R. Prof. C.

At page 10
own purposes or for the benefit of the respondent’s business; and Matter of Jackman, 444 Mass. 1013, 1013, 1015 (2005), where the attorney received a two-year suspension for violations

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 704 (2012)-In the Matter of Anthony J. Pignone

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in depositing the retainer in his offi ce operating account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). His conduc t in intentionally mi susing the retainer by paying himself fees before they were earned violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). The

At page 2
his office operating account and paid his fees fr om the retainer, along w ith a statement of the funds remaining in trust, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2).

At page 2
the matter violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b). His failure to send the QDRO to his client violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.15(c). In the third matter, a client paid the respondent a $2,000 retainer and a $300 filing fee

At page 3
The respondent’s deposit of the retainer into his operating account instead of a trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1). His intentional misuse of a portion of the retainer by paying himself fees before they were earned violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)

At page 3
the client with an acco unting of his fees when she discha rged him as her counsel violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1).

: Supreme Judicial Court, 2022-IN THE MATTER OF FLEUR

At page 4
(2007) . "The subsidiary findings of the hearing committee, as adopted by the board, `shall be upheld if supported by substantial evidence,’ see S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), and the hearing committee’s ultimate findings and recommendations, as adopted by the board, are entitled

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 238 (2011)-In the Matter of Cynthia A. Dziurgot

At page 2
resulting to the mortgage refina nce clients and the tenants, th e respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c), and 8.4(c) and 8.4(h). By not holdi ng the septic system escrow funds and the tenants’ security deposit in separate interest-bearing accounts, the respondent

At page 2 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5)(ii). In January of 2008, in connec tion with the respondent’s own divorce, the Worcester

At page 3
respondent and in part to a client or third pe rson, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d). By writing IOLTA account checks to cash and making external withdrawals from her IOLTA account for pe rsonal expenses, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 262 (2007)-In the Matter of Karen M. Harbeck

At page 2 disposition of trust property violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) and, for conduct prior to July 1, 2004, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a). The respondent’s failure to render a full and meaningful

At page 2 ccount to her client upon written and oral requests violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1), andfor conduct prior to July 1, 2004, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The respondent had a disciplinary history. On November 6, 2006, she received a public

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 648 (2011)-In the Matter of James G. Nelligan

At page 2
By failing to file timely trustee accounts in the probate court as required for one of the trusts, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.3, 1.15(d)(1), and 8.4(d) and (h). By failing to render timely accounts to the benefi ciaries of the other trusts, the respondent

At page 2 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.15 (d)(1) and 8.4(h). By failing timely to terminate the trusts of the deceased wards and promptly turn over to the beneficiaries the funds due them, the

At page 2 espondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.15(c), and 8.4(h). In aggravation, the respondent had extensiv e legal and fiduciary experience, and most

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 413 (2017)-In the Matter of Jay S. Rudolph

At page 1
temporary deprivation to the clients, and failed to maintain IOLTA account records in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent ultimately made restitution in full.

At page 1
The respondent also failed to keep records of funds for his two IOLTA accounts as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Among other things, the respondent did not keep a chronological check register showing each deposit and disbursement with client identifiers and

At page 1
The respondent admitted that a hearing committee, the Board of Bar Overseers and the Supreme Judicial Court would conclude that he violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1), (c), and (f)(1)(B), (C), (D), (E) and M ass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 157 (2016)-In the Matter of Jeffrey S. Entin

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misuse of the es tate’s funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c), and 8.4(c) and (h). By failing to maintain the estate’s funds in a trust account, by failing to promptly deliver to the beneficiaries of the estate the funds due them and by failing to

At page 2 Account, the respondent also vi olated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15( b)(1), 1.15(c), 1.15(d)(1) and 8.4(c).

At page 2
8.4(c). The respondent also violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2) by, on or before the date he

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of John F Lakin

At page 17
Tr. 1:74 (Broadhurst). Byrd , a 1993 law school graduate, practices in S arasot a, Florida – criminal la w, primarily, as well as s ome personal injury. Tr. 1:151-152 (Byrd). He was the president of the Sarasota County Bar Association, the president of the Florida Association of C riminal Defense Lawyers , a

At page 17 Scheb Inn of Court. He is Board certified in criminal defense. Tr. 1:152-153 (Byrd). He has known the petitioner for twenty years; they worked together for a year on a “very hotly contested” m urder trial , securing a not guilty verdict, and co-counseled several other cases

At page 17 ogether. Tr. 1:157, 160, 161 (Byrd). Byrd desc ribed the petitioner as a highly competent, highly skilled lawyer. Tr. 1:161 (Byrd). Byrd appeared before the petitio ner when he was a judge and

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 360 (2005)-In the Matter of Bruce V. Keary

At page 1
The respondent’s commingling of client funds with personal and business funds and his inadequate and improper record keeping was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) of therule in effect prior to July 2004 (now 1.15(b)). His knowing failure without good cause torespond to bar counsel’s demands for information and his failure to appear at the Office ofBar Counsel on two occasions pursuant to subpoenas was in violation of Supreme Judicial CourtRule 4:01 § 3 and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(b) and 8.4 (d) and (g). The respondent has been a member of the bar since 1974. In mitigation, he suffered from

At page 1 epression during the time in which this misconduct occurred. He has now opened a newIOLTA account that is properly maintained in accordance with the amendments to Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15 that took effect on July 1, 2004. This matter came before the Board on August 8, 2005 on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 111 (2013)-In the Matter of Paul J. Carchidi

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to adequately doc ument and safeguard estate funds was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The res pondent’s failure to maintain accurate financial records and negligently misusing estate funds we re in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3,

At page 2
3.3(a); false statements of material fact to a third person in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.1; failure to provide a full written accounting in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1); conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(d); and conduct

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 44 (2013)-In the Matter of Michael E. Bonenfant

At page 2
the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7(b), a nd 8.4(h). In failing to promptly remit the title insurance premium to the title insurer, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and 1.15(c). The respondent has been in practice since 2000 and has no disciplinary history.

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 800 (2006)-In the Matter of Daniel Joseph Wilkins

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in intentionally converting the payoff funds due KeySpan, with actual deprivation resulting, in failing to promptly inform the KeySpan of the receipt of thesettlement check, in failing to promptly pay KeySpan and in failing to maintain and safeguardthe payoff funds in a designated trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b) (c) and(d) and 8.4 (a), (c) and (h). In the second matter, the respondent was contacted by a paralegal at another law firm,

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in intentionally converting the settlement funds due KeySpan with actual deprivation resulting, in failing to promptly inform KeySpan of the receipt of thesettlement check, in failing to promptly pay KeySpan and in failing to maintain and safeguardthe payoff funds in a designated trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) and8.4 (c) and (h). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and a joint

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 252 (2004)-In the Matter of Albert V. Innarelli

At page 1
The respondent’s actions constituted dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c); failure to segregate, safeguard, and account for clients’funds in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b); failure to communicate in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b); and conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practicelaw in violation Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). In addition, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(g) and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3, by

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 695 (2010)-In the Matter of Nicholas L. Triantos

At page 1
least as of 2007 and continuing until July 31, 2008 when the IOLTA account was closed, therespondent:

  1. did not hold trust funds separate from the respondent’s own property butinstead deposited both trust funds and personal or business funds to the IOLTAaccount and made disbursements from the account for personal or businessexpenses as well as for client matters, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b);2. did not perform a three-way reconciliation of the IOLTA account at least everysixty days, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E);3. did not maintain a check register for his IOLTA account with a client identifierafter every transaction, a list of every transaction, and a running balance, inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B); and4. did not keep individual client ledgers for each client matter, in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). In addition to his IOLTA account, the respondent at all relevant times maintained a separateoperating account at the same bank. Between April 2 and April 15, 2008, the respondent madea series of deposits to his operating account of personal funds totaling $4400. The respondentbelieved, incorrectly, that he had deposited this $4400 in personal funds to his commingledIOLTA account, rather than to his operating account.

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 35 (2003)-In the Matter of William J. Bailey

At page 2
By failing to account for the client’s retainer, and failing to return any unearned portion of the retainer, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 1.6(d). By abandoning the client’s case without taking appropriate steps to protect the client’s

At page 3
respondent charged a clearly excessive fee, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a). By failing to return the client’s two deeds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 1.16(e).

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 196 (2005)-In the Matter of Alan Francis Do

At page 3
mismanagement of the IOLTA account and the delay of mortgage and lien pay-off checks, theboard concluded: "(1) That his failure to maintain adequate records of activity in the accountviolated Canon Nine, DR 9-102(B)(3), and, for conduct occurring after January 1,1998, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a). [complete records of client funds accounts to bekept by lawyer and preserved for six years] (2) That his conduct in delaying issuance of disbursement checks violated Canon

At page 3 even, DR 7-101(A)(1), (2), and (3), Canon Nine, DR 9-102(B)(4), and, for conductoccurring after January 1, 1998, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a) [lawyer’s duty to seeklawful objectives of client], 1.3 [lawyer’s duty to act diligently], and 1.15(b)[notice, delivery, and accounting to client of client funds]. (3) That his conduct in continuing to use the account for closings when it had a

At page 4
One, DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6), Canon Seven, DR 7-101(A)(1), (2), and (3), Canon Nine, DR 9-102(A) and (B), and, for conduct occurring after January 1, 1998, Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(a) & (b), 8.4(c) [professional misconduct for lawyer toengage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation], and8.4(h) [professional misconduct for lawyer to engage in conduct that adverselyreflects on his fitness to practice law]." (Citations to Petition for Discipline andRespondent’s Answers omitted.) As to the second count of the petition for discipline against Dodd, which alleged violationsspecific to the sequence of transactions involving Dodd’s attempts to pay off the PNCmortgage, the board concluded:

At page 4 1) That [Dodd’s] conduct in continuing to use the account for closings when it hada deficit, thereby knowingly misusing client funds to cover payments to or for thebenefit of other clients, with temporary deprivation resulting, and in knowinglyissuing disbursement checks that were not covered by good funds, violated CanonOne, DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6), Canon Seven, DR 7-101(A)(1), (2), and (3), CanonNine, DR 9-102(A) and (B), and, for conduct occurring after January 1, 1998, Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(a) & (b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h). (2) That the respondent’s conduct in delaying the issuance of disbursement checks

At page 4
(3) That the respondent’s conduct in commingling the Virk funds with his own and in using Virk’s funds to pay off an unrelated obligation, with deprivation resulting,violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), 1.15(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h). (4) That the respondent’s conduct in using the Virk closing proceeds to pay off the

At page 4 NC mortgage, with intent to deprive and with deprivation resulting, violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), 1.15(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h)." (Citations to Petition for Disciplineand Respondent’s Answers omitted.) The board dismissed the third count of the petition for discipline against Dodd, alleging hisfailure to cooperate with the inquiries of bar counsel, due to inadequacies in the recordbefore it.

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 456 (2015)-In the Matter of Robert J. Michalik

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in failing to perf orm a three-way reconc iliation of the IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). His conduct in failing to keep a chronological
check register with a client identifier for every transaction and running balance violated

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). His failure to ma intain individual client ledgers with a list of every transaction and running balance violated Ma ss. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). His failure to

At page 1 eep a ledger for bank charges violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D). The respondent’s cash withdrawals from the IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3). The respondent’s

At page 1
client funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b )(2). The respondent’s conduct in disbursing personal funds from his IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 99 (2017)-In the Matter of William P. Corbett, Jr

At page 4
The board concluded, in relation to Count II, that the respondent had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (hold trust funds separate from lawyer’s personal funds), by failing to keep Siegel-Dennis’s funds segregated in a trust fund; rule 1.15 (c) (prompt notice and delivery of

At page 4 his suspension and Siegel-Dennis’s demand; rule 1.15 (f) (1) (C) (no negative balances in individual client ledger) by authorizing distributions that caused negative balances; and, by

At page 5
Mass. R Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h), by intentionally misusing client funds; rule 8.4 (c) as well by intentionally making false and misleading statements to Siegel-Dennis; rule 1.15 (b) (1), by failing to keep client funds segregated in a trust account; rule 1.15 (c), by failing promptly to pay

At page 5 iege-Dennis the funds due to her; rule 1.15 (d) (accounting due on withdrawal for fees from trust account) by failing to provide Siegel-Dennis, on or before the date the respondent withdrew

At page 8
by falsely promising to pay Nystedt $15,000 from the settlement amount when the respondent planned to use the money himself and look for other funds to repay Nystedt; rule 1.15 (b) (1), by failing to keep client funds segregated in a trust account; rule 1.15 (c), by failing promptly to pay

At page 8 ystedt the funds that were due; 1.15 (d), by failing to deliver to Nystedt an itemized bill for his services rendered, written notice of the amount withdrawn, and the balance of client funds

At page 8
the three-way reconciliation of his trust accounts at least every sixty days, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f) (1) (E); and a count charging that the respondent failed to cooperate with bar counsel’s investigation, by failing to provide documents requested and thereby triggering his

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 460 (2020)-In the Matter of Linda A. Wagner

At page 2
C. 1.5(a). The respondent’s failure, when she withdrew the first $2,500 of Jane’s retainer funds from her IOLTA account, to deliver to Jane a written itemized bill or accounting showing the services rendered, written notice of amount and date of the withdrawal, and a statement of the balance she held in trust, violated Rule 1.15(d)(2). The respondent’s failure to deliver to Jane a full written accounting of the distribution of the entire retainer violated Rule 1.15(d)(1). The respondent’s intentional misuse of the unearned portion of the retainer violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s failure to return the unearned portion of the fee violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d).

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 507 (2009)-In the Matter of Maureen Pomeroy

At page 2
Based on the copies of bank records and cancelled checks produced by bar counsel, I conclude that bar counsel has satisfied her burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence thatrespondent has violated a disciplinary rule. On the most fundamental level, the respondenthas violated Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 (c) (contingency fee agreementsmust be in writing and state, among other items, the nature of the claim or controversy, theservices to be performed, and the contingency upon which compensation is to be paid).Moreover, the evidence shows at least by a preponderance of the evidence that therespondent’s actions violated rules 1.15(a) (lawyer shall not collect a clearly excessive fee);1.15(b) (lawyer shall safeguard and keep separate client funds); 1.15(c) (lawyer shouldpromptly notify client upon receiving client funds); 1.15(d) (lawyer shall render fullaccounting of trust property upon request by the client); and 8.4(c) (lawyer shall not engagein conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentations). These violationsamount to a likely intentional misappropriation of client funds that resulted in actualdeprivation to the client, Hoffmann. The presumptive sanction for such conduct is disbarmentor indefinite suspension. Matter of Schoepfer , 426 Mass. 183, 187(1997). 2. Balancing of harms

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (2005), 444 Mass. 1002 (2005)-In the Matter of John Arthur Johnson

At page 1
Bar counsel filed a two-count petition for discipline with the Board of Bar Overseers (board), alleging that the respondent violated various disciplinary rules arising out of his representationof two clients. The allegations were deemed admitted, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (3),as amended, 430 Mass. 1314 (1999), and have not been challenged on appeal. In summary, therespondent deposited two checks issued by insurance companies for the benefit of his clientsinto his business checking account, rather than into either an IOLTA or designated trustaccount. He thereby commingled funds in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (d), and (e),426 Mass. 1363 (1998). The respondent then used a portion of his clients’ funds to pay his ownpersonal and business expenses, "with the intent to deprive [his client] of the funds at leasttemporarily and with actual deprivation resulting," in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b),426 Mass. 1363 (1998), Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998), and Mass. R. Prof. C.8.4 (g), as amended, 427 Mass. 1301 (1998). In one of the cases, the respondent also failed toexecute a written contingent fee agreement, in violation of S.J.C. Rule 3:05 (4), as appearing in 382 Mass. 762 (1981), and S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 2, DR 2-106 (C), 382 Mass. 772 (1981),

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122 (2008), 450 Mass. 533 (2008)-In the Matter of Gary C. Crossen

At page 25
(2007); Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 480 (2 005); Matter of McIntyre, 426 Mass. 1012, 1015 (1998), the concern behind th ose cases extends to all thir d parties who are manipulated by an attorney’s unethical behavi or. Here, as we noted above, th e victims of Crossen’s dupery

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 568 (2010)-In the Matter of James F. Scola

At page 1
This matter came before me on an information and record of proceedings, together with a vote of the Board of Bar Overseers (board). Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 12 (4), of the rulesof professional conduct, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline against the respondent thatwas brought before a hearing committee of the board, see S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (3), secondpar, as appearing in 435 Mass 1302 (2002). Bar counsel asserted that the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C 1.15 (f)(l)(B), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f )(1)(C), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.(f)(1)(D),and Mass. R. Prof. C. l.15(f)(1)(E), by failing to perform a three-way reconciliation of hisIOLTA account every sixty days as required by the rule, failing to maintain proper records oftransactions in the account, and issuing checks drawn on the account that created a negativebalance; Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2a, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 by performinga real estate closing but failing to confirm that he had received funds for the closing; andMass. R. Prof . C.1.4 and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) by intentionally misusing client funds to payfor closings of other clients, issuing checks that he knew would be dishonored, failing toinform lenders that he knew his IOLTA account was in deficit, and instructing lendersnonetheless to deposit funds into that account. The hearing committee concluded that the respondent had violated the rules of professional conduct as alleged,

16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 434 (2000)-In the Matter of David Wysocki

At page 1
Counts Two and Three of the petition for discipline involved financial record keeping problems in the respondent’s trust account, including commingling cash payments from clients withpersonal cash and failing otherwise to maintain adequate or complete records. Count Twoarose from a complaint by clients whose funds (mortgage payments) the respondent washolding in trust as part of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. The plan was dismissed for unrelatedreasons before the payments were remitted to the mortgagee. The respondent thereafter paidthe clients the funds that he was holding on their behalf in his trust account. However,because the respondent had commingled certain cash payments from the clients with his ownfunds, he did not show the receipt of the cash on his client ledger and inadvertentlymiscalculated the balance that the clients were due. After the complaint to Bar Counsel wasfiled, the respondent found the discrepancy and reimbursed the clients for the $870 shortfallcaused by his inaccurate accounting. The respondent’s conduct in this matter was in violationof Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b) and its predecessor DR 9-102(A),(B)(3),(4). Count Three arose from two notices of dishonored checks sent to Bar Counsel by the bank in

At page 1 hich the respondent maintained his IOLTA account. The first check was dishonored becausethe respondent had by mistake failed to make a deposit. In the second instance, severalchecks were dishonored because the respondent mistakenly paid himself, as fees, sumsreceived from clients intended to cover both fees and costs. The respondent then paid thecosts from the trust account despite the fact that the monies needed to support thesedisbursements had already been withdrawn. The dishonored checks were paid upon redepositor replaced. The respondent’s conduct in this matter was again in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(a),(b) and its predecessor DR 9-102(A),(B)(3),(4). Counts Four and Five of the petition followed Bankruptcy Court decisions. In the first case,

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 203 (2012)-In the Matter of James S. Dilday

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in failing to provi de an accounting to the client of funds advanced for costs and expenses vi olated Mass. R Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1).

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Brian B Ky

At page 5
with itemized bills of services rendered, violating Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 1.15(d)(2), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h). Count Two alleged that respondent failed to communicate with bar counsel

At page 6
intentionally misused those client funds, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and 8.4(h); and failed to deliver a written notice of fee withdrawals with an itemized

At page 7 1.15(d)(2). The respondent admitted to many of these factual allegations in his answer, see supra, and at the hearing. With

At page 7
portion of the retainer funds he had not earned, constituted intentional misuse, violating Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h).

At page 10
the committee’s conclusion that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2) by failing to deliver an itemized bill for services and notice of fee withdrawals. Nevertheless, the respondent does not challenge the committee’s findings in this

At page 11
Matter of Weiss, 474 Mass. 1001, 1001 n.1 (2016), quoting S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). See Matter of Abbot, 437 Mass. 384, 391 (2002), and cases cited.

At page 13
committee — whether respondent "intentionally" misused client funds as alleged in Count One. The hearing committee held that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (holding trust property separate from lawyer’s property), 8.4(c) (conduct

At page 14
account on a client’s behalf until the fees are earned"); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1). See also Benalcazar v. Goldsmith, 400 Mass. 111, 114 (1987) ("Even if we were to read the contract as ambiguous on that point, the ambiguity would be construed

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 111 (2004)-In the Matter of Michael J. Cruz

At page 1
By providing financial assistance to the client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(e). By signing or causing the client’sname to be signed to a settlement check without authorization and then depositing the checkinto his IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c). By comminglingpersonal funds in his IOLTA account, and by intentionally converting trust funds with intent todeprive the client or the Department of Revenue of the use of the funds at least temporarilyand with actual deprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h)and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1303, 1363 (1997), effectiveJanuary 1998 through June 30, 2004. Commencing no later than August 2002 and continuing through at least February 2003, the

At page 2
By commingling and intentionally converting trust funds in these three matters with intent to deprive the clients or their creditors of the use of the funds at least temporarily and withactual deprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) andMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1303, 1363 (1997), effective January1998 through June 30, 2004. On November 8, 2004, the respondent submitted his affidavit of resignation from the practice

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 854 (2012)-In the Matter of Albert E. Todino

At page 1
By depositing personal funds to his IOLT A account, commingling them with trust property, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.15(a) and 8.4(h). By intentionally

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 105 (2001)-In the Matter of John W. Capone

At page 2 violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.15 and 8.4(c) and (h). In a second matter, on January 14, 1999, the respondent was settlement agent of a refinance

At page 2
The respondent intentionally used at least $12, 131.97 of loan proceeds for his own personal or business purposes with intent to deprive the client or a third party of the funds, at leasttemporarily and with actual deprivation resulting. The respondent’s conduct was in violationof Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.15 and 8.4(c) and (h). In a third matter, the respondent’s letterhead as of August 1999 included the statement

16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 5 (2000)-In the Matter of Frank T. Barber, III

At page 1
In addition, between early 1996 and late 1999, the respondent maintained a designated IOLTA account that he used as a combined repository for trust, business and personal funds. Therespondent did not promptly withdraw funds due him as fees, and he deposited earned feesand personal funds in the account. He failed to make or maintain adequate records and failedto account adequately for his disposition of all the funds in the account. The respondent’scommingling of funds in the IOLTA account and his failure to keep required records or accountadequately for all IOLTA funds violated Canon Nine, DR 9-102(A) and (B)(3) and 9-102(C), and,after January 1, 1998, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), (d) and (e). In aggravation, the respondent failed to repay most of the fire damage proceeds for about five

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 312 (2005)-In the Matter of Jodie Grossman

At page 3
The hearing committee concluded that the respondent intentionally misused and converted $1,000 of the escrowed funds, failed to safeguard and promptly pay over or deliver the funds,and failed to account adequately for the funds, in violation of Canon One, DR 1-102 (A)(4)(dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and (6) (conduct adversely reflecting onfitness to practice), 382 Mass. 769 (1981), and Canon Nine, 9-102 (A), (B) (lawyers shall keepclient funds separate from his funds, shall safeguard client property, shall pay over clientfunds when due), 382 Mass. 795 (1995), and DR 9-102 (C), see Petition of the Mass. Bar Ass’n& the Boston Bar Ass’n, 395 Mass. 1 (1985), as amended, 414 Mass. 1301 ((1995), and afterDecember 31, 1998, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) and (b) (lawyer shall safeguard and keepseparate client funds and shall notify client upon receipt of funds), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998),Rule 8.4 (c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and Rule 8.4 (h) (conductadversely reflecting on fitness to practice), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998). The hearing committee also concluded that the respondent submitted fabricated evidence to

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 381 (2013)-In the Matter of Paul A. Lancia

At page 1
and failed to maintain the retainer in his IO LTA account until it was earned, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1). In the same case, the respondent intentionally used the retainer for purposes unrelated to client before the re tainer funds were earned and with deprivation

At page 1 esulting, in violation of 1.15(b) and 8.4(c). Fi nally, the respondent failed on or before the date he paid himself a fee to provide his c lient with an itemized bill or other accounting

At page 1
statement of the balance of the client’s funds in the trust account after the withdrawal, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2).

At page 2
from representation and failing to return an unearned portion of a retainer, in violation of Mass. R .Prof. C. 1.15(d) and 1.16(d).

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 637 (2016)-In the Matter of David Zak

At page 7
(MARS) as defined in 16 C.F.R. Part 322, recodified on December 30, 2011, as Regulation o, 12 C.F.R part 1015. Under 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 25. 02, an attorney is prohibited from sol·iciting,

At page 39 of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 1 regarding notice and accounting of funds held in his IOLTA account1 depositing and holding trust

At page 46
actions with respect to Onyiriuka’s payments alone, the board found. that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) and (d), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) 1 by failing to deposit the.

At page 47
IOLTA account, with deprivation to client and without restitution, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) and (b) 1 is disbarment). In such situations, an offending attorney faces

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 331 (2005)-In the Matter of Michael Paul Henry

At page 2
The respondent’s deposit of escrow funds into his law office operating account constituted commingling of personal and trust funds in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (e)(5)and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). The respondent’s intentional misuse of trust funds withdeprivation resulting was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (c) and Mass. R. Prof.C. 8.4(c) and (h). In aggravation, the respondent had a prior admonition for neglect and other misconduct.The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary

509 NE 2d 1158, 400 Mass. 417 (1987)-In the Matter of Allen

At page 1 509 N.E.2d 1 158 IN THE MATTER OF MAX J. ALLEN.

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 463 (2015)-In the Matter of Julie C. Molloy

At page 2
By intentionally misusing $1,000 of the client’s funds for her own purposes, the respondent violated Mass. R. P rof. C. 1.15(c) and Mass. R. Prof . C. 8.4(c) and (h). By failing to call the expert as a witness for the client at trial, the respo ndent violated 1.1, 1.2(a), and 1.3.

At page 3
By intentionally misusing the c lient’s retainer for her own pu rposes, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15( c) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).
By depositing the $500 retainer to her personal checking accou nt and intentionally

At page 3 1.15(b) and (c) and Mass. R. P rof. C. 8.4 (c) and (h).
By failing to provide the client with any written itemized bil ls or other accountings

At page 3
failing to refund the unearned porti on of the retainer, the res pondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d) (1) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d).
By failing to act with reasonabl e diligence and promptness in representing the client, the

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Mark C. Watson

At page 2

The respondent’s misconduct violated Rules 1.15(c), 1.15(f)(1)(C) and (E)(iii), and 5.3(a) and (b).

435 Mass. 7 (2001)-In the Matter of Cohen

At page 3
problems, but that the problems could be cured if bar counsel filed a petition for temporary suspension pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 12A, 425 Mass. 1315 (1997). The single justice then deferred any action on the respondent’s motion until bar counsel had an opportunity to file such a petition.13

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 391 (2005)-In the Matter of Henry Lebensbaum

At page 3
proceedings, the respondent violated the husband’s legal rights, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.4. The respondent’s representation of the client in a criminal matter in which therespondent had a personal interest in concealing his participation in the allegedly unlawfulconduct, and while the respondent was involved in a personal relationship with the client, andhis failure to obtain informed consent if informed consent was possible, violated Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.7(b). The respondent’s representation of the client in a criminal matter in which therespondent was likely to be a necessary witness violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.7(a). By failing tosafeguard and by failing to promptly deliver to the client airplane tickets that had beendelivered to the respondent on behalf of the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.3, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(3) and (c). In the alternative, by falsely telling the clientthat he had misplaced the tickets and by intentionally withholding the airplane tickets fromthe client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), and 8.4(c) and (h). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation and joint

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Erius Monpremier

At page 1
until at least September 2020, the respondent withdrew his earned fees from the IOLTA account via cash withdrawals rather than by prenumbered check s. Beginning no later than October 1, 2018, the respondent has failed to keep records in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 for the IOLTA account. H e also failed to maintain a check register with a client identifier for each transaction and with a running balance, and failed to perform a three- way reconciliation at least

At page 1
By making cash withdrawals from the IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4) and (5). By failing to maintain a compliant check register, individual client ledgers, a bank fees and charges ledger, and by failing to perform and maintain three- way

At page 1 econciliation reports for the IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C), (D) and (E). On May 19, 2021, bar counsel and the respondent filed a stipulation with the Board of

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Joaquim F Silva

At page 1
From approximately 2018 through September 2021, the respondent failed to keep proper IOLTA records, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1) (B), (C), (D), and (E). Between April 2018 and February 2021, the respondent paid personal and business

At page 1
deposited funds into the IOLTA, and issued a new check to the client, which the client promptly cashed. In addition to the rules cited above, the respondent’s conduct in depositing personal funds to his IOLTA violated rule 1.15(b)(2); issuing checks to his creditors directly from the IOLTA violated 1.15(e)(5); and his negligent misuse violated 1.15(b).

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 89 (2003)-In the Matter of Neil R. Cola

At page 1
By failing to disburse the proceeds from the sale of the client’s property to the client or her estate, by failing to account to the client or her estate for the funds and by intentionallymisappropriating the funds, with intent to deprive the client or her estate of the funds atleast temporarily, and with actual deprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c) and (h). In the second matter, the respondent was retained in or around July 1998 to represent a

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 521 (2017), 476 Mass. 1034 (2017)-In the Matter of David Zak

At page 4
account. See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 25.02 ( 2) (2007); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1015.5 and 1015.7 (2017). The respondent does not dispute either that he charged advance fees or that the advance fees

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 182 (2008)-In the Matter of John F. Cullen

At page 2
By failing to advise the borrower fully on the consequences of transferring funds to him and to the accountant, including that the transfers could be deemed a fraud on creditors, therespondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.4(b). By agreeing to represent the borrowerwhen his representation of the borrower was likely to be materially limited by hisresponsibilities to the accountant and by the respondent’s own interests, and withoutobtaining the borrower’s consent after consultation, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.7(b). By commingling client funds with his personal funds, the respondent violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(a), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004. The respondent was admitted to practice on June 7, 1977, and had no record of discipline. In

439 Mass. 134, 786 NE 2d 337 (2003)-IN THE MATTER OF BAILEY

At page 6
ownership, possessory , security , or other pecuniary interest adverse to client); 4-1.8(b) (use of information to disadvantage of client); 4-1.15(a) (commingling of client’s funds with lawyer’s own); 4-3.3(a)(1) (false statement to tribunal); 4-3.4(c) (knowing violation of rules of tribunal); 4-3.5(a) (attempt to influence judge,

At page 10
accounting. [16] Rule 4-1.15 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar expressly provides that "[a] lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer’s own property , funds and property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation."

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 638 (2005)-In the Matter of Kevin C. Sullivan

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to keep or assure that the conservator keep adequate records of conservatorship funds was in violation of Canon Six, Disciplinary Rules 6-101(A)(1), (2) and (3),Canon Seven, Disciplinary Rules 7-101(A)(1) and (2), and Canon Nine, Disciplinary Rule 9-102(B)(3), and, for conduct on and after January 1, 1998, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3and 1.15(a). The respondent did not file or assure that the conservator file annual accountings with the

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 2 (2015)-In the Matter of John A. Aliperta

At page 1
in estate funds and did not re imburse the estate for these fu nds, thereby violating Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). On June 13, 2016, the board voted to recomm end to the Court that the affidavit of resignation be accepted and that a judgment of disbarment be entered forthwith. On July 11,

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 169 (2007)-In the Matter of J. Michael Freedberg

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to secure the closing funds, failure promptly to pay the closing funds to Countrywide, intentional misappropriation of funds from the closing in May and June of2007 to pay other clients or third parties, and his intentional misappropriation of funds ondeposit for other clients or closings to pay off the Countrywide mortgage in June of 2007,violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), and (d), and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’sintentional misrepresentations to the mortgagee’s counsel violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). The respondent was admitted to practice in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on April 24,

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of John A Doonan

At page 2
partners maintained an IOLTA account at People’s United Bank. Between January 2020 and August 2021, the respondent failed to maintain IOLTA records in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f ). He failed to maintain a compliant check register, failed to maintain compliant client ledgers, failed to maintain a bank fee

At page 2
The respondent’s misconduct violated numerous subsections of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, including 1.15(b), 1.15(b)(2)(ii), 1.15(b)(4) and 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C), (D) and (E).
The respondent was admitted to the Massachusetts bar on September 24, 1986

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 14 (2006)-In the Matter of Michael P. Ascher

At page 4
account. On May 7, 2004, the respondent paid $37,500 from his IOLTA account to the lawyeras the client had instructed. On May 10, 2004, the respondent issued an IOLTA check for$76,463.97 to the client for remaining net sale proceeds. The respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) as in effect prior to July 1, 2004, (lawyer shall safeguard client funds and keep them separate from lawyer’s funds) by intentionallydepositing his own personal funds in his IOLTA account and by failing promptly to withdrawearned fees from the IOLTA account. The respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(c) (lawyerin a contingent fee case shall render accounting to client for funds received on client’sbehalf) by his failure to render a written accounting showing the remittance to his clients andthe method of determination.

At page 4 their behalf and to which they were entitled, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b) as in effect prior to July 1, 2004, (lawyer shall promptly notify client of receipt offunds on client’s behalf and promptly deliver to client funds to which client is entitled). The respondent violated Mass R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving

476 Mass. 1006, 63 NE 3d 1113 (2016)-Matter of Greene

At page 2
reinstatement nineteen months before he would otherwise be entitled to apply for reinstatement under S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (2) (b)," as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). The respondent appeals to the full court, arguing that the sanction is too harsh.[ 5 ]1008

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 55 (2014)-In the Matter of Christine M. Cedrone

At page 1
without deprivation in one matter, negligently misused client funds in three other cases, and failed to maintain IOLTA account records in co mpliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent made restitution in full in all matters.

At page 2
From and after January 1, 2011, the respondent failed to keep records of funds for her IOLTA account as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Among other things , the respondent did not keep a chronological check register showing each deposit and disbursement with client

At page 2
In the first matter, the respondent’s conduct in intentionally misusing trust funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). He r conduct in failing to open a separate interest bearing trust account for her clie nt violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5). Her conduct in

At page 2
receipt, maintenance, and dis position of those funds, includi ng her failure to maintain an individual ledger, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15( b)(1), and her failure to maintain trust funds separate from her own funds in her operating account , violated Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.15(b) and (f)

At page 2
promptly distribute funds to clients upon receipt violated Ma ss. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h), 1.3, and 1.15(b) and (f)(1)(C).
In addition, the respondent’s conduct in failing to maintain trust funds separate from the

At page 2 er own funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep a chronological check register showing all transactions in the IOLTA account with client

At page 2
his personal funds, failing to prepare reconciliat ion reports, and failing to keep deposit records with client identifiers vi olated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C ), (D), (E), (F)(ii) and (iii).
The matter came before Court, Gants, J ., on a stipulation of facts and a joint

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 143 (2010)-In the Matter of Robert J. Doyle

At page 1
The respondent deposited the check for the full retainer to his business account under the mistaken belief that he had earned the entire amount. His failure to deposit the retainer tothe IOLTA account and withdraw the amount of his earned fee violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b)(1) and 1.15(b)(2)(ii). Within a short time after receiving the retainer, however, therespondent earned it in full. Before or at the time he deposited the check, the respondent did not send the client in

At page 1 riting an itemized bill or other accounting showing the services rendered, written notice ofthe amount and date of the deposit, and a statement of the balance of the client’s fundsafter the deposit. The respondent’s failure to do so violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2). Between September and December 2007, the respondent reviewed and indexed over 400

At page 1
By a letter dated February 5, 2008, the Pennsylvania lawyer requested that the respondent send his review of the file. The respondent did not reply to this request, in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.4(a). The respondent was discharged in April 2008 and asked to refund the fullretainer. The respondent did not reply to the letter of discharge, and he did not deposit thedisputed fee to a trust account until the dispute could be resolved, in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii).

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 150 (2009)-In the Matter of Pacifico M. DeCapua

At page 2
From and after July 1, 2004, the respondent failed to keep the records required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) for his IOLTA account. On May 6, 2005, the respondent borrowed $90,000 anddeposited the funds into his IOLTA account. On May 9, 2005, the respondent used theborrowed funds to purchase a cashier’s check made payable to the new administrator. Therespondent used this check and an additional $17,000 from his IOLTA account to purchaseanother cashier’s check for $107,000, which he delivered to the administrator on May 10, 2005with a partial accounting of his handling of estate assets. On February 7, 2006, the administrator filed his First and Final Account for the uncle’s estate.

At page 3
By failing to maintain adequate records of his receipt, maintenance, and disposition of estate assets and of funds in his IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), asin effect prior to July 1, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f), as in effect on and after July 1.2004. By failing promptly to deliver his file and estate assets to the administrator, therespondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d) and (e). By failing to render a full, writtenaccounting of estate property when he turned over funds to the administrator, the respondentviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1), as in effect on and after July 1, 2004. By intentionally commingling estate funds with his own funds and by intentionally misusing

At page 3 state funds, with the intent to deprive the estate and its beneficiaries of the funds at leasttemporarily, and with actual deprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004, and 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,deceit, or misrepresentation) and (h). By intentionally misusing client funds in his IOLTAaccount to repay funds he had misappropriated from the estate, the respondent violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), for conduct occurring before July 1,2004, and 1.15(b) and (d), for conduct occurring on and after July 1, 2004. By misrepresenting to the daughter that he was negotiating with MassHealth concerning its

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 754 (2011)-In the Matter of James R. Rosencranz

At page 3
invoice for legal services either upon request by a clie nt or on or before payment of fees due the respondent was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1) and (2). The respondent’s conduct in knowingly failing to provide a clie nt’s file upon request by a client was in

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Edward M Mahlowitz

At page 2
2 The petition alleged that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (b)(1) (duty to provide written communication concerning scope of representation and fees); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b),
(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(4) (duty to safeguard client’s property, maintain client funds in trust account,

At page 4
respect to his fail ure to communicate in writing to the client the basis of the fee and the scope of the services to be rendered, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(b)(1). Nor does he challenge the finding that he failed properly to segregate trust property, to hold trust funds in a trust account, to safeguard trust property, to identify non-cash trust property as trust property, or that he withdrew trust funds before they were earned, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), (b)(1), (b)(3) and
(b)(4). His focus, instead, is principally on the most serious allegation of misconduct, namely,

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Daniel K Webster

At page 1
continued to use his IOLTA account but falsely certified that he had closed it. For over a year, he kept no IOLTA records. Once reinstated, he made at least four cash withdrawals from the IOLTA account, and held personal funds in it. This misconduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3. 4(c); 8.4(b), (c), (d) and (h); 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C) and (E); 1.15(b)(2); and 1.15(e)(4), all as in effect prior to July 1, 2015; and 1.15(e)(4) and (b)(2).

At page 1
records in response to bar counsel’s subpoena. He submitted bank records to bar counsel that he had tampered with and knew were false. The respondent’s Count Two misconduct violated rules 1.15(c); 1.15(b)(1); 1.15(f)(1)(C), all as in effect prior to July 1, 2015, and rules 8.1(a) and (b), and 8.4 (c), (d), and

At page 1
T here were no mitigating factors. In aggravation, the respondent had prior discipline – a term suspension for nine months for intentional misuse of client funds, failure to hold trust funds in a trust account, and failure to keep records as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Matter of Webster , 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 663 (2013). The Board accepted the parties’ stipulation on December 14, 2020.

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 150 (2012)-In the Matter of Joseph K. Chancellor

At page 1
From at least January 2007 through August 201 0, the respondent failed to maintain records for his IOLTA account in acco rdance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent kept personal funds in the account, issued checks made payable to his creditors from the account,

At page 1 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 1.15(e)(3) and (5), and 1.15(f)( 1)(B-E).
In March 2007, the respondent agreed to repr esent a client on a personal injury claim

At page 1
funds on the client’s behalf. The respond ent took his fee of $10,000 without prior or contemporaneous notice to the client in violat ion of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2). Between October and November 2007, the respondent c onverted the client’s $20,000 share of the

At page 2
settlement funds on her behalf, th e respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.4(a) and (b), and 1.15(c). By failing promp tly to turn over the funds due the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c ). By inten tionally misappropriating the client’s settlement

At page 2 unds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), and (f)(1 )(C), and 8.4 (c) and (h). By falsely representing the status of her case to the client in 2008, the respondent

At page 3
clients. The respondent also pa id $10,000 in cash to the client’s mother in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3).
In December 2008, the respondent deposite d in his IOLTA account a $9,900 check

At page 3
misappropriation of the money hi s client had given him to pay costs violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (f)(1)(C), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).
In the spring of 2008, the respondent met with a female witne ss in her home in

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 809 (2011), 459 Mass. 558 (2011)-In the Matter of Tammy Shari

At page 3
retainer, belong to the client until earned by the attorney and must be held as trust funds in a client trust account. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 ( a) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003) (“trust funds” defined as any funds belonging to client but held by lawyer in connection with

At page 4
attorney has earned all or some of the fees advanced, the attorney should withdraw the earned fees, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (2) (ii), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003), but the attorney may not do so before delivering to the client “in writing (i) an itemized bill or other

At page 4
withdrawal, and (iii) a statement of the balance of the client’s funds in the trust account after the withdrawal.” Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) (2), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003).6 Where the client disputes the bill, the attorney may not withdraw the disputed funds from the trust account

At page 4 ntil the dispute is resolved. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (2) (ii). If the attorney has already withdrawn the amount billed and the client within a reasonable time after receiving the bill

At page 5
an error of timing is a serious disciplinary violation and should not happen where an attorney complies with the accounting procedure set forth in rule 1.15 (d) (2), it is different in severity
from the misuse of client funds that will never belong to the attorney.

At page 5
Law Dictionary. While the funds in an advance fee retainer belong to the client and must be held in a trust account on a client’s behalf until the fees are earned, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) (1); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1) and (2) (ii), classic retainers are considered earned by the attorney

At page 5
held in an attorney’s operating or business account, even though both are considered client trust funds. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1) (“Trust funds shall be held in a trust account, except that advances for costs and expenses may be held in a business account”). When a client advances

At page 6
(a), as amended, 432 Mass. 1301 (2000) (charging or collecting excessive fees); Mass. R. Prof.
C. 1.15 (b) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003) (failure to hold client property in trust

At page 7 full accounting of client trust property); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) (2), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2003) (failure to provide notic e of withdrawal, accounting of services rendered, and

At page 7
6Monies advanced by a client to pay for future expenses, such as filing costs or experts’ fees, are also client trust funds but need not be deposited in a trust account. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b)
(1) (“Trust funds shall be held in a trust account, exce pt that advances for costs and expenses

At page 7
the expenses for which they were advanced without the prior written notice to a client required to withdraw monies advan ced to pay legal fees. Contrast Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) (2). 7While the rules governing trust funds have been frequently amended, we have long considered

At page 7 account until earned. See, e.g., S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) (“lawyer shall hold property of clients . . . separate from the lawyer’s own property”; “[c]omplete

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 155 (2014)-In the Matter of Louis P. Font

At page 2

The respondent also violated Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.15(d)(1) (accounting for trust funds on request and final distribution of trust funds), 1.15(d)(2) (notice and accountings required on

16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 160 (2000)-In the Matter of Brian J. Feeney

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in commingling estate funds with personal funds and in converting not less than $229,463.04 of funds belonging to the estate, with intent to deprive the estateor the beneficiaries of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, isin violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and 8.4(c) and (h). On June 29, 2000, the respondent submitted his affidavit of resignation from the practice of

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 521 (2012)-In the Matter of Warren A. Kirshenbaum

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to deposit the funds to a separate interest-bearing account with interest payable to the client violated Ma ss. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5). The respondent’s conversion of the funds to his ow n use violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4( c) and (h).

At page 1 is failure to promptly to pay the client the funds due violat ed Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c).
The respondent’s intentional misrepresentations to his client explaining the delay in returning

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 70 (2012)-In the Matter of John C. Bryson, Jr

At page 2
1.5(c) (s~atement required at cenclusion of contingent-fee matter) and various provisions of Rule. ‘1.15 (segregation and payment of trust funds; records required for trust accounts). It also found that, in the circumstances, the respondent’s signing his client’s name to a release without

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 152 (2001)-In the Matter of Scott Albert Corliss

At page 1
In the first matter, the respondent obtained $5,400.00 from a client under the guise of requiring the funds for certain litigation-related expenses, including retention of an expert.The respondent had no intention of spending the funds for the reasons given to his client. Therespondent misrepresented the status of the case to his client and, when discharged by theclient, did not return any of the funds. The respondent’s conduct of intentionallymisrepresenting the status of his representation to his client was in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 8.4(c). The respondent’s conduct in obtaining funds by false pretense with intent to defraudhis client, and with actual deprivation resulting, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c) and (h). In the second matter, the respondent accepted a $500.00 retainer from a client, was then

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 77 (2013)-In the Matter of Robert K. Cabana

At page 1
of all client matter balances. The responden t’s failure to reconcile his IOLTA account and maintain required records for that account violated Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(E).
Between 2007 and the fall of 2011, the res pondent deposited earned fees and other

At page 2
withdraw from his IOLTA account all his earned fees and expense reim bursements violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). The respond ent’s cash withdrawals from his IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3). His withdrawals in cash to pay earned fees and

At page 2 xpense reimbursements violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4). In the fall of 2011, after re ceiving notice of bar counsel’s investigation, the

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 525 (2012)-In the Matter of Peter Anthony Lagorio

At page 1
was approximately $450,000 short of the amount that should have been on deposit. His conduct in these respects violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).
On July 25, 2012, the respondent submitted an affidavit of resignation pursuant to S.J.C.

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 182 (2003)-In the Matter of Carlos M. Gomez

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to account to the clients regarding his handling and distribution of funds, and his inadequate and improper record keeping including his failure to maintain andpreserve sufficient records of the handling, maintenance and disposition of client trust fundsin his possession from time of receipt to time of final distribution, constituted conduct inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b). The respondent’s failure to refund unearned feesconstituted conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d). Commencing in November 2001, the respondent on occasion corresponded with Bar Counsel.

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 512 (2003)-In the Matter of Richard H. Wynn

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct of settling a case without his client’s knowledge, his false representations to this client as to the status of her case, and false execution andnotarization of his client’s signature on a release were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a)and 8.4(c). The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of client funds with intent todeprive the client of the funds and with actual deprivation resulting was in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c) and (h). In a second matter, in July of 2001, a client retained the respondent to represent her with

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of client funds with intent to deprive the client of the funds and with actual deprivation resulting was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s conduct in continuing to practice law whiletemporarily suspended and in failing to notify the client of his suspension is in violationMass.R.Prof.C. 5.5(a) and 8.4(d),(h), as well as of Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 17, and§ 3(1). In a third matter, in September of 2001, a brother and sister retained the respondent to

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of client funds with intent to deprive the clients of the funds and with actual deprivation resulting, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c) and (h). In a fourth matter, the respondent represented a defendant in a civil matter resulting from

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of client funds with intent to deprive the client of the funds and with actual deprivation resulting was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s failure to transmit to the plaintiff the settlementfunds provided by his client was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and(h). In a fifth matter, in May of 1999, the respondent filed a complaint for divorce on behalf of

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misuse of client funds with intent to deprive the client of the funds and with actual deprivation resulting was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d)and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s failure to transmit trust funds on behalf of his client wasin violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). On March 3, 2003, the respondent submitted his affidavit of resignation from the practice of

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 145 (2020)-In the Matter of Jennifer Anne Elcock

At page 7
• failing to return the client’s funds and property (Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. ER 1.15[b)); • abandoning the client and failing to communicate to

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Richard W Larkin

At page 1
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his misconduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(b), 8.4(c) and 8.4(h). He further acknowledged that bar counsel would recommend that the Affidavit of Resignation be accepted, and that an Order of disbarment enter. Bar counsel indeed made these recommendations in a letter to the Board, citing Matter of Schoepfer , 426 Mass. 183 (1997), for the proposition that disbarment is the presumptive sa nction in cases of intentional misuse with deprivation,

306 NE 2d 203, 364 Mass. 15 (1973)-In the Matter of Troy

At page 18 nonstock corporation formed in 1896 under the provisions of Pub. Sts. (1882) c. 1 15, the predecessor of G.L.c. 180, "for educational, literary and musical purposes and encouraging athletic exercises." The

At page 20
charitable corporation. The mere fact that a corporation was formed under the provisions of G.L.c. 180 (or its predecessor , Pub. Sts. [1882] c. 1 15), does not, by itself, establish that it is a charitable corporation. Moran v. Plymouth Rubber Co. Mut. Benefit Assn. 307 Mass. 444, 446 . Arnold v. Commissioner of Corps. &

At page 35
property dedicated by statute to the charitable purposes of a Massachusetts charitable corporation organized as the Bohemian, American, Slavonik, Athletic and Literary Society under Chapter 1 15 of the Public Statutes, predecessor to Chapter 180 of the General Laws, as follows:

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 254 (2002)-In the Matter of Blake James Godbout

At page 1
Commencing in October 1998 the respondent held $9,250.00 as escrow agent. The funds were held in the respondent’s IOLTA account and represented a deposit on the prospective sale of acondominium unit pursuant to the terms of an executed purchase and sale agreement. Therespondent was the attorney for the seller in the transaction and held the deposit funds inescrow as attorney for the seller as provided in the purchase and sale agreement. The salewas not consummated. Between October 22, 1998, and December 19, 1999, the buyer madedemands upon the seller and the respondent for return of the funds. The seller also claimedentitlement to the funds. As of January 1999, the respondent was aware that it was not likelythat the dispute would be shortly resolved. However, he did not transfer the funds into anindividual interest-bearing account until December 1999, when the buyer filed suit against theseller, the respondent and others for damages. At all times before the litigation was filed, therespondent held the funds intact in his IOLTA account, pending resolution of the dispute. Therespondent’s holding of substantial disputed funds, long term, in his IOLTA account was inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d). In connection with the above complaint, the respondent failed to respond to correspondence

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 301 (2012)-In the Matter of Stephen J. Ellis

At page 2
R. Prof C. 1.5(a). By failing promptly to refund the full unearned portion of the fee, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d). By failing to provide an accurate accounting of the fee to the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof C. 1.15(d)(1). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on the respondent’s

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 337 (2020)-In the Matter of John G. Molloy

At page 1
By regularly failing to deposit client settlement funds to a client trust account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1). By failing to keep client trust funds separate from his own funds in his operating account, and by failing to safeguard the client trust funds by holding the funds in his operating account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 1.15(b)(4). By failing to maintain complete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of client trust property, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). By failing to maintain trust account records including a check register, individual client records, a ledger for bank fees and charges, and reconciliation reports, and to properly reconcile the records concerning the client trust funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), 1.15(f)(1)(C), 1.15(f)(1)(D), and 1.15(f)(1)(E).
Count Two:

At page 1
By failing promptly to render a full written accounting to his client upon final distribution of the settlement funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1).

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 86 (2018), 480 Mass. 1016 (2018)-In the Matter of Valeriano Diviacchi

At page 1
filed a petition for reinstatement in the county court, see S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (4), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009) which was then transmitted to the Board of Bar Overseers

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 708 (2007)-In the Matter of Cornelius J. Sullivan

At page 2
In regard to the estate of Dominica Manduca, bar counsel alleged that Walsh failed to pay the beneficiaries of the will for several years and failed to file estate accounts for certain years inviolation of Canon Six, DR 6-102 (A) (3) and Canon Seven, DR 7-101 (A) (1), (2) & (3), 382Mass. 784 (1981) (until January 1, 1998), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a) & 1.3, 426 Mass. 1310,1313 (1998) (conduct subsequent to January 1, 1998); failed to notify the Attorney General ofcharitable bequests as required G. L. c. 12, § 8G, in violation of Canon One, DR 1-2 (A) (5);failed to keep estate funds in a separate interest-bearing account and failed to keepadequate records of the estate funds in violation of Canon Nine, DR 9-102 (A), (B) & (C);commingled client and personal funds in the respondents’ operating account in violation ofCanon Nine, DR 9-102 (A) & (B), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998);charged a clearly excessive fee in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a) & (b), as amended 432Mass. 1301 (2000); made a false statement of material fact to a tribunal and engaged in adishonest and deceptive act in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (a) (1), 426 Mass. 1383(1998), and Rule 8.4 (c), (d) & (h), as amended 429 Mass. 1301 (1999); knowingly disobeyed acourt order and failed to expedite litigation in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.2, 3.4 (c), 426Mass. 1382, 1389 (1998), and Rule 8.4 (d) & (h); and intentionally commingled and misusedclient funds with resulting deprivation. Bar counsel alleged that Sullivan intentionally misusedthe funds of a separate, unrelated client to pay the Manduca beneficiaries. A hearing committee found that the respondents had engaged in the misconduct above.

16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 191 (2000)-In the Matter of Timothy P. Foster

At page 1
The respondent commingled funds and converted trust funds with the intent to deprive clients or their creditors of the use of the funds and with actual deprivation of the funds. Therespondent has not made any restitution. He has not participated in these proceedings nor hashe cooperated with bar counsel. The respondent repeatedly violated the disciplinary rules.See Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4)(6) and Canon 9, DR 9-102 (A)(B)(3)(4) and Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4 (c) and (n). In sum, there is no reason not to disbar the respondent. Accordingly, an order shall enter disbarring Timothy P. Foster immediately on this date, June

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 335 (2013)-In the Matter of Michael P. Hersey

At page 1
temporary deprivation to the clie nts, failed to cooperate with bar counsel’s investigation, and failed to maintain IOLTA account records in co mpliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent made restitution in full.

At page 1
The respondent failed to keep records of funds for his IOLTA account as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Among other things, the respondent did not keep a chronological check register showing each deposit and disbursement with client identifiers and with a calculation of

At page 2

The respondent’s conduct in converting trust funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s conduct in making distributions from his IOLTA account

At page 2 hat created negative balances on behalf of clients violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s conduct in failing to promptly dist ribute funds to his clie nt and the ex-spouse

At page 2 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). The respond ent’s conduct in writing a check when he knew he did not have sufficient funds in his IOLTA acc ount to cover the check violated Mass. R. Prof.

At page 2
respondent’s conduct in failing to provide a full a ccounting to his client u pon final distribution of property violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1). The responden t’s conduct in failing to keep a chronological check register showing all transactions in the IOLTA account with client

At page 2 with client identifiers violat ed Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B ), (C), (D), and (E). The respondent’s conduct in failing without good cause to respond to bar counsel’s request for

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 136 (2012)-In the Matter of Apolo Juan Catala

At page 1
of the evidence and that a he aring committee, the board and the Supreme Judicial Court would conclude: that he had violated Mass . R. Prof. C. 1.15(b ) and 8.4(c) and (h) by intentionally misusing client funds, with deprivation; and that his intentional

986 NE 2d 377, 464 Mass. 1021 (2013)-IN THE MATTER OF GUSTAFSON

At page 2
practice of law for six months, and that thereafter she be required to petition for reinstatement pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (4), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), including its requirement that she take and pass the multistate professional responsibility examination. The board filed an information to this ef fect

At page 3
to a long-term suspension must petition for reinstatement. S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (1)-(2), (4). [5] Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 18 (1) (c), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), provides that "[r]einstatement under this subsection (1) will be ef fective automatically ten days after the filing of the af fidavit unless the Bar Counsel, prior to the expiration of the

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 640 (2006)-In the Matter of David A. Reardon

At page 3
By failing to timely complete the ancillary probate proceedings in Maine and appraise and distribute the safe deposit box property, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3,1.15(b) of the rule in effect from January 1, 1998, through June 30, 2004, and 1.15(c) of therule in effect on and after July 1, 2004. By continuing to act as personal representative for theestate after his appointment as temporary executor expired; by failing to timely file his bondand obtain confirmation of his appointment as executor; by failing to timely collect, secureand distribute estate assets; by failing to take steps to prevent estate assets from escheatingto the state; by failing to reclaim escheated assets on behalf of the estate; and by delayingthe settlement of the estate, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 8.4(d), and8.4(h). By converting estate funds to his own benefit, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

At page 4
box contents upon request by persons on whose behalf he was supposed to be holding the property, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) of the rule in effect from January1, 1998, through June 30, 2004, and 1.15(d)(1) of the rule in effect on and after July 1, 2004. By filing a first and final account with the Probate Court that intentionally misrepresented

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 81 (2017)-In the Matter of Steven Louis Charli

At page 1
During the years 2014 and 2015, the r espondent failed to keep r ecords for his IOLTA account as required by Mass. R. P rof. C. 1.15. In particular, the respondent failed to maintain a chronological check register with a client identifier for each transaction; failed to perform a three-way reconciliation at least every sixty days; and failed to keep individual ledgers for each

At page 1 Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), 1.15(f )(1)(E), and 1.15(f)(1)(C) and (D ), respectively.
In September 2014, the respondent rep resented the seller of rea l estate located in Malden,

At page 1
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3. By depositing the fund s into his operating account rather than into a client trust account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) as in effect prior to July 1, 2015. By commingl ing the buyer’s deposit with his own business and/or personal

At page 1 unds, the respondent violated Ma ss. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) as in effect prior to July 1, 2015.

At page 1
deposited these funds into his operating account rather than hi s IOLTA, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1). He ultimat ely disbursed the funds from the operating account in early May 2015. The matter came before the Boa rd of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and a joint

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Theodore Wilfred Beauparlant

At page 2
By June 2021, after bar counsel had initiated an investigation, the respondent brought his IOLTA account records largely into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. There was no client complaint or evidence of misuse of client funds. In aggravation, the respondent had received a prior admonition.

At page 2
balance after each transaction violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) (1)(B). The respondent’s failure to maintain individual client ledgers violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s failure to maintain a bank fees and charges ledger violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D). The respondent’s failure to perform a three-way reconciliation every sixty days and maintain

At page 2 econciliation reports violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).
On February 16, 2022, bar counsel and the respondent filed a stipulation in which the

15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 564 (1999)-In the Matter of Walter R. Snyder Jr

At page 1
The respondent’s use of the investors’ funds, without prior knowledge and authorization, for the respondent’s own purposes or those of third parties unrelated to the investors and in violation of theescrow agreements, constitutes intentional misappropriation of trust funds with the intent to deprive, atleast temporarily, and with actual deprivation resulting, in violation of Canon One, Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4), (6); Canon Seven, Disciplinary Rules 7-102(A)(7) and (8); and Canon Nine, Disciplinary Rules 9-102(A), (B)(3), (4), and (as to conduct after January 1, 1998) Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b); 4.1(a),8.4(c), (h). In addition to the above, the respondent also failed to comply with a court order. From September 26,

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 166 (2005)-In the Matter of Robert J. Delaney

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in knowingly misusing the escrow funds was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), 1.15(b), 8.4(c) and 8.4(h). His failure to promptly deliver the escrow funds tothe seller upon notice that the seller was entitled to the funds was in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(b) and 8.4(h). Count Two: On or about May 3, 2001, the respondent abandoned his law office and law

At page 2
The respondent’s abandonment of his law practice and resulting neglect of a number of clients and pending matters was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3 and 8.4(h). Hisfailure to notify clients with pending matters of his withdrawal as their counsel, his failure tomake their files available to them, his failure to refer them to or advise them to seek otherattorneys and his failure to make any other effort to protect their interests were in violationMass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(d) and 8.4(h). His abandonment of closed files andrecords concerning his IOLTA account and his failure to make any of the closed files availableto clients and to inform them that he was abandoning his office and his practice were inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(a), 1.16(d) and 8.4(h). His failure to maintainthe confidentiality of client information left in his office when he abandoned his practice wasin violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(a) and 8.4(h). Count Three: The respondent failed without good cause to cooperate with Bar Counsel’s

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 524 (2015)-In the Matter of Hiram N. Pan

At page 1
in order to conceal his misuse of f unds in his client trust account.
By his conduct, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c), among other rules of professional conduct.
On April 27, 2015, the respondent filed an affidavit of resignation. Bar counsel

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 280 (2013)-In the Matter of Michael F. Germano

At page 1
The respondent agreed th at these facts justified the conclusion that his conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).
On January 14, 2013, the board voted to reco mmend that the affidavit of resignation

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 8 (2019)-In the Matter of Thomas R. Beauvais

At page 1
him to submit to bar counsel, on a quarterly basis for one (1) year, records demonstrating that he is compliant with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent stipulated to the facts and sanction.

At page 2
respects. By failing to promptly deliver the final share of th e settlement proceeds to his client, the respondent violated Mass. R . Prof. C. 1.3 and 1.15(c). By negligently misusing funds belonging to the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). By failing to keep

15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 462 (1999)-In the Matter of Michael D. O’Neil

At page 4
21. On January 9, 1996, the respondent was sentenced to thirty-seven months imprisonment followed by thirty-six months of supervised probation and a special assessment of 50percountforatotalof50 per count for a total of1,150.00 (Ans. ¶ 3; Ex. 4, 5). 22. During his incarceration, the respondent underwent six hundred hours of treatment for alcoholism

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 254 (2016), 476 Mass. 1006 (2016)-In the Matter of Evan A. Greene

At page 3
entitled to apply for reinstatement under S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (2) (b)," as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). The respondent appeals to the full court, arguing that the sanction is too

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (2010)-In the Matter of Marie B. McGuirk

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to file inventories and annual accounts, failure to timely file a final account upon request after the ward’s death, and failure to serve the orders of noticeviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 1.15(d) (1) and 8.4(d) and (h). In a second case, the respondent was retained on a flat fee basis by the mother of a mentally

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 23 (2017)-In the Matter of Harvey J. Bazile

At page 1
From at least·March 2013 through November 2016, the respondent failed to keep records for his IOLTA account in compliance with Mass. R. Pro£ C. 1.15. The respondent did not keep ( 1) a check register with a chronologica l list showing for

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Abby R Williams

At page 7
the only authorized signatory on the relevant IOLTA and operating accounts. The hearing committee determined, and the board agreed, that the clients were deprived of that amount, $126,607.22. The respondent’s transfer of the excess expense portion of the settlement funds into her operating account and int entional misuse of the settlement funds, with continuing deprivation resulting, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (segregation and safekeeping of trust property), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015); Mass R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) (dishonesty, deceit, misrep resentation or fraud), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1483 (2015); and 8.4 (h) (other conduct reflected adversely on fitness to practice) , as appearing in 471 Mass. 1483 (2015).

At page 7
to promptly pay her clients the funds that were due to them violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c) (failure to promptly pay funds held in trust ). Her failure to render a full written accounting to her clients, particularly with respect to a full accounting of the $160,000 she claimed were due to the firm for costs, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d)(1) (accounting due on final distribution); her failure to provide the clients, in writing, on or before the date of the withdrawal from her IOLTA account to pay her attorneys’ fees, with an itemized bill or other accounting of her services rendered, and a statement of the balance of their funds remaining in the account, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d)(2) (duty to render bill and accounting on withdrawal of funds from account). The respondent’s creation of a ne gative balance in her IOLTA account for the client matter

At page 8 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f)(1)(C) (negative client ledger balance). Her intentional misrepresentation to the clients, in the form of a false settlement breakdown, that the amount of costs she incurred on their matter was $160,000 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) (conduct involving misrepresentation) and 8.4 (d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Although the respondent suggested that Annenberg was responsible for the misappropriation, the hearing committee found no credible evidence that Annenberg (or the firm’s bookkeeper) altered the firm’s records concerning expenses for the case. For reasons detailed in the hearing committee’s report, it declined to credit much o f the respondent’s

At page 9
It found that she knew that the firm was "vastly overcharging costs," that the claimed expenses were very high for a case that resulted in a net settlement of only $300,000 and noted the suspiciously round number of the settlement proceeds. By knowingly participating in the firm’s overcharging of expenses, underpayments to the client, misrepresentations to the client about the costs in the case, her intentional mis use of the funds, and transfer of settlement funds to her operating account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) and (h). In addition, her failure promptly to pay the client the funds due violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c). Her failure to provide a full accounting to the client violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d)(1). Her failure to notify the client in writing on or before withdrawing funds for attorneys’ fees, with the amount of the fee, the services provided, and the balance of the client’s funds remaining violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d)(2). Her creation of a negative balance in her IOLTA account for the client matter violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f)(1)(C). Her intentional misrepresentation to the client that the amount of costs and fees incurred was $195,171.17

At page 10
account, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E); that she failed to "maintain" a ledger for all attorney funds in the IOLTA account for bank fees and expenses, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D); that she failed to "maintain" an individual client ledger for each client matter with a list of every transaction and running balance, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C); and that she failed to "maintain" complete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of trust property, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). In addition, the respondent failed to "make or maintain" a check register with a client identifier after every transaction, a list of every transaction and a running balance, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). 4. Count four. Like counts one and two, count four charged the respondent with

At page 12
Commonwealth, and in the other, an insurer — and then intentionally used a portion of the remaining balance to make payments for unrelated client, business and/or personal matters. The respondent’s failure to keep client funds separate from personal and business funds, and her intentional misuse of client funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) and (h). The respondent’s disbursement of funds from her IOLTA account , creating a negative balance for individual clients, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f)(1)(C). To the extent that nonlawyer assistants, or other lawyers associated with of affiliated with the respondent handled or was responsible for handling any aspect of either case, the respondent failed to supervise the lawyer or nonlawyer assistant adequately, and failed to make reasonable effor ts to

951 NE 2d 885, 460 Mass. 400 (2011)-IN THE MATTER OF PUDLO

At page 1
accounting of the fee to Barbuto. The third count alleged that by August 1, 2008, the respondent had yet to maintain any of the IOL TA records required by the July 1, 2004, amendment to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f)

At page 3
on or before the date that an attorney withdraws his fees from a client trust account. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (2) (ii) and (d) (2), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004). Nevertheless, under the pre-2004 rules in effect at the time of the respondent’s violation, the respondent was clearly obligated to keep client monies

At page 5
382 Mass. 769 (1981), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a), 426 Mass. 1315 (1998) (charging excessive fees); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) (failure to render promptly full accounting of funds received); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16 (d), 426 Mass. 1369 (1998) (failure to refund

At page 5 nearned portion of client’s advance payment); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) (ef fective July 1, 2004) (failure to maintain required records of funds in IOL TA accounts).

At page 5
(b), 426 Mass. 1314 (1998) (keep client informed, respond to reasonable inquiries, explain matters for client decisions); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (b), 426 Mass. 1315 (1998) (communicating basis for fee where lawyer has not regularly represented client); S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 1, DR 1-102 (A) (4), as appearing in 382 Mass. 769 (1981), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (engaging in conduct

At page 5
[3] The hearing committee found no mitigating or aggravating factors. [4] See Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) ("lawyer shall hold property of clients … separate from the lawyer’s own property"; "[c]omplete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of [client funds] shall be kept

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 287 (2020)-In the Matter of Christopher J. Kiely

At page 2
By failing to carry out his responsibilities as settlement agent with competence and reasonable diligence, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3. By failing to promptly deliver the funds held in his IOLTA account to the seller and the mortgage lenders, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). Once notified of the seller’s complaint by bar counsel, the respondent failed to respond to

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 426 (2016)-In the Matter of Ezenwa L. Nwogu

At page 1
ledgers, withdrawing cash from the IOLTA account and failing to periodically reconcile it. His conduct was found to be in violation of disciplinary rules 1.15 (b) and (c), 1.15(e)(3), 1.15(f)(1)(C) and (E), 1.8(e), 3.3(a)(1), and 8.4(c), (d) and (h).

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 542 (2008)-In the Matter of Robert H. Guida

At page 3
By delegating complete responsibility to the office manager and bookkeeping staff for their IOLTA accounts; by each personally failing to supervise and monitor the office manager andstaff to insure that G&P’s accounts were managed in a manner compatible with the firm’sprofessional obligations; and by failing to maintain or cause to be maintained adequate andaccurate records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of client and other trust funds,the respondents violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) as in effect prior to July 1, 2004, aswell as Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and 5.3. By failing to safeguard client funds; by turning over control of trust accounts to the office

At page 3 anager and bookkeeping staff without ensuring that they were conducting themselves in amanner compatible with the firm’s professional obligations; and by failing promptly to payfunds due to clients and third persons, the respondents violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and(b) as in effect prior to July 1, 2004, as well as Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and 5.3. In mitigation, the respondent Perry self-reported this matter to bar counsel and the firm made

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 221 (2015)-In the Matter of Evan A. Greene

At page 5
would need to do to ·repurchase her home. The board foWld that as to three of the transactions the respondent violated mle 1.15 (d) by commingling rent received from homeowners and other personal payments with client ftmds

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 377 (2005)-In the Matter of Daniel R. Kirkpatrick

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of trust funds for personal and business purposes unrelated to the testamentary trust resulted in actual and continuing deprivation andconstituted conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and 1.15(a) and (b), asappearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04. The respondent’sfailure to account fully for the testamentary trust’s funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), asappearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04. On December 28, 2005, the respondent filed an affidavit of resignation pursuant to Supreme

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of E. David Edge

At page 2
objectives), 1.3 (act with reasonable diligence), 1.15(b)(1) (hold trust funds in trust account), 1.15(b)(3) (deposit legal fees in trust account and withdraw only as earned), 1.15(b)(4) (safeguard trust property), and 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
The second count of the petition for discipline charged IOLTA recordkeeping violations from June through November 2018, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E) (prepare reconciliation reports at least every sixty days).

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 389 (2003)-In the Matter of Isaiah Shalom

At page 8
Count Four – Conclusions of Law 51. By commingling client or third-party funds and personal funds and by converting client orthird-party funds to his own use, the Respondent violated Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.15(a) (property ofclients or third persons shall be held separate from lawyer’s own funds) and (d) (all funds heldin trust shall be held in accounts identified as fiduciary accounts) and 8.4(c) (dishonesty,fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) and (h) (conduct that adversely reflects on his or herfitness to practice). II. Factors in Mitigation and Aggravation

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 383 (2003)-In the Matter of Shawn C. Salter

At page 1
In the first matter, the respondent was retained in October 1999 by to represent a defendant on the appeal of his criminal conviction for drug trafficking. The respondent was paid $10,000plus an additional $1500 for trial transcripts. The respondent never filed an appellate brief onbehalf of the client, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, and stopped communicating with theclient in April 2001, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4. The client wrote to the respondent inFebruary 2002, and discharged him as appellate counsel. He also requested an accounting ofthe funds that he had paid to the respondent and refund of any unearned fee. The respondentfailed to reply the client’s telephone calls and letters, failed to withdraw after beingdischarged in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16 (a), failed to account for his $10,000 fee inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), and failed to return any unearned fee in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) and 1.16 (d). In the second matter, the respondent was retained in May 2001, to represent a defendant on

At page 1 rug trafficking charges pending in district court. The district court charges were dismissedafter the client was indicted and arraigned in Suffolk Superior Court. The client decided todischarge the respondent in October 2001, and retain new counsel. Successor counsel wrote tothe respondent on October 26, 2001 and requested that he send the client’s file, anaccounting of his services, and a refund of any unearned fees. The respondent failed to replyto the successor counsel’s letter and did not provide the file, accounting or refund, all inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4, 1.15 (b), 1.16 (d) and (e) In the third matter, the respondent was assigned by the Committee for Public Counsel Services

At page 1 o review the criminal conviction of a defendant to determine whether or not there werearguable grounds for a motion for new trial. The respondent was to proceed with the motionif he determined that there was basis to file it. The respondent determined that there weregrounds to support a motion and he filed a motion for new trial on behalf of the client inJune 2001, together with a request for a hearing on the matter. The respondent made somefollow-up telephone calls to the clerk’s office to attempt to schedule the hearing. However,the court took no action. The respondent failed to pursue the matter further, in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and then stopped communicating with the client in October 2001, inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4. The client contacted the Committee for Public CounselServices for assistance, and on or about January 17, 2002, new counsel was appointed torepresent the client. Successor counsel wrote to the respondent on June 27, 2002 andrequested that the respondent send him the client’s file. The respondent failed to reply tosuccessor counsel’s letter and did not provide him with the file in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15 (b), and 1.16(d) and (e) The respondent also failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s inquiries regarding these matters,

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 147 (2017)-In the Matter of Nancy C. Flahive

At page 1
intentionally misusing client f unds, the respondent violated Ma ss. R. Prof. C. Rules 3.4(c), 1.15(b) and (c), and 8.4(c).

At page 2
failed to maintain accurate client ledgers, a check register an d three-way reconciliations, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. R ule 1.15 (b), (d), (e) and (f).
On May 23, 2017, bar counsel filed with the board the respondent’s affidavit of

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 537 (2011)-In the Matter of Peter Charles Lacy

At page 1
funds in the account to cover bank charges. By June 2010, the respondent had brought his IOLTA account record keeping into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15.
The respondent’s conduct in failing to perf orm a three-way reconciliation of the account

At page 1 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). His conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with a client identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction and running balance violated

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individual client ledgers with a list of every transaction and runni ng balance and failing to keep a ledger of his

At page 1 ersonal funds for bank fees and expenses violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C), and (D). The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds and his conduct in issuing checks that created a negative balance in the amounts held in the IOLTA account for individual clients violated Mass.

At page 1 . Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (f)(1)(C).

851 NE 2d 404, 447 Mass. 345 (2006)-IN THE MATTER OF LUPO

At page 5
rule 8.4(h). Finally , the hearing committee concluded that the respondent’s refusal to account for his handling and disposition of his aunt’s funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998).[ 2 6 ]354 As to the factors in mitigation or aggravation, the hearing committee found no mitigating factors, but noted

At page 8
year suspension for experienced real estate attorney who made false statements and material omissions regarding improper loans); Matter of McIntyre, 426 Mass. 1012, 1015 (1998) (two-year suspension for mishandling of client funds). Here, the respondent’s conduct was far more egregious than conflicted

At page 10
rules, the "recommended sanction would not be altered." [26] At the time of the hearings and ef fective until July 1, 2004, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998), provided: "Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.

At page 10
third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property ." See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004). [27] The board did not issue a written decision, nor did it address the appeal panel’s recommendation that an accounting of his aunt’s

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 588 (2009)-In the Matter of J. Edward Surette, III

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to promptly deliver trust funds to a third person entitled to receive the funds, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). In addition, from July 31, 2007, to September 11, 2007, the respondent knowingly failed to

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 105 (2009)-In the Matter of Ennio Cataldo

At page 2
In Count One, the respondent’s negligent misuse of his client’s funds for unrelated personal or business purposes, his failure to account for or deliver the client’s funds, and his failure tomaintain contemporaneous records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of the client’sfunds was conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), (d), and (f). In Counts Two,Four, and Five, the respondent’s conduct constituted lack of diligence, failure tocommunicate, and failure to seek the clients’ lawful objectives in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.4(b). In Count Three, the respondent’s conduct constituted lack ofdiligence and failure to seek the client’s lawful objectives in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.2(a) and 1.3. In Counts Two, Four, and Five, the respondent’s conduct constituted charginga clearly excessive fee and a failure to refund the unearned portion of the fee in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a), 1.15(c), and 1.16(d). In Count Three, the respondent’s conductconstituted a failure to account for and refund the unexpended costs paid by the client and afailure to pay the client the full amount of the judgment as required by a court order inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), 3.4(c), and 8.4(d). In Counts Three and Five, therespondent’s conduct in making misrepresentations to his clients was in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 8.4(c). In Count Six, the respondent was charged with failing to respond to eight grievances, four of

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 326 (2004)-In the Matter of Richard H. Liebman

At page 2
By failing to notify a public administrator or personal representative of the first ward’s estate that he was holding funds on behalf of ward, and by failing promptly to pay or deliver saidfunds to the person(s) or entities entitled to receive said funds after his ward’s death in 1984,the respondent violated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), Canon Six, DR 6-101(A)(3), andCanon Nine, DR 9-102(B)(1) and (4), as to conduct occurring before January 1, 1998, andMass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.15(b), and 8.4(d) and (h), as to conduct occurring on and afterJanuary 1, 1998. By failing to take steps to prevent his wards’ funds from escheating to theCommonwealth of Massachusetts, or to reclaim said funds, the respondent violated Canon Six,DR 6-101(A)(2) and (3), and Canon Nine, DR 9-102(B)(2), as to conduct occurring beforeJanuary 1, 1998, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.15(a), as to conduct occurringon and after January 1, 1998. By failing to pay or deliver the funds he was holding on behalf of the third ward to a court-

At page 2 ppointed person after he was discharged as guardian on February 7, 1994, and by failing tonotify the Probate Court at the time he was discharged that other funds he previously washolding on behalf of the ward had escheated to the state and had not yet been claimed, therespondent violated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), Canon Six, DR 6-101(A)(3), and CanonNine, DR 9-102(B)(1) and (4), as to conduct occurring before January 1, 1998, and Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.3, 1.15(b), and 8.4(d) and (h), as to conduct occurring on and after January 1,1998. By failing to notify a public administrator or personal representative of the third ward’sestate that he was holding funds on behalf of the ward, and by failing promptly to pay ordeliver said funds to the person(s) or entities entitled to receive said funds after the thirdward’s death in 2002, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.15(b), and 8.4(d) and(h). By intentionally misrepresenting to the State Treasurer’s Office that he was still serving as

At page 3
By failing to render accounts at least once a year regarding the guardianship estates as required by Massachusetts General Laws c. 206, §1, thereby neglecting his duties as guardianand engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, the respondent violatedCanon One, DR 1-102(A)(5), Canon Six, DR 6-101(A)(3), and Canon Nine, DR 9-102(B)(3), as toconduct occurring before January 1, 1998, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and 8.4(d), as to conductoccurring on and after January 1, 1998. By failing to maintain complete records of thereceipt, maintenance, and disposition of all funds and property he received as guardian, andby failing to account for his wards’ funds when asked to do so by the G.A.L. appointed by theProbate Court, the respondent violated Canon Six, DR 6-101(A)(2) and (3), and Canon Nine,DR 9-102(B)(3), as to conduct occurring before January 1, 1998, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1,1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(a) and (b), and 8.4(d) and (h), as to conduct occurring on and after January1, 1998. By filing accounts with the Probate Court under the pains and penalties of perjury that were

At page 3
By failing to hold the wards’ funds in interest-bearing client funds accounts clearly identified as fiduciary accounts for the wards after December 2, 1998, the respondent violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(a), (d) and (e). By failing to promptly pay the wards’ funds to publicadministrators, with actual deprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a) and (b), and 8.4(h). On December 9, 1992, the respondent was appointed the temporary guardian, and on

At page 4
101(A)(2) and (3), and Canon Nine, DR 9-102(B)(3), as to conduct occurring before January 1, 1998, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.15(a), as to conduct occurring on and afterJanuary 1, 1998. By failing to sell or appropriately maintain his ward’s real property, and byfailing to make available for the use of his ward the funds he is holding on her behalf, therespondent has violated his fiduciary obligations as guardian of the ward and neglected a legalmatter entrusted to him, in violation of Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(5), and Canon Six, DR 6-101(A)(3), as to conduct occurring before January 1, 1998, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a),1.3, and 8.4(d), as to conduct occurring on and after January 1, 1998. By failing to hold thefunds represented by the $233.25 Fleet bank check in an interest-bearing client funds accountclearly identified as a fiduciary account after September 6, 2000, the respondent violatedMass. Rule Prof. C. 1.15(a), (d), and (e). By failing to pay the real estate taxes on the ward’sproperty, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), and 1.3. On July 21, 1988, the respondent was appointed administrator of an estate. On or about July

At page 4
By failing to promptly pay the estate funds to the person(s) or entities entitled to receive said funds, with actual deprivation resulting; by commingling the estate funds with his own funds;and by failing to maintain the estate funds in an interest-bearing client funds account clearlyidentified as a fiduciary account for the estate, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a), (b), (d), and (e), and 8.4(h). By failing to take steps as executor to prevent theestate’s funds from escheating, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, and1.15(a). By failing to maintain complete records of the receipt, maintenance, and dispositionof all funds and property he received on behalf of the estate, the respondent violated CanonSix, DR 6-101(A)(2) and (3), and Canon Nine, DR 9-102(B)(3), as to conduct occurring beforeJanuary 1, 1998, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.15(a), as to conduct occurringon and after January 1, 1998. By failing to file an inventory, and by failing to render accountsat least once a year regarding the estate as required by Massachusetts General Laws c. 206,§1, thereby neglecting his duties as executor and engaging in conduct prejudicial to theadministration of justice, the respondent violated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(5), Canon Six, DR6-101(A)(3), and Canon Nine, DR 9-102(B)(3), as to conduct occurring before January 1, 1998,and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and 8.4(d), as to conduct occurring on and after January 1, 1998. Byfailing to complete the settlement of the estate in a timely manner, the respondent violatedCanon Six, DR 6-101(A)(3), as to conduct occurring before January 1, 1998, and Mass. R. Prof.C. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), and 1.3, as to conduct occurring on and after January 1,1998. The respondent failed without good cause to provide documentation requested by Bar Counsel

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Mark Clinton Hooper Jr

At page 2
IOLTA account for anticipated bank fees. The respondent’s failure to perform a three- way reconciliation of his IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). The respondent’s failure to maintain a chronological check register w ith client identifiers for

At page 2 very transaction and a running balance violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s failure to keep individual client matter ledgers violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s failure to keep a ledger for bank fees and charges with a list of every transaction and running balance violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(F)(1)(D).

865 NE 2d 1110, 449 Mass. 154 (2007)-IN THE MATTER OF McBRIDE

At page 2
*157 By January 26, 1995, Stallworth had discharged McBride. They agreed that of the 15,000thathadbeenpaidforhisworkonthecriminalappeal,McBridewouldkeeponly15,000 that had been paid for his work on the criminal appeal, McBride would keep only 1,150. On January 27, McBride

At page 4
board’s finding of violations of DR 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6); DR 2-106(A); DR 7-101(A)(1), (2), and (3); DR 9-102(A), (B), and (C); and, for those violations occurring after January 1, 1998, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, 426 Mass. 1363 (1998), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998).160

At page 7
$25,683.33 represented the $50,000 settlement less the $6,500 in payments to the Stallworths, 16,166.67forMcBride′sforfeiturefee,and16,166.67 for McBride's forfeiture fee, and 1,150 for the criminal appeal. [4] Doe’s conduct also was the subject of a petition for discipline. See Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney , 448 Mass. 819 (2007) .

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 649 (2008)-In the Matter of Stafford Sheehan

At page 1
. The respondent maintained an IOLTA account into which he deposited his personal funds from December, 2002, to June 13, 2005. This is a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d), effective to July 1, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (b), effective July 1, 2004.

At page 2
from a different client, who was disabled and undergoing surgery at the time. That client had engaged the respondent to collect moneys due on a note. After declaring retired status onNovember 10, 2006, the respondent referred the matter to another attorney, who eventuallysettled the case. The client asked the other attorney to hold about $34,000. Without theclient’s permission, the respondent obtained a bank check drawn on these funds and madepayable to the client. He signed the client’s name on the check, without authority, anddeposited it to his IOLTA account. He then used these funds to repay the estate, as describedin Count 2. The respondent has not fully repaid the amount taken, and still owes about$11,000. This conduct violates Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) and (h). In aggravation, the respondent engaged in misconduct motivated by self interest. See Matter

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 80 (2010)-In the Matter of David J. Coffey

At page 2 funds with his own, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1). The respondent’sfailure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness on his client’s case, to appear forscheduled court dates and to compel discovery violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3. Therespondent’s failure to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information from theclient violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4. By failing to promptly return the client’s file as requested, the respondent violated Mass. R.

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 347 (2005)-In the Matter of Ronald J. Itri

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to conclude in a timely manner the administration of the estates for which he was appointed public administrator and to make prompt disbursement of the estateassets to the persons entitled to receive the funds is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.3 and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997) effective1/1/98 through 6/30/04 and, for conduct prior to January 1, 1998, Canon Six, DR 6 101(A)(3)and Canon Nine, DR 9 102(A) and (B). The respondent’s record keeping for the estates for which he was appointed public

At page 1
The respondent’s inadequate record keeping and inaccurate accounting, his failure to conclude in a timely manner the administration of the estates for which he was appointedpublic administrator and his failure to make prompt disbursement of the estate assets to therecipient is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b)as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997) effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04 and, forconduct prior to January 1, 1998, Canon Six, DR 6 101(A)(3) and Canon Nine, DR 9 102(A) and(B). On June 7, 2005, the respondent filed an affidavit of resignation pursuant to Supreme Judicial

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Peter T Sli

At page 1
violations. As to count 1, the hearing committee found that the respondent intentional ly misus ed client funds, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015) ; made cash withdrawals f rom an IOLTA account, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (e) (4);

At page 1 C. 1.15 (e) (6); failed to provide his clients with a writing stating the basis for his fees and expenses, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (b), as appearing in 463 Mass. 1302 (2012); failed to provide competent representation, to seek the lawful objectives of his clients and to perform the contracted services with reasonable diligence, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, as appearing

At page 2
found that the respondent failed to provide his client with a written contingent fee agreement, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (c), as amended, 480 Mass. 1315 (2018), and engaged in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice and adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law see Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (d), (h), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1483 (2015).

At page 2
The board voted to adopt the hearing committee’s decision and to file an information with this court recommending that the respondent be disbarred. The board’s recommendation that the respondent be disbarred is based on his violating Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015), by intentionally misusing client funds as alleged in count 1. As to each of the additional violations which made up the rest of count 1 and the viol ations that were proved as

At page 9
evidence.’" Matter of Weiss , 474 Mass. 1001, 1001 n.1 (2016), quoting S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009) . "[T] he hearing committee’s ultimate ‘findings and recommendations, as adopted by the board, are entitled to deference, although they are not binding on this court.’" Id ., quoting Matter of Ellis , 457 Mass. 413, 415 (2010). See Matter of

At page 10
The hearing committee concluded that misuse resulting in actual deprivation occurred because the Higginbottoms’ funds were the only funds in the IOLTA account and the account balance consistently fell below the amount needed to pay off the mortgage as a result of the numerous cash withdrawals that the respondent made. In addition, the funds were due immediately to the mortgagee on the Higginbottoms’ behalf, but the respondent failed to timely pay off the mortgage. Eventually, the Higginbottoms were forced to pay off the mortgage using additional personal funds. The record therefore adequately supports the hearing committee’s conclusion, which the board adopted, that misuse resulting in deprivation occurred in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) and 8.4 (c), (h). 10 Matter of Bailey , 439 Mass. 134, 150 (2003)

At page 11
unavailability of the client’s funds after they have become due, and may expose the client to a risk of harm, even if no harm actually occurs" [ citation omitted ]). In addition, these facts support the hearing committee’s findings and conclusions that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (e) (4) by making cash withdrawals from the IOLTA account and violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (e) (6) by holding an amount in excess of $96,000 in a noninterest- bearing IOLTA account instead of in a separate interest -bearin g account.

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 610 (2010)-In the Matter of Gerald S. Shulman

At page 1
Between July 1, 2004 and May 2010, the respondent’s IOLTA account was not properly reconciled every sixty days, the check register lacked client identifiers, the respondent didnot calculate a running balance, the respondent did not maintain individual ledgers for eachclient matter, and there was no ledger for the respondent’s personal funds in the account tocover bank charges. Bar counsel asked the respondent four times to bring his account recordsinto compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent did not do so until May 2010. InFebruary 2009, a check to a client drawn on the IOLTA account was dishonored for insufficientfunds because the respondent had negligently drawn on the client’s funds in the account. Therespondent immediately deposited personal funds to the account to correct the shortage. The respondent’s conduct in failing to perform a three-way reconciliation of the account

At page 1 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). His conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with aclient identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction and running balanceviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individualclient ledgers with a list of every transaction and running balance and failing to keep a ledgeror other records of his personal funds for bank fees and expenses violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(C), and (D). The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds in the IOLTA accountviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). On July 7, 2010, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline, and the parties filed the

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 72 (2002)-In the Matter of Richard P. Blaustein

At page 1
The respondent’s commingling and intentional misappropriation of client funds, with intent to deprive the client of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, isconduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c),(h) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b),(d), and(e). The respondent’s drafting and execution of an agreement with the client in March 2001

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2004)-In the Matter of Michael G. McDonal

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to safeguard the deposit and to account for his receipt, handling, maintenance and disposition of the funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b). Therespondent’s conduct in commingling the escrow funds with his own funds, in intentionallymisappropriating the buyer’s escrow funds, and in failing promptly to turn the funds overwhen due violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), and (d), and 8.4(c) and (h). The second matter involved the respondent’s representation of another seller of real estate in

At page 2 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b). The respondent’s conduct in commingling the escrow funds with his own funds, in intentionally misappropriating the buyers’ escrow funds,

At page 2 nd in failing promptly to turn the funds over when due violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b), and (d), and 8.4(c) and (h). In the third matter, the respondent represented a debtor in a Chapter 13 proceeding before

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in failing to promptly pay the original lender violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.15(b). The respondent’s conduct in signing the stipulation withoutauthority from his client violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a) and 1.4(a) and (b). The respondent’sconduct in failing to communicate to his client that the respondent had never paid theobligation to the original lender and that the original lender was seeking to enjoin furtherencumbrances and vacate the discharge violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b) and 8.4(h).

At page 3 lender the funds to which it was entitled violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), and (d), and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s conduct in intentionally misrepresenting to counsel for thefirst lender and the bankruptcy court that payment was made to the first lender by check onhis business account when he knew that the funds in that account were insufficient violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(a)(1), (2), and (4), 4.1(a), and 8.4(c), (d), and (h). The respondent’sconduct in intentionally misrepresenting to the bankruptcy court that he had notified hisclient of his failure to pay the first lender violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(a)(1), (2), and (4),and 8.4(c) and (d).

At page 4
The respondent’s conduct in failing to promptly pay his client the funds that were due to her, commingling her funds with his funds, and in intentionally misappropriating his client’s fundsviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.15(a), (b), and (d) and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’sconduct in concealing his connection to the realty company from his client violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 4.1(a) and (b) and 8.4(c) and (h). His conduct in paying himself a brokeragecommission for the sale of the condominium upon terms that were not fair and reasonable tohis client and without her written consent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(a). His conduct indeliberately concealing the payments from the sale of the condominium to himself for legalservices and broker’s commission from the bankruptcy court violated Mass. R. Prof. C.3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), and 8.4(c), (d), and (h). The fifth matter involved the representation of a husband and wife who were debtors in a

At page 4
The respondent’s conduct in commingling this client’s funds, failing to distribute the funds when due, failing to segregate the funds and hold them at interest for the benefit of his clientor her bankruptcy estate, and failing to account adequately for the funds violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.15(a), (b), (d) and (e) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’sconduct in intentionally misappropriating the client’s funds and in failing promptly to turn thefunds over to his client when due violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), and (d), and 8.4(c)and (h).

At page 6
The respondent’s conduct in commingling the proceeds of the closing with his own funds and in intentionally converting the funds lent to the realty trust violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b), (c), and (d), and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s conduct in using confidential information gained in representing his in-laws

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 707 (2015)-In the Matter of Kelly A. Young aka Kelly A. Foley

At page 9 1.15 (b), (c), (d), and (f) (failing promptly to pay client, properly to segregate and account for trust property, and to

At page 11
to act with diligence and promptness in representing a client); 1.15 (c) (failing properly to segregate and account for trust property); 1.16 (d) (withdrawing from the representation without

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 476 (2017)-In the Matter of Sergio P. Vespa

At page 9
funds, where a dishonored check is automatically reported to the Office of the Bar Counsel because it raises the specter of misuse of client funds. 5 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(h) (dishonored check notification). More importantly, he is responsible for accurate bookkeeping

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 368 (2006)-In the Matter of Paul J. Grella

At page 1
Paul J. Grella is before the court on an Information filed by the Board of Bar Overseers (board) recommending that he be disbarred. The recommended sanction is for violations ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.15(a), 1.15(b), 8.1(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), 8.4(g), and8.4(h). I held a hearing on July 27, 2006, and have carefully reviewed the record ofproceedings before the board, including the special hearing officer’s report, which the boardadopted. I conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction (an issue not disputed byGrella), and reject the respondent’s claim that the disbarment should be retroactive to thedate he was eligible to be reinstated following an earlier suspension on an unrelated matter.

  1. Background. Grella was first suspended from the practice of law on December 12, 2002.

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 13 (2014)-In the Matter of Lisa Beth Wilkins Baker

At page 1
account or an individual, interest-bearing trust account and failed to maintain records of the receipt and maintenance of these funds in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). The respondent also deposited personal funds into her IOLTA account in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b).

At page 2
entitled to receive the funds. The respondent failed to promptly de liver the funds, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). Thereafter, in violat ion of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a), the respondent ignored requests from an attorney for the minor for bank statements and other records that would

At page 2 accounting of the funds, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1).

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 285 (2005)-In the Matter of Merrill D. Goldfarb

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of trust funds, with intent to deprive the client or the intended recipient of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivationresulting and continuing, is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) in effectprior to July 1, 2004 (now Rule 1.15(b) and (c)) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c)and (h). The respondent’s intentional misrepresentation in his affidavit of compliance filed with bar

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 68 (2001)-In the Matter of Michael J. Bednarz, Jr

At page 2
which the respondent received by certified check from her successor counsel on June 14, 1993) with the wrongful intent to deprive his client of the use of those assets at leasttemporarily, resulting in actual and continuing deprivation to his client, violated Canon One,DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6), Canon Two, DR 2-110(A)(2), and Canon Nine, DR 9-102(A), (B), and(C), and Rules 1.15(a), (b), and (d), Rule 1.16(d), and Rules 8.4(c) and (h) of theMassachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent’s failure to account to his client concerning the escrow funds violated Canon

At page 2 ne, DR 1-102(A)(6) and Canon Nine, DR 9-102(B)(1) and (3), and Rules 1.15(b) and Rule8.4(h) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent’s failure to take steps to enforce the terms of his client’s settlement

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 503 (2008)-In the Matter of Christopher Nolan

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in commingling his own funds with trust funds in the IOLTA account, depositing personal or business funds to the IOLTA account, and failing to withdraw fees fromthe account promptly as they were earned violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (d)(2), as ineffect through June 30, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2), effective July 1, 2004. ThroughJune 30, 2004, the respondent’s failure to maintain complete IOLTA account records violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), as then in effect. From July 1, 2004, through October 2006, therespondent’s failure to reconcile his IOLTA account and maintain all required account recordsviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(F), as in effect since July 1, 2004. Count II

At page 2
The respondent’s conversion of the escrow funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). The respondent’s intentional misrepresentation to the tenant’s lawyer about the status of thefunds and failure to disclose his misuse and dissipation of the funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C.4.1(a) and (b) and 8.4(c). The respondent’s failure to deposit the escrow funds to anindividual trust account with interest payable as directed by the parties, failure to segregatethe funds, and commingling of the funds with his own funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(d) and (e) through June 30, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (e)(5) on and after July1, 2004. The respondent’s failure promptly to remit the funds due the tenant violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) through June 30, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) on and after July 1,2004. The respondent’s failure to keep complete, required records of the escrow funds and to

At page 2 ccount for the funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) through June 30, 2004, andMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1) on and after July 1, 2004. His failure to inform his clients that heno longer held funds on their behalf, had misused and dissipated the funds, and was thereforeunable to pay the funds to the tenant violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b). Count III

At page 3
respondent’s failure to deposit those funds to a trust account or segregate the funds and his commingling of the funds with his own funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (d) and (e), asin effect through June 30, 2004. The respondent’s failure promptly to remit the funds due hisclient violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), as in effect through June 30, 2004. The respondent’sfailure to keep complete records of the funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), as in effectthrough June 30, 2004. Count IV. In early 2005, roommates hired the respondent to represent them in lease disputes

At page 3
The respondent’s conversion of the clients’ funds violated Mass. R. Prof. 8.4(c). The respondent’s failure to deposit the funds to a trust account and his commingling the fundswith his own funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (e)(5), as in effect on and after July1, 2004. The respondent’s failure promptly to remit the funds due the landlord pursuant to hisclients’ instructions violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), as in effect on and after July 1, 2004.The respondent’s failure to keep required records of the funds and to account for the fundsviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1), as in effect on and after July 1, 2004. His failure toinform the clients of his misuse and dissipation of the funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a)and (b). Count V

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 45 (2014)-In the Matter of David M. Butler

At page 1

By his conduct, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (d), (e) and (f). On August 26, 2014, the respond ent filed an affidavit of resignation. Bar counsel

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 704 (2008)-In the Matter of John Udo

At page 2
The respondent’s commingling of personal and business funds with client funds in his IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(h). The respondent’s intentional misuse ofestate sale proceeds for unrelated client and other business and personal purposes, withcontinuing deprivation resulting to the client, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c). Therespondent’s failure to promptly disburse funds due to the client that the client was entitledto receive violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.4, 1.15(c) and 8.4(h). The respondent’s failureto promptly restore disputed legal fees to his client trust account violated Mass R. Prof.1.15(b)(2). Other counts in bar counsel’s petition alleged failure to safeguard advanced filing fees paid,

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 126 (2010)-In the Matter of Richard A. Dalton

At page 2 trust funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). By failing to keep check registers for his escrow and IOLTA accounts with client identifiers after every transaction, lists

At page 2 f every transaction, and running balances, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(B). By failing to keep individual client ledgers for each client matter with lists ofevery transaction and running balances for his escrow and IOLTA accounts, the respondentviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). By failing to keep ledgers for all of his funds for bankfees and expenses on deposit in the escrow and IOLTA accounts, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D). By failing to hold client trust property separate from hispersonal property, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). By failing to removeearned fees from the IOLTA account at the earliest reasonable time after his interest in thefunds became fixed, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii). The respondent’snegligent misuse of client funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The respondent attended a trust account record-keeping class and began reconciling his IOLTA

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 652 (2008)-In the Matter of Joel F. Soforenko

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in failing to maintain required records for his IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). The respondent’s conduct in issuing checks from his IOLTAaccount that caused a negative balance with respect to an individual client violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s failure to promptly pay funds to persons or entitiesentitled to receive them violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, and 1.15(b). The respondent’s recklessdisregard that his IOLTA account was short of funds, his continuing to make payments from theaccount without regard to whether or not there were sufficient funds on deposit from theproper client to meet those obligations, and his use of funds belonging to clients to payobligations unrelated to those clients violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), and 8.4(c). Therespondent’s conduct in recklessly issuing disbursement checks that were not covered by goodfunds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C), and 8.4(c). The respondent was admitted to practice in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on December

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 177 (2018)-In the Matter of Pamela Harris-Daley

At page 2 representation, the respondent vi olated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15( b) and 1.16(d).

At page 2
a statement of the balance of t he client’s funds in the trust a ccount before each withdrawal of his funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2) .

At page 2 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5).

At page 2
reconciliation reports on a regul ar basis for her IOLTA account , the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)(C)(D) and (E).

279 NE 2d 296, 360 Mass. 787, 360 Ma … – Mass: Supreme Judicial …, 1972-MATTER OF DeSAULNIER (NO. 4)

At page 36
(corresponding Paragraphs in the Information are noted in parenthesis)

  1. (1-15) Paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Information are true statements to the best of the Respondent’s information and belief. Respondent further informs the Court that his friendship

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 312 (2008)-In the Matter of James S. Gregson

At page 1
The respondent’s misuse and conversion of funds constituted dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and conversion, commingling, failureto safeguard trust funds, and failure to deliver trust funds, all in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b) and (c). The respondent’s withdrawal of funds from his IOLTA account without identifying the client

At page 1 atter to which the withdrawals related constituted failure to maintain complete records ofthe receipt, maintenance, and disposition of his trust account funds, in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(f). The respondent’s resignation was accepted and an order of disbarment entered.

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 434 (2006)-In the Matter of Irwin Kwiat

At page 1
In October of 2002, the client terminated the representation and demanded the return of his retainer. The respondent did not withdraw from the representation and did not provide theclient with an accounting for his fee. The respondent’s failure to withdraw and account for hisfee upon termination was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) [as in effect through June30, 2004], 1.15(d)(1) [effective July 1, 2004] and 1.16(a)(3). In the second matter, the respondent agreed in February of 2001 to represent a client in

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to withdraw and account for his fee upon termination was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) [as in effect through June 30, 2004], 1.15(d)(1) [effective July 1,2004] and 1.16(a)(3). In the third matter, the respondent agreed in March of 2001 to represent a client on a direct

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to maintain reasonable communications with the client and to respond to his reasonable requests for information was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a).His failure to account for his fee upon termination in August of 2002 was in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) [as in effect through June 30, 2004] and 1.15(d)(1) [effective July 1, 2004]. In the fourth matter, the respondent agreed in July of 2001 to represent a client on a direct

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to maintain reasonable communications with the client and to respond to his reasonable requests for information was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a).His failure to withdraw and account for his fee upon termination in September of 2002 was inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) [as in effect through June 30, 2004], 1.15(d)(1) [effectiveJuly 1, 2004] and 1.16(a)(3). In the fifth matter, the respondent represented a client on various criminal charges in

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 376 (2018), 479 Mass. 1016 (2018)-In the Matter of Robert C. Moran

At page 1

3 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) (2), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).

At page 2

4 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1) , as appea ring in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) .

At page 2
Prof. C. 1.2 (a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c) , (d) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (c),

At page 2

8 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1), (e) (5), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) .

At page 2

11 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.

At page 5
objectives); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998) (lack of diligence); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c) , as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) (failure promptly to deliver funds to

At page 6
estates, in trust accounts, in violation of Mass. R. Pro f. C. 1.15 (b) (1) , as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) .
Admonition No. 05 -20, 21 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 712 (2005).

At page 6 himself, in v iolation of Mass. R. Prof. 1.15 (d), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004), and failed to keep required trust

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 303 (2018)-In the Matter of Marina R. Matuzek

At page 1
those accounts adequately and fa iled to maintain adequately all records requir ed by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) for those accounts.
In the course of admin isteri ng her old IOLTA, the respondent fa iled at times to remit

At page 1
By failing promptly to remit all trust funds to which her clien ts were entitled from her old IOLTA, the respondent violated M ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and Ma ss. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d) as then in effect. By failing to withdraw prom ptly all her earned f ees and expense reimbursements from

At page 1
reconcile her IOLTA accounts and failing to main tain all requir ed records for those accounts, the respondent violated Mass. R . Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(E). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on the partie s’ stipu lation of facts

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 581 (2016)-In the Matter of Glen R. Vasa

At page 3
conduct of respondent, Glen R. Vasa, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5 (a), 471 Mass. 1415 (2015) {lawyer shall not engage in or assist unauthorized practice of law); S.J.C. Rule 4:01, §

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 35 (2002)-In the Matter of Richard Askenase

At page 2
The respondent’s closing on his client’s purchase of the Lawrence property and tendering his IOLTA check to the seller, knowing that he had not received the funds due from the buyer,and the respondent’s also having done so in six previous closings for this client, was a breachof the respondent’s fiduciary obligations as closing attorney, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.8.4(c),(h) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b). The respondent’s negligent misuse of other clients’ funds to pay the seller in the first closing

At page 2 n the Lawrence property, without intent to deprive and with no deprivation resulting, wasconduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a). This matter came before the Board on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary violations and a

867 NE 2d 332, 449 Mass. 1014 (2007)-IN THE MATTER OF LiBASSI

At page 1
practice law after bar counsel received a formal complaint from one of the respondent’s clients, Edward Morgan, regarding the alleged mishandling of client funds. Morgan hired the respondent in early *1015 1999 to represent him in connection with his purchase of his parents’ home. The respondent held mortgage

At page 1
disbursements were made for mortgage payments until September , 2001, the balance in the account fell to only $3,367.95 by March 30, 2001, and to $2,030.85 by April 30, 2001.1015 Then, in January , 2002, following a probate proceeding between Morgan and his sister related to the

At page 2
Rules of Professional Conduct, including Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), (d), (e), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(a)(1), (c), (d), 426 Mass. 1369 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c), 426 Mass. 1389 (1998); Mass.

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122 (2006)-In the Matter of Vincent G. Campanella, Jr

At page 2
By settling the client’s underinsurance claim without her knowledge or consent, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.4, and 8.4(c) and (h). By signing or causing theclient’s name to be signed to a settlement check without the client’s knowledge orauthorization, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) and (h). By failing to accountto the client for a substantial portion of her settlement, by commingling the settlement fundswith his own business or personal funds, and by intentionally converting settlement funds withintent to deprive the client of the use of the funds at least temporarily and with actualdeprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)-(d) and 8.4(c), (h). The second matter concerned the other passenger in the same March 5, 2005 accident. The

At page 2
By failing to account to the client for a substantial portion of her settlement, and by intentionally converting settlement funds with intent to deprive the client of the use of thefunds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)-(d) and 8.4(c), (h). In addition, the respondent failed to cooperate with bar counsel’s investigation of the above

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 282 (2016)-In the Matter of Jamie Mauritz James

At page 1
identifier and running balance after every transac tion, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). By failing to keep an individual c lient ledger consistently for each client matter with a list of every transaction for each client and with a running balan ce after every transaction,

At page 1 he respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f)(1)(C). By failing to perform a three-way reconciliation of her IOLTA account, the responden t violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).

At page 2 negative balance for individual c lients, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (f)(1)(C). By leaving earned fees in her IOLTA account and by depositing personal funds into

At page 2 er IOLTA account, the respondent viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b).

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 762 (2008)-In the Matter of Steven L. Winniman

At page 1
Winniman, alleging, inter alia, that (1) he intentionally misused Client A’s funds with actual and continuing deprivation,and he failed to account for the funds, all in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b),(c), and (d), and 8.4 (c) and (h); (2) he failed to file timely a bankruptcy petition for Client A, as agreed, he

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 508 (2011)-In the Matter of Brandon Lea Keltner

At page 1
client. By his conduct, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a); 1.4(a) and (b); 1.15(b), (c), and (d)(1 ); 4.1(a) and (b); and 8.4(c) and (h).

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 621 (2012)-In the Matter of Robert H. Monheimer

At page 2
8.4(c). The respondent’s conduct in failing promp tly to turn over the funds due to his client violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.15(c). Th e respondent’s conduct in failing to keep his client’s funds in trust and in converting client funds to his own use violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

At page 2 the end of the representation and upon demand violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1).
The respondent’s conduct in intentionally failing without good cause to respond to bar

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 189 (2011)-In the Matter of Shawn E. Dillon

At page 2
By failing to provide the client with an accounting of the funds paid, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d).

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 751 (2011)-In the Matter of James F. Rennick

At page 1
respondent had brought his IOLTA account record keeping into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15.
The respondent’s conduct in failing to perf orm a three-way reconciliation of the account

At page 1 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). His conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with a client identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction and running balance violated

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individual client ledgers with a list of every transaction and runni ng balance and failing to keep a ledger of his

At page 2 personal funds for bank fees and expenses violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C), and (D). The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds and his issuing checks that created a negative

At page 2 alance for individual clients in the IOLTA acc ount violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (f)(1)(C). The respondent’s conduct in withdrawing funds from his IOLTA account via cash withdrawals and by authorizing payments from his IOLTA account direc tly to creditors or

At page 2 endors for his personal expenses violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3) and (4).
On November 22, 2011, bar counsel filed a peti tion for discipline, and the parties filed

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 279 (2014)-In the Matter of Daniel James Najarian

At page 1
until 2013, the respondent failed to keep reco rds in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent did not perform three-way reconciliations of the account at least every sixty days, in violati on of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E), and did not keep individual client ledgers char ges with a list of every transa ction and running balance and

At page 1 n individual ledger for bank charges, in viol ation of Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.15(f)(1)(C) and (D).

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to deposit $ 9,324.52 into the Citizens IOLTA account and his resulting misuse of clients’ funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and 8.4(c) and (h). In mitigation, the misuse of clients’ funds occurred over a short period of time, there was

At page 1
investigation of an unrelated matter. In further mitigation, the respondent on his own initiative hired a bookkeeper, brought his IOLTA account into compliance with rule 1.15,

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 66 (2007)-In the Matter of Eric Chali

At page 1
At the time that the respondent received the check and continuing until on or after March 2006, the respondent did not maintain his client ledgers apart from the client file or reconcilethe total of the client ledger balances against his check register balance or against theadjusted bank statement balance as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. As a result of hisinadequate record keeping, the respondent first learned of the receipt of the One Beaconcheck in or about March 2005. On divers dates between March of 2005 and October of 2005, Hanover sent repeated requests

At page 2
After the respondent was notified of the complaint by bar counsel, he hired counsel and remedied his bookkeeping to comply with the requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. By failing to promptly deliver to a third party the funds that the party was entitled to receive,

At page 2 he respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15 (c). By failing to adequately supervise his staffsuch that he was initially unaware of the receipt and deposit of the One Beacon check, therespondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3(a) and (b). By failing to maintain properreconciliation reports, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). In aggravation, the respondent received an admonition on February 18, 2005, for false or

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 450 (2008)-In the Matter of Bernard J. Maccallum

At page 1
Count One arises from the respondent’s intentional withdrawing of funds from his clients’ escrow account without obtaining the consent of his clients. In 2000, Salvatore Ciampa andJohn McGillivray (the clients) retained respondent to represent them in the sale of realestate. For the purposes of purchasing the real estate, Salvatore Passariello (the buyer) gave adeposit of $100,000 to the respondent for him to hold in escrow, and the respondentdeposited this money into his IOLTA account because his clients had an interest in the money.The respondent withdrew and used some of these funds to pay his office expenses. Althoughhe obtained consent from the buyer to use these funds, he did not seek consent from hisclients. Later, when the real estate transaction did not close for various reasons, therespondent returned the entire $100,000 deposit to the buyer. These acts amounted to anintentional misuse of escrow funds without an intent to deprive and with no deprivationresulting, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). Count Two arises from the respondent’s commingling of personal, business, and client funds in

At page 1 is IOLTA account. The respondent admitted to such commingling and to inadequatemaintenance of records for his IOLTA account. These acts and omissions violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(a). Count Three arises from the respondent’s untimely responses to Bar Counsel. August 20, 2002,

At page 2
In aggravation of his violations, the respondent’s inadequate record keeping, commingling, and misuse of his IOLTA account occurred over a period of time, and the respondent may not beaware of the present requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Discussion

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 534 (2004)-In the Matter of Elizabeth Wolfe

At page 2
deceit, and misrepresentation violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and constituted conduct thatadversely reflected on her fitness to practice law in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). Inaddition, Her failure to segregate and safeguard client funds was a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b).

At page 2 C. 1.15(a), and Her failure to seek the lawful objectives of the parties to the escrow agreement was a

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 191 (2007)-In the Matter of Lawrence B. Goldberg

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to ensure that he maintained adequate records of his receipt and maintenance of funds on behalf of his clients and his failure to safeguard his client fundsviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004 (lawyer to safeguardclient’s property in separate account and keep accurate records of receipt, maintenance anddisposition of client funds). The respondent’s failure to ensure that funds he had received onbehalf of clients were promptly paid to the person or persons entitled to receive themviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 (competence), 1.2(a) (lawyer to seek lawful objectives ofclient), 1.3 (diligence), and 1.15(b), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004 (lawyer to promptlynotify client of receipt of client’s funds and promptly deliver to client or third person funds towhich client or third person is entitled to receive). The respondent’s conduct in permittingthe funds of other clients to be used to pay obligations of unrelated borrowers violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(b) as in effect prior to July 1, 2004, and 8.4(c) (lawyer shallnot engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). The matter came before the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County (Cordy, J.) on an

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 794 (2006)-In the Matter of Jo-Ellen Wells

At page 1
reasonable requests for information, failing to explain a fee agreement, and failing to adviseclients on the status of their cases. The respondent failed to advise one client that the casehad been dismissed, and she failed to advise another client of a final hearing on a divorce. 4. Rule 1.15: Failure to return unearned retainers.6. 1.16: Failure to protect the client and withdrawal shortly before a hearing7. 8.4(c): Intentional misrepresentation to a client that she had a scheduling conflict.The respondent also failed to participate in the New Hampshire bar discipline proceedings.On April 4, 2006, bar counsel filed an amended petition for reciprocal discipline based on the disbarment order entered in New Hampshire. The county court issued an order of notice onApril 7, 2006, which was duly served on the respondent. The respondent made no reply.

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Kevin W Sullivan

At page 3
client ledgers for his IOLTA account and failing to perform three- way reconciliations of the account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C) and (E), as in effect on and after Januar y 1, 2004. By failing to send the clients in writing an itemized bill or other accounting

At page 3
statement of the balance of the clients’ funds after the withdrawal, th e respondent violated Mass. R Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1) and (2), as in effect on and after January 1, 2004. By failing to request supporting documentation for expenses charged by the broker or to suggest to the clients that they seek supporting documentation, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3. By failing to document the credits applied for the benefit of the clients and by failing to ensure that credits

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 851 (2011)-In the Matter of Mark D. Sullivan

At page 2
The respondent’s failure timely to notify the le nder of the settlement and promptly to pay off the loan violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, and 1.15(c). The responden t’s failure to explain to the client that failure promptly to pay the le nder violated the loan agre ement and that delay in

At page 2
failure promptly to withdraw his fees and e xpense reimbursements violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). Between at least January 2009 and July 2011, th e respondent failed to maintain required

At page 2
The respondent’s cash withdrawals from the IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3). His failure to reconcile and ma intain required record s for his IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)B-F.

At page 2
account records into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. In May 2011, the respondent attended bar counsel’s trust account training program. In August 2011, the respondent established trust account records in co mpliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on the pa rties’ stipulation of facts

At page 2
course designated by bar counsel and on his certification, six months after the imposition of the reprimand, of his compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 35 (2011)-In the Matter of Pedro L. Beato

At page 2
The respondent’s conversion of the clients’ funds in these cases violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). His intentional misrepre sentations violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s fa ilure promptly to rem it the funds when due

At page 2 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). His failure to keep required records of the funds, account for the funds, and inform the clients of the dissipation of their funds violated Mass. R. Prof.

At page 2 . 1.4(a) and (b) and 1.15(d)(1) and (f). The respondent’s failure to render competent and diligent se rvices to these clients and

At page 2
agreement to report instruments dishonored fo r insufficient funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(h)(1). By keeping pooled trust funds in an account with interest paid to the respondent and failing to pay the accumu lated interest to the clients, the respondent

At page 2 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), (e)(5) an d (g)(2). By depositing personal or business funds to the account, the respond ent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). By making cash

At page 2 ithdrawals from the account, the respondent viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3). By withdrawing funds as fee paym ents through payments to third parties, the respondent

At page 2 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4). By failing to perform three-way reconciliations and keep required account records, the responde nt violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1).

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 670 (2011)-In the Matter of Michael L. O’Brien

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in writing a check from his IOLTA account to pay a personal obligation violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4). The respondent’s conduct in writing a check that he knew would be dishonored due to insufficient funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s conduct in intentionally failing without good cause to cooperate with bar counsel’s investigation violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(b) and 8.4(g). The respondent’s knowing failure to

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 633 (2019)-In the Matter of Doreen M Zankowski

At page 26
supported by substantial evidence,’ see S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009) ." In re Weiss, 474 Mass. 1001, 1001 n.1 (2016). "Substantial evidence is that

At page 39
R. 471 (2016) (three month suspension, stayed on conditions, for violations of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, 1.5(a), 1.2(c), 3.1, 3.3(a), 3.4(c), and 8.4(a), (d) by entering into limited

At page 39
R. 4 61 (2013) ( suspension of three months, stayed for one year, for violations of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.15, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5(a), 3.3(a), 8.4(c) (d) (h) for charging clearly excessive fee over

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 450 (2012)-In the Matter of Wayne T. Henry

At page 3
promptly the escrowed proceeds of the sa le after the FAB set his fee at $35,000.00, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c); and (3) by his willfu lly blind misuse of $49,796.60 of the clients’ funds for his own purposes , with deprivation re sulting, the respondent

At page 3 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c). In mitigation, the hearing committee found that the respondent made full and comple te restitution, includ ing interest and attorney’s fees, when

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 197 (2017), 477 Mass. 1015 (2017)-In the Matter of David M. Hass

At page 3
received, and failed to promptly deliver funds to ELF, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (1998). A majority of the panel recommended a three-month term suspension. Both the respondent and bar counsel appealed.

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 332 (2013)-In the Matter of Richard P. Heartquist

At page 3
The respondent did not maintain records ofthe IOLTA conveyancing account in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f), including the requisite chronological check register, individual client ledgers, and reconciliation reports. He understood that he had a professional

At page 7
following Rules of Professional Conduct: • Mass. Rule Prof. C. 1.15(f)(l)(E) by failing to pe1form the three-way reconciliations required under that rule; the respondent’s answer admits that he violated this rule with

At page 7
with the respondent’s ethical duties). • Mass. R Prof. C. 1.15( c) (prompt notice and delivery of trust funds to persons entitled to them).

At page 11
following Rules of Professional Conduct: II Mass. RProf. C. 1.15(c). II Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.l(a) (misrepresentation of material fact to bar counsel during

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 502 (2010)-In the Matter of Edward W. Pepyne, Jr

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misuse of client funds, with intent to deprive and actual deprivation resulting, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c) and Mass. R. Prof.C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s conduct of charging or accepting a $5,000 fee to payhospital bills or liens without a clause in the contingent fee agreement authorizing thepayment, and in circumstances where no significant legal services were necessary constitutedthe collection of an excessive fee, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a). In addition and in connection with his representation of the client, the respondent failed to

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 630 (2019)-In the Matter of Jeffrey P White

At page 1
Conduct 1.3 (dilatory conduct in r epresentation), 1.4(a)(2)(3) and (4)(communication with clients), 1.5(a) (excessive f ee), 1.15(b) and (i) (deposit of r etainers into trust account, safekeeping and return of unused retainer), 1.16(d)(refund of u nearned fees), 3.3(a) (candor

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 360 (2002)-In the Matter of David M. Lemler

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional use of trust funds for personal or business purposes, with intent to deprive, at least temporarily, and with actual deprivation resulting was in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c) and (h). On May 15, 2001, Bar Counsel requested that the Board issue a subpoena for the respondent as

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 826 (2011)-In the Matter of Maureen N. Shea

At page 1
account to pay these obligations. By D ecember 31, 2009, the respondent had brought her IOLTA account record keeping into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15.
The respondent’s conduct in failing to perf orm a three-way reconciliation of the account

At page 1 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). Her co nduct in failing to keep an account ledger with a client identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction and running balance violated

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individual client ledgers with a list of every transaction and runni ng balance and failing to keep a ledger of her

At page 1 ersonal funds for bank fees and expenses violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C), and (D). The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds and her issuing checks that created a negative balance for individual clients in the IOLTA acc ount violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and

At page 1 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b).

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 384 (2020)-In the Matter of Donald Lloyd Pitman

At page 2
the balance of the client’s tru st funds in the account after the withdrawal violation Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2). By neglig ently misusi ng a portion of t he client’s unearned retainer, the respondent vio lated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b).

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to prep are and retain a three-way reco nciliation of the IOLTA account violated Mass. R . Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). The respondent’s failure to create and maintain an IOLTA chec k register violated Mass. R. P rof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B).

At page 2
R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s failure to create and maintain a ledger for bank fees and expenses in the IOLTA account violated Mass. R. P rof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D). The respondent’s failure to maintain complete records of the re ceipt, maintenance, and

At page 2 isposition of trust propert y violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f ).

At page 2
those funds, the respondent faile d to hold trust funds in a tru st account in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1). B y disbursing funds on behalf of clients that created negative balances in those clie nts’ accounts, the respondent vi olated Mass. R. Prof. C.

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 302 (2010)-In the Matter of John-Paul LaPre

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in failing to perform a three-way reconciliation of the account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). His conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with aclient identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction and running balanceviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individualclient ledgers with a list of every transaction and running balance and failing to keep a ledgeror other records of his personal funds for bank fees and expenses violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(C), and (D). The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds in the IOLTA accountviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). On July 7, 2010, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline, and the parties filed the

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 584 (2013)-In the Matter of Lynn A. Sementelli

At page 11
(lack of d.ilige1,1ce); 1.4(a) and (b) (failure adequately to communicate with client); 1.7(b) (conflict of interest); 1.15(c) (failure promptly to turn over funds to client); 1.16(a)(l) (duty to terminate representation if rules violation will occur); 8.4 (a) (attempting or

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 396 (2007), 449 Mass. 1014 (2007)-In the Matter of J. Douglas Libassi

At page 2
he was supposed to be holding funds in escrow related to the Henderson matter. Only afterbar counsel learned of and objected to the respondent’s continued activity did the respondentcome into compliance with the temporary suspension order, on May 14, 2002. [1] Then, in August, 2003, bar counsel filed with the Board of Bar Overseers (board) a two-countpetition for discipline alleging that the respondent had intentionally misused client orfiduciary funds and had made intentional misrepresentations under oath to bar counsel andthis court in connection with the temporary suspension. A hearing committee found that therespondent had violated a number of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct,including Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass.1313 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (b), (d), (e), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C.1.16 (a)(1), (c), (d), 426 Mass. 1369 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1389 (1998);Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5 (a), 426 Mass. 1410 (1998); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), (d), (h), asamended, 429 Mass. 1301 (1999), as well as S.J.C. Rule 4.01, § 17 (1)(a)-(e) and (g), (3), (5),(6), as amended, 426 Mass. 1301 (1997). The committee recommended that the respondent bedisbarred. The board unanimously agreed and recommended disbarment retroactive to May14, 2002, the date that the respondent complied with the February, 2002, order of temporarysuspension. An information was filed in the county court and heard by the single justice, whoissued a judgment of disbarment effective on entry of the judgment. Discussion . "We review de novo the question of the appropriate level of discipline to be

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 155 (2018)-In the Matter of Claude David Grayer

At page 3
(communication); 1. 5 (b ( ( 1) ( scope of representation and fees) ; 1.15 (d) (safekeeping of property); 1. 6 (d) (steps to be taken upon declining or termination of representation-); 3.4(c)

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 593 (2009)-In the Matter of James R. Tewhey

At page 1
By commingling personal and client funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1). By depositing client funds into a business account, the respondent misused those funds, in

At page 1 iolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), and 8.4(c) and (h). Since at least July 1, 2004, the respondent has maintained an IOLTA account at Bank of

At page 1 merica. The respondent has at all time since July 1, 2004, held trust property in this IOLTAaccount. From January 2005 through at least December of 2007, the respondent failed tomaintain the following account records required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f): a. a check register showing in chronological order the date and amount of each deposit;the date, amount and payee of each disbursement; the identity of the client matter towhich each deposit and disbursement pertained; and the balance after each deposit anddisbursement;

At page 2
By failing to maintain required records of the funds in his IOLTA accounts, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on an agreed recommendation for

15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 20 (1999)-In the Matter of Matthew W. Barrett

At page 3
The respondent’s commingling of the client’s funds with his personal funds, his failure promptly to pay the client the funds due her, resulting in temporary deprivation to the client, and his intentional use of theclient’s funds to pay personal and business obligations and to pay the obligations of other clients,violated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6), Canon Nine, DR 9-102(A), (B) and (C), and Rules 1.15(a),(b), (d), and (e), and Rules 8.4(c) and (h) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. Therespondent’s misrepresentations to Bar Counsel violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Massachusetts Rules ofProfessional Conduct. Bar Counsel’s investigation revealed that between 1996 and 1998, the respondent routinely used client

At page 4
The respondent’s serial misuse of clients funds and his commingling of personal and client funds in the IOLTA account, his failure promptly to pay his clients the funds due to them, resulting in temporarydeprivation to his clients, and his intentional use of his clients’ funds to pay personal and businessobligations and to pay the obligations of other clients violated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6) andCanon Nine, DR 9- 102(A), (B), and (C), and Rules 1.15(a), (b), (d) and (e), and Rules 8.4(c) and (h) ofthe Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent’s misrepresentations to Bar Counselviolated Rule 8.4(c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. On July 23, 1999, the respondent submitted his affidavit of resignation from the practice of law. In the

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Steven Michael Dwyer

At page 1
(pursue client goals), 1.3 (diligence), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of obligations under rules of tribunal), 1.5(a) (clearly excessive fees), and 1.15(d)(2) (failing to provide invoice for fees before paying self from conservator account). Count Two allege d that, to refund fees to one client (“Client A”), the respondent

At page 1
negligently misused, caused the check to Client A to be dishonored, resulting in f ailure to refund all unearned fees. The misconduct charged under Count Two violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (segregation and protection of client funds).
Count Three alleged IOLTA recordkeeping lapses, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 118 (2007)-In the Matter of Valeriano Diviacchi

At page 1
The respondent was admitted to the bar on June 14, 1990. The respondent maintained an IOLTA account at the Bank of America until March 30, 2007, when he closed the account.From July 1, 2004 through March 30, 2007, the respondent failed to maintain a check registerin the form required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B); failed to maintain individual clientrecords in the form required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C); failed to maintain a ledger ofbank fees and charges, as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D); and failed to producereconciliation reports at least every sixty days, as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). In December 2005 and January 2006, the respondent deposited personal funds in excess of

At page 1
By commingling personal and client funds in his IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). By writing checks on his IOLTA account in payment of personal expenses,directly to his creditors, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4). By failing tomaintain a check register and individual client records in the form required by Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(f)(1)(B) and (C); failing to maintain a separate ledger of bank fees and charges; andfailing to create reconciliation reports at least every sixty days; the respondent violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on an agreed recommendation for

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 65 (2010)-In the Matter of Craig J. Camerlin

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness on his client’s cases violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a) and 1.3. The respondent’s failure to promptly comply withreasonable requests for information from the client violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a) and (b).The respondent’s failure to account for the client’s retainer, refund the unearned portion ofthe fees and promptly return the client’s file as requested violated Mass. R. Prof C. 1.15(d)(1)and 1.16 (d) and (e), and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17(1)(f). The respondent’s failure to advise theclient that he had been suspended violated Mass. R. Prof C. 3.4(d) and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, §§ 3and 17(1)(c). The second case concerned the defense of a client in a criminal matter. In May and June

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 549 (2018)-In the Matter of James A. Walckner

At page 7 appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), and the committee’s ultimate ‘"findings and recommendations, as adopted by the board, are

At page 9
applies for admission to the bar. See Britton v. Board of Bar _Examiners, 471 Mass. 1015, 1018 (2015); Strigler v. Board of Bar Examiners, 448 Mass. 1027, 1029 (2007). Because it is a bar

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 212 (2012)-In the Matter of James P. Dillon, Jr

At page 2
By failing to promptly return the unearned portion of the fee to his client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and 1.16(d) . By knowingly failing without good cause to cooperate with bar counsel’s investigation and by failing to comply with the subpoena issued by

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 21 (2019)-In the Matter of Kevin M Brill

At page 1
the Board of Bar Overseers, and the Supreme Judicial Court woul d conclude that, by engaging in the foregoing misconduct, he violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 279 (2020)-In the Matter of Melvin Alanson Hear

At page 2
By failing to deposit the $3,000 into an IOLTA or other client trust account and by intentionally using such funds for other business and/or personal expenses, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1), 1.15(b) (3), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h). By failing to refund the unearned fees in a timely manner upon termination of the

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 342 (2002)-In the Matter of Demetrios G. Kafkas

At page 1
relevant times, he was a sole practitioner in Lowell, Massachusetts. His practice consistedprimarily of small or medium-sized personal injury claims. On February 5, 1999, and pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f), Bar Counsel received notice from the bank in which the respondent maintained his IOLTA account that a check in theamount of $3996.98 drawn on the respondent’s IOLTA account had been dishonored. Thecheck was payable to a client in settlement of a personal injury claim and payment wouldhave caused an overdraft in the amount of $326. The respondent deposited personal funds tothe account to enable the check to clear upon redeposit.

At page 1
The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds without intent to deprive but with actual deprivation resulting, his commingling of client funds with personal or business funds, hisfailure to make prompt disbursement of trust funds, and his inadequate and improper recordkeeping is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 25 (2010)-In the Matter of Charles H. Balkam, Jr

At page 1
The respondent acted as closing attorney representing lenders in real estate transactions. He admitted in the affidavit that sufficient evidence existed to prove by a preponderance of theevidence that he intentionally misappropriated real estate settlement funds over a period oftime, that he repeatedly used funds from subsequent closings to pay off mortgages or otherobligations owed on earlier closings, that the net result was that the balance in his IOLTAaccount was approximately $170,000 short of the amount that should have been on deposit,and that he did not have adequate funds available to pay off a mortgage on a recent closingthat had gone to record. The respondent further admitted that a hearing committee, theBoard and the Supreme Judicial Court would conclude that he had violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b) and (c) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). On August 16, 2010, the Board of Bar Overseers voted to recommend that the affidavit of

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 640 (2011)-In the Matter of Anthony W. Neal

At page 1
By his conduct, the respondent violated Ma ss. R. Prof. C. 1.1; 1.2(a); 1.3; 1.4(a) and (b); 1.15(b), (c), (d)(2), and (f); and 8.4(c). In aggravati on, the respondent had received a prior public reprimand, Matter of Neal, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 330 (2003), and an

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 176 (2012)-In the Matter of Paul D. Decenzo

At page 2
disputed portion of his fee to a trust account af ter being advised that hi s right to the fee was disputed violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii) . His failure to promptly pay the wife the funds that she was owed violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). The respondent’s conduct in unilaterally demanding releases in order to turn over funds to the wife a nd the client violated

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 6 (2017)-In the Matter of Gaurika Anan

At page 1
opposing party’s counsel, she faile d to provide notice to the b ank that the account was a trust account as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.
Ultimately, all the funds were re stored to the proper parties. No client or other party was

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misuse of funds without deprivati on violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s failure to sa feguard escrowed funds and to comply with the rules regardi ng opening trust accounts violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3) and

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 271 (2015)-In the Matter of Thomas F. Healy

At page 10 violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e) (6); failing diligently to attempt a settlement of the Medicare lien, in violation of Mass.

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 867 (2011)-In the Matter of Stephen B. Swaye

At page 2
1 Speci~ically,· the petition alleged that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (segregation of personal and client funds), (e) (operational requirements for IOLTA accounts) ,

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Kevin G Graves

At page 2
maintained an IOLTA account at People’s United Bank. Between January 2020 and October 2021, the respondent failed to maintain IOLTA records in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). He failed to maintain a compliant check register, fai led to maintain compliant client ledgers, failed to maintain a bank fee ledger and failed to reconcile his IOLTA account at

At page 2
The respondent’s misconduct violated numerous subsections of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, including 1.15(b), 1.15(b)(2)(ii), 1.15(b)(4) and 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C), (D) and (E).
The respondent was admitted to the Massachusetts bar on March 29, 1995 and retired

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 38 (2002)-In the Matter of F. Lee Bailey

At page 3
liquidation, Bailey was then to transmit the proceeds to the United States. Bailey sold the Japanese stock and deposited approximately $730,000 into his Credit Suisse account on orabout July 6, 1994. Bailey then transferred the money into his Barnett Bank Money MarketAccount. The money was paid to the United States Marshal on or about August 15, 1994. Thereferee found that Bailey admitted that his money market account was not a lawyer’s trustaccount, nor did Bailey create or maintain it as a separate account for the sole purpose ofmaintaining the stock proceeds. In concluding that Bailey had engaged in commingling, thereferee rejected Bailey’s claims that there were no personal funds in the Barnett Bank accountat the time Bailey transferred the funds from the Japanese Stock into this account, and thatBailey’s deposit of the proceeds into a non-trust account was “inadvertent error.” The refereeconcluded that Bailey violated Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.15(a) by failing to set up aseparate account for these funds and also by commingling client funds with his personal funds. Count II of the Bar’s complaint charged Bailey with misappropriating trust funds and

At page 3
The referee rejected Bailey’s two defenses to the Bar’s charge of misappropriation: (1) he never held the stock in trust for Duboc or the United States; rather, it was transferred to himin fee simple absolute; and (2) this stock was not subject to forfeiture. The referee foundBailey guilty of violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3-4.3 (lawyer shall not commit anyact that is contrary to honesty and justice), 4-1.15(a) (commingling funds), 4-8.4(b) (lawyershall not commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 4-8.4(c) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct involvingdeceit, dishonesty, fraud or misrepresentation), and 5-1.1 (requiring money or other propertyentrusted to an attorney to be held in trust and applied only for a specific purpose). Count III charged Bailey with continuing to expend Biochem funds in contravention of two

At page 6
standard of ethical and professional conduct prescribed by this Court, and with notice of rule 3-4.1. Rule 4-1.15 provides:

At page 7
If Bailey’s fee had been earned, then it could have and should have been withdrawn from a trust account; the failure to do so would have been a violation of trust account rules. SeeFlorida Bar v. Tillman, 682 So. 2d 542 (1996) (holding that rule 4-1.15(c) requires fees to bewithdrawn when they become due and the failure to do so constitutes a trust accountviolation). However, if money is given to a client to be applied to fees when they becomeearned, much like a retainer, these monies cannot be withdrawn from a trust account andspent until they are earned. See In re Sather, 3 P.3d 403, 410 (Colo. 2000) (“[U]nearnedportion[s] of . . . advance fees must be kept in trust and cannot be treated as the attorney’sproperty until earned.”). In this case, by express agreement, Bailey was not entitled to anyfees until determined and approved by Judge Paul. Thus, he was expressly prohibited fromwithdrawing and spending any portion of the stock for his own personal benefit until approvedby Judge Paul. See generally Spann, 682 So. 2d at 1070-71. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that regardless of the manner in which the stock was

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Leon Alan Blais

At page 15
44. B ar counsel charged that b y failing to deposit the $2,000 retainer into his IOLTA or other trust account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) (hold trust property separate from lawyer’s own property , in a trust account). 45. The respondent denied this allegation in his answer, writing simply “[d]enied” at ¶ 22. We place little stock in this denial, because it violates B.B.O Rules, § 3.15(d). That rule provides that an answer shall deny “specifically, and in reasonable detail, each material allegation of the petition and state clearly and concisely the facts and matters of law relied upon.

At page 18
as received . It was a retainer to fund future work, and it should have been safeguarded in a trust account and withdrawn as earned. The respondent’s failure to do this violated Rule 1.15(b)(1). 54. B ar counsel charged that by failing to send to his client an itemized bill or other

At page 18 ccounting upon request, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1) (upon final distribution of any trust property or upon request by the client . . . the lawyer shall promptly render a full written accounting regarding such property).
55. Although the respondent denied this allegation in his Answer at ¶ 23, he again did so in violation of our rules. See supra , ¶ 45 and fn. 1. In correspondence with Bar Counsel, the

At page 18 56. To the extent that Rule 1.15(d)(1) references a specific request for an accounting, we have not seen one. We infer, however, from a review of Klunder’s documents, that such a request was made and ignored. See Ex. 29 (128, 129) (undated email to bar c ounsel) (three

At page 18 eferences to the respondent failing to provide an accounting). We note that the text of Rule 1.15(d)(1) provides for an accounting upon final distribution, with or without a request. 57. W e conclude, based on Klunder’s email to bar counsel and the respondent’s admission, that no accounting was ever provided. Cf. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2) (not charged) (setting out requirements for lawyer to follow on or before making a withdrawal of fees from a

At page 18 rust account). We therefore conclude that bar counsel has proved a violation of Rule 1.15(d)(1). 58. B ar counsel charged that b y misusing client funds, the respondent violated Mass.

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 438 (2004)-In the Matter of Steven E. Murra

At page 2
By failing to notify the husband of his receipt of the $15,000 check, and failing to provide him, in response to his request, with a full written accounting of his distribution of the $15,000,the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). By failing to provide the husband with a written statement of the outcome of his lawsuit and

997 NE 2d 1196, 466 Mass. 1018 (2013)-In the Matter of Fletcher

At page 1
detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar , the administration of justice, or to the public interest." S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). See Matter of Pool, 401 Mass. 460, 463

At page 3
she presently has the necessary competency and learning in law . Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (8), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), the petitioner may renew her application or reapply for reinstatement or readmission one year from the date of this decision.

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (2009)-In the Matter of Brett Levy

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to supervise his employees to make sure their conduct conformed to his own professional obligations violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3(b). The respondent’s failurepromptly to notify the client that her settlement funds had been received violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.4(a) and 1.15(c). The respondent’s failure to pay promptly to his client and thirdparties the funds due to them violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, and 1.15(c). Therespondent’s failure to prepare and maintain three-way reconciliation reports and individualclient ledgers documenting the receipt and disbursement of funds for each of his clientsviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C) and E.

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 406 (2015)-In the Matter of Robert D. Loventhal

At page 1
several cash withdrawals from the IOLTA account. By June 27, 2014, the respondent had brought his IOLTA account records into comp liance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent’s conduct in failing to perform a th ree-way reconciliation of the account violated

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). His conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with a client identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction and running balance violated

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individual client ledgers with a list of every tr ansaction and running balance violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

At page 1 .15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s cash withdrawals from the IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3).
Count two details two specifi c instances of inadequate record keeping and other

At page 1
withdrawal and failed to keep a ledger listing every transaction with a running balance after every transaction in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2), (e)(3), and (f)(1)(C).

At page 2
invoices for completed work and then deposited the earned fees he received into his IOLTA account and withdrew them via cas h withdrawal in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2) and 1.15(e)(3). The respondent did no t keep a ledger listing in chr onological order all deposits and

At page 2 R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C).

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 227 (2014)-In the Matter of Gary M. Katz

At page 1
termination of the representation. His conduc t in these respects was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b)(2), (e)(3) and (4), and (f), for conduct on and after July 1, 2004, and predecessor rules for conduct before that date.

At page 1
expenses, and did not perform a three-way rec onciliation of the IOLTA account at least every sixty days. His conduct in these respects was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C), (D), and (E).

At page 1
in negligently misusing trust funds from the closing is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) as then in effect for conduct pr ior to July 1, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (c) for conduct on and after July 1, 2004.

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 568 (2013)-In the Matter of Frank Foss Russell

At page 2
of the funds. He also failed to account adequately for the funds.
The respondent’s conversion of trust funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (2) and 8.4(c) and (h). His inte ntional misrepresentations viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.1(a)

At page 2 Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.15(c) and 8.4(h). His failure to disclose hi s misuse and dissipation of the funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b). The respondent’s failure to account adequa tely for the funds a nd to respond promptly

At page 2 o the clients’ demands for the funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b) and 1.15(d)(1).
His failure promptly to turn ov er the client’s files violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e).

At page 2
respondent’s failure to give the client timely notice of fee withdrawals violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2). At least from December 2011 through November 2012, th e respondent failed to

At page 2
respondent’s failure to make account in full an d maintain the required records violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d) and (f)(1)(B)-(E). In vi olation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3), the respondent on occasion issued IOLTA checks payable to cash He also deposited and

At page 2 of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2).
The respondent was administratively susp ended from practice in the Commonwealth

470 Mass. 1018, 21 NE 3d 545 (2014)-MATTER OF THE PETITION SMALLWOOD

At page 1
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF DEWOE W. SMALLWOOD. SJC-1 1559 December 19, 2014.Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 292 (2013), 464 Mass. 1021 (2013)-In the Matter of Lauren Gustafson

At page 1
practice of law for six months, and that thereafter she be required to petition for reinstatement pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(4), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), including its requirement that she take and pass the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Examination. The board filed an information to this

At page 3
suspension must petition for reinstatement. S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(1)-(2), (4). FNS. Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 18(1)(c), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), provides that "[r]einstatement under this subsection (1) will be effective

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 554 (2019)-In the Matter of Frank Arthur Smith III

At page 16
embarrassing and detrimental than the infonnation the respondent disclosed about Doe in this case. In Ad 07·3~, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1015 (2007), a lawyer was involved in a fee dispute with his client, who had charged the legal fee to his credit card but then disputed the charge. In

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 18 (2017)-In the Matter of Charles R. Arthur, Jr

At page 1
commingling client funds with personal funds, the respondent vi olated Mass. R. Prof. C. Rule 1.15(b)(1). By failing to promptly turn over to the beneficiar ies or to the special representative

At page 2 1.15(c).

At page 2 Rules 1.15(b)(1) and (3). By charging the client and her estat e his legal rate for non-legal services, the respondent violate d Mass. R. Prof. C. Rule 1.5(a) .

At page 2
or before the date of each withdrawal of funds in the account t o pay for his fees, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C . Rules 1.4(a) and 1.15(d)(2). In the second matter, the res pondent agreed to represent a cli ent in a personal injury

At page 2
commingling client funds with personal funds, the respondent vi olated Mass. R. Prof. C. Rule 1.15(b)(1). By failing to promptly turn over to the client the funds that were due her, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. Rule 1.15(c).

At page 2
funds remaining on or before the date of each withdrawal of fun ds in the account to pay for his fees, the respondent violated Mas s. R. Prof. C. Rules 1.4(a) an d 1.15(d)(2). By failing to deliver to the client at the conclusion of the matter a writing showing the remittance due her and the

At page 2
ethod of its determination, the r espondent violated Mass. R. P rof. Co. Rules 1.4(a), 1.5(c) and 1.15(d)(1). By failing to enter into a writt en contingent fee agreement wit h the client and/or by

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 328 (2017)-In the Matter of Robert C. Moran

At page 7 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015) (holding and depositing trust funds of Wilcox in nontrust

At page 7
(2015) (charging and collecting clearly excessive fees); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2) (failing to give timely written notice of all of respondent’s fee withdrawals).

At page 8
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a) (charging and collecting clearly excessive fees); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (1), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e) (5) (by withholding Wilcox estate funds in

At page 9
471 Mass. 1313 .(2015), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1318 (2015), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) (failing to make timely distributions to Wilcox estate beneficiaries); and

At page 9
Wildox estate); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1), Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1425 (2015), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(d)

At page 10
concluded that the respondent’s conduct violated: Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (1) (holding and depositing trust funds of Stevens in non-trust accounts); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a)

At page 10 Prof. C. 1.15(d) (2) (failing to give timely written notice to Stevens of all of respondent’s fee withdrawals).

At page 12
1,5(a) (charging and collecting clearly excessive fees); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5) (by withholding Stevens estate funds in nontrust accounts and

At page 13
Mass, R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) (failing to make timely distributions to Stevens estate beneficiaries); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, Mass.

At page 13 rof. C. 1.3, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1), Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c), and Mass, R. Prof. C. 8.4(d) (by failing to file a

At page 14
committee concluded that the conduct of the respondent violated: Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5) (depositing and holding trust funds in respondent’s nontrust

At page 14 onveyancing account); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) (failing promptly to remit to all clients and third parties trust funds

At page 14 o which they were entitled); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (failing to withdraw promptly all earned fees and expense reimbursements

At page 14 rom IOLTA account); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(E) (failing to reconcile adequately and maintain required records

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 216 (2018)-In the Matter of Gaytri D. Kachroo

At page 1
negligently misusing the funds of other clients to prematurely pay the client’s legal fees, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c), in effect prior to July 2015.
On September 2, 2013, the client e xecuted an "Investment Agree ment" prepared by

At page 3 other clients, in violation of M ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c ), in effect prior to July 2015. No deprivation resulted.

At page 3
IOLTA account at Bank of America . She failed to keep IOLTA acco unt records in compliance with Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.15 in the following particu lars:

At page 3
transaction and a running balance of each, the respondent viola ted Mass. R. Prof. C.
1.15(f)(1)(C). By faili ng to maintain a contemporaneous check r egister in her IOLTA account listing all transactions i n chronological order and a r unning balance, the respondent

At page 3 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15( f)(1)(B). By failing to perform adequate and timely three- way reconciliations at least ev ery sixty days, the respondent v iolated Mass. R. Prof. C.

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 30 (2005)-In the Matter of Joseph A. Barrese

At page 2 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a); 1.4(a) and (b); 1.15(a) of the rule in effect prior to 2004 (now 1.15(b)), (b) and (d); and 8.4(a), (c) and (d).

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in intentionally converting the settlement funds due the client with intent to deprive the client of these funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivationresulting, in concealing the settlement from the law firm, in failing to promptly inform theclient of the receipt of the settlement check, in failing to promptly pay the client and infailing to maintain and safeguard client funds in a designated trust account violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.2(a); 1.4(a) and (b); 1.15(a) of the rule in effect prior to 2004 (now 1.15(b)), (b)and (d); and 8.4 (a), (c) and (h). Count Three arose from the respondent’s representation of a client in her claim for damages

At page 3
The respondent’s conduct in intentionally converting the settlement funds due the client with intent to deprive the client of these funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivationresulting, in concealing the settlement from the law firm, in failing to promptly inform theclient of the receipt of the settlement check, in failing to promptly pay the client and infailing to maintain and safeguard client funds in a designated trust account violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.2(a); 1.4(a) and (b); 1.15(a) of the rule in effect prior to 2004 (now 1.15(b)), (b)and (d); and 8.4 (a), (c) and (h). Count Four of the petition arose from a medical malpractice case referred to the respondent

At page 3
The respondent’s conduct in intentionally converting the settlement funds due the client with intent to deprive the client of these funds and with actual deprivation resulting, in concealingthe settlement from the law firm, in failing to promptly inform the client of the receipt of thesettlement check, in failing to promptly pay the client, in misrepresenting to the client thathe still had funds in his account to pay the costs of litigation and in failing to maintain andsafeguard client funds in a designated trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a); 1.4(a)and (b); 1.15(a) of the rule in effect prior to 2004 (now 1.15(b)), (b) and (d); and 8.4 (a), (c)and (h). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts, disciplinary

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 383 (2014)-In the Matter of Carlos M. Sousa

At page 2
account, the respondent failed to pr ovide written notice to his client that he had taken retainer funds and failed to provide his client with a bi ll. This conduct violated Mass. 1.15(b) and 1.15(d)(2) and 8.4( c) and (h).

At page 3
From March 2006 to July 2007, the client repeat edly requested an itemized bill from the respondent, but he failed to provide one, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1). On June 27, 2007, the respondent re filed the same complaint and served the developer. On

At page 3
written bill or accounting to his clients itemizing hi s services. He also failed to account for the funds upon final distribution. This conduct violated of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2) and 1.15(d)(1).

At page 3
in writing that he had taken the re tainer as his fee and failed to provide them with a bill showing the services rendered, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 1.15(d)(2). Between June 27, 2009, and February 24, 2012, the respondent took no court action on

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 366 (2008)-In the Matter of Michael L. Howar

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in all four matters constituted lack of diligence, failure to provide competent representation, and failure to seek the clients’ lawful objectives in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.1, and 1.2(a). In all four matters, the respondent’s conduct alsoconstituted failure to refund an unearned fee and failure to promptly deliver funds due aclient in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d) and 1.15(c). In Counts One, Two, and Three,the respondent’s failure to advise his clients of the dismissal of their bankruptcy cases and torespond to their repeated calls about their bankruptcy matters was conduct in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b). The respondent was admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth on December 17, 1975. In

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 385 (2010)-In the Matter of Earl D. Munroe

At page 2
By failing to keep the estate funds in a trust account and separate from his own property and by distributing estate funds when he was not authorized to do so, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (3), and 8.4(d). The respondent also failed to maintaincomplete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of the estate account funds inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). On September 9, 2004, the respondent’s appointment as temporary executor expired. On

At page 2 eptember 30, 2004, the brother filed an affidavit of objections to allowance of the will andappointment of the respondent as executor, alleging that the testator had been subject toundue influence from the respondent and that the respondent had violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.8(c) in drafting the will. The respondent distributed over $23,000 from the estate accountafter his appointment expired to pay estate expenses. On October 20, 2004, the respondentfiled a motion to extend his appointment as temporary executor back to the expiration dateof his previous appointment, which the probate court denied. By failing to keep the estatefunds in a trust account and by distributing approximately $23,000 from the estate accountafter his appointment as temporary executor had expired, the respondent violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (3), and 8.4(d). On October 27, 2004, the probate court appointed an independent party to serve as special

At page 4
By knowingly disobeying a court order and by assisting his clients in violating a court order, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(d), 3.4(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d). By failing toconsult with the clients regarding the relevant limitations on his conduct when he knew thatthe clients expected assistance not permitted by the rules of professional conduct or otherlaw, and by failing to withdraw, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(e) and1.16(a)(1). By failing to promptly return the disputed trust funds to his IOLTA account andmaintain the disputed trust funds in his IOLTA account until the dispute was resolved, therespondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii). By removing the case to federal court inorder to avoid or delay the preliminary injunction hearing when there was no basis that wasnot frivolous for removal, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.1, 3.2, 4.4, and 8.4(d). The respondent was admitted to practice in 1988. In aggravation, the respondent received an

479 Mass. 294, 94 NE 3d 770 (2018)-IN THE MATTER OF STRAUSS

At page 2 committee of the board (committee) agreed that the conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f) (1) (B) and (E), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).

At page 2
injury claim. The committee found that the respondent (1) failed to safeguard the client’s funds in a trust account, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004); (2) failed to pay the client the proceeds of her settlement promptly , in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), as

At page 2
amount of the fee, an itemized bill for services rendered, and a balance of the client’s funds left in the account, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004); (4) authorized distributions that caused a negative balance in his client trust account, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15

At page 3
client. After a check drawn on the account was dishonored for insuf ficient funds, bar counsel was notified. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (h), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).297 After approximately two weeks abroad, the client returned to the United States in January , 2013. The

At page 5
three months prior to four years and five months from the ef fective date of the order of indefinite suspension. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (2) (b), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009).303 So ordered.

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 395 (2001)-In the Matter of Suzanne E. Macpherson

At page 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND V1OLATIONS Respondent was admitted to the Bar in 1996. During. the times relevant to this proceeding,she was engaged in solo practice in Dover. As a result of a compliance audit which wasconducted at Respondent’s offices on June 21, 2000, it was discovered that Respondent’s booksfailed to comply with the requirements of Rule 1.15 of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules ofProfessional Conduct. Subsequently, it was discovered that Respondent had not filed anyreturns or forms for or paid any federal and state payroll taxes owed for her law practice forthe period from January 1, 1998 through July 25, 2000. Moreover, Respondent failed to fileher 1998 and 1999 federal and state personal income tax returns in a timely fashion.However, in completing and signing the 1998, 1999 and 2000 certificates of compliance whichall members of the Delaware Bar are required to file with the Delaware Supreme Court,Respondent incorrectly certified that "all federal, state and local payroll, gross receipts andincome taxes have been filed and paid on a timely basis." As a result of the books and recordsproblems and incorrect certification to the Delaware Supreme Court, Respondent admittedthat she had violated Rules 1. 15(b), 1.15(d), 8.4(c) and 8.4(d). After considering the facts setforth in the stipulation, the members of the Panel concluded that the facts supported afinding that those rules had been violated. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 501 (2016)-In the Matter of Layn M. Saint-Loius

At page 1
intentionally misappropriated c lient funds and engaged in other dishonest conduct, in violation of District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15(a), (c) , (d) and (e) and 8.4(c). The Court affirmed the findings, as well as the recommendation of the Board that the respondent be disbarred.

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 245 (2019)-In the Matter of Saba B. Hashem

At page 20
has not convinced us that the violence he inflicted upon Dr. Hitchmoth, whom he’ described as the love ofhitlife (Tr. 1:151, "true love" "for the first time in my life"), and who left her husband for him (Ex. 28, at p. 5, SBH000440, Tr. 88, Farrah), was a transitory aberration that is

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 646 (2010)-In the Matter of William Soo Hoo

At page 1
For years, the respondent maintained an IOLTA account and an operating account. The check register and individual client records for the IOLTA account were generally compliant with therecordkeeping requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, except that the respondent did notperform the three-way reconciliation of the IOLTA account at least every sixty days asrequired by the rule. The respondent represented a client in a personal injury case and in May 2007, received a

At page 2 funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). In June 2008, the respondent attended a trust account education program conducted by the

At page 2 oston Bar Association and the Office of Bar Counsel. The respondent thereafter brought hisrecordkeeping into full compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. This matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on the parties’ stipulation of facts and

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 89 (2006)-In the Matter of Richard G. Birchall

At page 2
$235,000 of the client’s funds to his own personal or business use with the intent to deprive the client of her funds. The respondent’s conduct prior to January 1, 1998, violated CanonOne, DR 10102(A)(4) and (6) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,deceit, or misrepresentation, or other conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law),and Canon Nine, DR 9-102(A) and (B) (prohibition against lawyer commingling client fundswith personal funds and requirement that lawyer maintain complete records of handling,maintenance, and disposition of client funds, render accounts to client regarding such funds,and promptly pay to client as requested funds to which client is entitled). The respondent’sconduct after January 1, 1998, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), and (d) (prohibitionagainst commingling, and requirement that lawyer keep client funds in trust account, accountfor handling of client funds, and pay client funds to which client entitled), and 8.4(c) and (h)(prohibition against dishonest conduct and conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practicelaw). On at least two occasions in 1998 and 1999, the client demanded that the respondent provide

At page 2 er with an accounting of the property she had transferred to him. The respondent failed toprovide an accounting in response to these demands, thereby violating Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a)and (b) (lawyer shall comply with client’s request for information and explain matter so clientcan make informed decisions about representation), and 1.15(a), (b), and (d), as in effectprior to July 1, 2004. In 2000, the client filed suit against the respondent alleging that he had converted her

At page 2 roperty, made misrepresentations to her, and breached his fiduciary duty to her by misusingand misappropriating her funds. Shortly thereafter, the respondent established a newcorporation, opened a new bank account in the name of the new corporation, and transferredfunds from the Cape Cod account and the Bahamian account to the new bank account in orderto conceal from the client what remained of the funds she had entrusted to him. This conductviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(a) (lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another party’s accessto evidence). The respondent commingled his own personal funds with the client’s funds in thenew account and intentionally converted the client’s funds to his own use, all in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), and (d), and 8.4(c) and (h). On February 18, 2004, a judge in the client’s civil action against the respondent ordered the

At page 3
In May 1998, the client sent $145,000 to the Bahamian bank with instructions to deposit the funds into the account he believed belonged to his corporation. After May 1998, either therespondent or his business partner intentionally and without authority used the client’s fundsfor purposes unrelated to the client or the client’s corporation. By inducing the client todeposit his funds into an account over which the respondent had signatory authority and whichwas used by the respondent and his business associate to conduct their own business withoutobtaining the client’s consent after consultation, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.4(a) and (b), 1.7(b) (lawyer shall not represent client if representation may be materiallylimited by lawyer’s responsibilities to third person or by lawyer’s own interests, unless clientconsents after consultation), and 8.4(c) and (h). By causing the client’s funds to be depositedinto an account containing the respondent’s business or personal funds, and by converting orpermitting the client’s funds to be converted to his own personal or business use, therespondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), and (d), and 8.4(c) and (h). The client confronted the respondent after he discovered that his money was gone and that

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 311 (2020)-In the Matter of Ilya Liviz

At page 3
See also Stornanti v. Commonwealth , 389 Mass. 518, 521-522 (1983); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15A, 480 Mass. 1316 (2018) (generally requiring retention of client files for six -year

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 552 (2004)-In the Matter of William Paul Yonce

At page 1
SUMMARY2 In or about October 19, 2001, and pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f), Bar Counsel received a notice of a dishonored check, drawn on the respondent’s IOLTA account, from the bank atwhich the account was maintained. The respondent’s IOLTA account was a commingledaccount, used for the deposit and disbursement of trust funds, as well as for ATM withdrawalsfor personal use. The returned check was payable to a client and represented a share of theproceeds of a $10,000 civil settlement.

At page 1
The respondent’s commingling of trust funds with personal or business funds, and his intentional misappropriation of the settlement funds with intent to deprive the client or hermedical provider of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting,violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c),(h) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b). The respondent’s depositto his IOLTA account of the settlement check without the knowledge, authorization, orendorsement of the co?payee is in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c),(h). The respondent’sdisbursement to the client of funds owed to the HMO pursuant to its statutory medical lien isin violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b). On or about January 8, 2002, Bar Counsel sent the respondent notice of the dishonored check

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 98 (2002)-In the Matter of Frederick A. Busconi

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in June 1991 of retaining $1,000 held for “future medical services” when no future medical services were anticipated violated Canon Nine, DR 9-102(B)(4) (lawyershall promptly deliver to client funds the client is entitled to receive). His conduct in failingpromptly to turn over the entire $5,343 in April 1997, when the statute of limitations had runon any claim to enforce a lien by a medical insurer violated DR 9-102(B)(4) and, after January1, 1998, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The respondent’s failure to negotiate the lien and pay it within a reasonable time constituted

At page 1 violation of Canon Six, DR 6-101(A)(3), and Canon Seven, DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3), for conductprior to January 1, 1998, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1,1.2, and 1.3 for conduct after January 1,1998. The respondent’s failure to maintain reasonable communications with his client violatedCanon Six, DR 6-101(A)(3), and Canon Seven, DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3) for conduct before January 1,1998, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1and 1.4 for conduct after January 1, 1998. The respondent’smisrepresentation to the client in September 1998 that he was in the process of negotiatingthe lien with the medical insurer violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’sfailure to deposit the money held for the medical insurer’s lien, $5,343, in an interest bearingaccount between April, 1991 and March, 2000 constituted a failure to deposit funds other thannominal amounts or held for a short period in an interest bearing account in violation ofCanon Six, DR 6-101(A)(3), Canon Seven, 7-101(A)(3), and Canon Nine, DR 9-102(C) forconduct prior to January 1, 1998, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2, and 1.15(e) for conduct afterJanuary 1, 1998. The respondent has been in practice since 1964. His disciplinary history consists of two private

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 725 (2008)-In the Matter of Burton A. Waisbren

At page 4
confidential information without the client’s knowledge or consent, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(a) and 1.16(d); that, by failing to take reasonable steps to protect hisclient’s interests upon the termination of the representation, the respondent violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.16(c) and (d); and that, by failing to comply with the client’s requests that hereturn her file, provide an accounting and refund his unearned fee, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a) and (c), 1.15(b), and 1.16(d) and (e). In Count Three, in June 2000, a client, who was a law student, retained the respondent to

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 6 (2007)-In the Matter of Joseph G. Abromovitz

At page 2 transactions violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), as in effect through June 30, 2004 (failure tokeep complete records of receipt, maintenance and disposition of trust account funds). The respondent’s failure promptly to inform the client when he received the $20,000

At page 2 ettlement payment, failure promptly to remit the net proceeds of that settlement, andfailure to give the client an accurate accounting of all the proceeds violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b), as in effect through June 30, 2004 (failure to notify client promptly of receipt ofclient’s funds; failure promptly to deliver to client funds to which client is entitled; failurepromptly to render full accounting to client upon request). The respondent’s negligent failureto inform the client accurately in 2000 of all of the proceeds collected and due her andrender a further accounting promptly in 2003 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) (failure to keepclient reasonably informed about status of matter; failure to comply promptly with reasonablerequests for information) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), as in effect through June 30, 2004. The respondent was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 1974. He has no history of

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 63 (2010)-In the Matter of Barrando Butler

At page 1
The respondent did not keep required records of the account, reconcile the account, or maintain a chronological check register, records of deposit or individual client ledgers forclient funds deposited to the account, all as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). On April 23, 2008, at closing, the respondent wrote checks from the account for various

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in commingling personal and client funds in the account was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The respondent’s conduct in authorizing a periodicautomatic debit from the account for a personal expense was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(e)(2). The respondent’s failure to keep required records of the account was in violationof Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). Finally, the respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds with nointent to deprive was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). There were no factors on aggravation or mitigation of his misconduct. At the suggestion of bar

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 701 (2012)-In the Matter of George Piandes

At page 1
periodic basis, but no less frequently than every sixty days, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(E). The respondent’s failure to maintain an accurate client ledger was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s conduct in depositing personal loans into the IOLTA account for payment of hi s personal obligations was in violation of

At page 1 ass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b)(2). The respondent’s conduct in making a cash withdrawal from his IOLTA account was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3). The respondent’s conduct

At page 2
withdrawal, and a statement of the remaining f unds of the client in the IOLTA account, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(d)(2 ) and 8.4(h). The re spondent’s conduct in negligently paying himself more in fees than had been earned was in violation of Mass. R.

At page 2 rof. C. 1.15 and 8.4(h).

At page 2 Mass. R. Prof C. 1.15.

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 319 (2008)-In the Matter of Christopher T. Hajec

At page 2
By using his IOLTA account to hold business funds and to pay business obligations, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). By failing within a reasonable time to turn over to the brokerage client the funds due to her,

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 2 (2013)-In the Matter of David R. Ardito

At page 2
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.4(a) and (b), and 8.4(c) and (h). By intentionally misusing the funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and 8.4(c) and (h).
By failing promptly to notify the clients of his receipt of their funds, the respondent violated

At page 2 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b) and 1.15(c). By failing promptly to deliver the funds to which the clients were entitled, the respond ent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c).

At page 2 C. 1.4(a) and (b) and 1.15(d)(1). By intenti onally misrepresenting hi s qualifications and the status of the claims, the respon dent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). By failing to inform

484 Mass. 1039, 144 NE 3d 284 (2020)-MATTER OF LIVIZ

At page 2
Mass. 431, 441 (1987) ("required records exception" precludes "valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege"). See also Stornanti v. Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 518, 521-522 (1983) ; Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15A, 480 Mass. 1316 (2018) (generally requiring retention of client files for six-year period). He is not entitled to a

405 NE 2d 115, 380 Mass. 629 (1980)-In the matter of Spring

At page 1 405 N.E.2d 1 15 IN THE MATTER OF EARLE N. SPRING.

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 430 (2017)-In the Matter of Lawrence F. Scofiel

At page 2
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3(b) . By failing to maintain indi vidual client ledgers and failing to perform three-way reconciliatio ns, the respondent violated M ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f)(1)(C) and (f)(1)(E).

At page 2
the commingling of client funds with operating funds and the in tentional misuse of client funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8. 4(c).
In November 2012, the respondent a greed to enter into a factori ng agreement with a

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 68 (2002)-In the Matter of Stephen L. Blaha

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to maintain records of the disposition of a retainer and his failure to promptly render of full accounting regarding a retainer was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a), (b). The respondent was admitted in 1987 and in 1997 received an admonition for failing to

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 282 (2006), 447 Mass. 678 (2006)-In the Matter of Wilfred C. Driscoll, Jr

At page 6
Bar counsel correctly points out that disbarment — or, in some instances, indefinite suspension — is the usual and presumptive sanction for a lawyer who has committed a felony while in thecourse of practicing law. See id. (attorney disbarred after being convicted of thirty-fivefelonies, including conspiracy and bank fraud). See also Matter of Ogan, 424 Mass. 1015, 1016(1997) (attorney disbarred after pleading guilty to one count of making false statement tofederally insured institution where facts showed that attorney participated in thirty-threeimproper financial transactions); Matter of Nickerson, 422 Mass. 333, 337 (1996) (attorneyindefinitely suspended after pleading guilty to fourteen counts of making false statements tofederally insured bank). "For the most part, those attorneys who have received a suspensionhave escaped the greater sanction of disbarment or indefinite suspension due to specialmitigating circumstances." Matter of Concemi, supra at 330 n.4. The respondent contends that, while he admittedly pleaded guilty to one count of making a

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 259 (2009)-In the Matter of Bruce E. Hopper

At page 1
The respondent did not make a reasonable effort to ensure that he had in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that his bookkeepers’ record keeping was compatible with therespondent’s professional obligations under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, and, in particular, thatthey maintained the records as required by Rule 1.15 from and after July 1, 2004. Therespondent’s IOLTA account was not properly reconciled every sixty days, the check registerlacked client identifiers, the respondent did not calculate a running balance, the respondentdid not maintain individual ledgers for each client matter, and there was no ledger for therespondent’s personal funds in the account to cover bank charges. On or about February 18, 2006, the respondent wrote a check in the amount of $8,185.07 to a

At page 1
Bar counsel asked the respondent on November 17, 2006, and several times thereafter to bring his account records into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent did notdo so until about October 10, 2008. The respondent’s conduct in failing to perform a three-way reconciliation of the account

At page 2 R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and 1.15(f)(1)(C). On May 28, 2009, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline, and the parties filed the

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 71 (2014)-In the Matter of Rosaleen Clayton

At page 2
failing to keep adequate records, by misusing the funds and by failing to refund the deposit, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) and (c), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h).
By failing to respond to the client’s telephone calls and by failing to refund the

489 Mass. 300 (2022)-IN THE MATTER OF KELLEY

At page 5
adequately with a client, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1319 (2015), and failed to deliver client files timely to successor counsel, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15A, 480 Mass. 1316 (2018), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d) and (e), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1396 (2015) (ef fective until September 1,

476 Mass. 1034, 73 NE 3d 262 (2017)-IN THE MATTER OF ZAK

At page 2
assistance relief services unless the fees are deposited into a client trust account. See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 25.02(2) (2007); 12 C.F .R. §§ 1015.5, 1015.7 (2017). The respondent does not dispute either that he charged advance fees or that the advance fees were not deposited into a client trust account. He argues

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 609 (2015)-In the Matter of Daniel J. Szostkiewicz

At page 2
charging a clearly excessive fee a nd his failure to refund unearned f ees as requested by the client is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a) (as in eff ect prior to 2011), 1.15(d (2) and 1.16(d). The respondent’s failure to notify the cl ient of his 2010 suspension from practice, in

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 80 (2007)-In the Matter of Margaret T. Connolly

At page 2
The respondent’s commingling the estate’s funds with her own funds, her conversion of the estate’s funds to her own use, and her failure promptly to turn over the funds to the estate’sbeneficiaries violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) and (c) (lawyer shall hold trust propertyseparate from the lawyer’s own property and shall promptly notify and deliver funds that aclient or a third person is entitled to receive), and 8.4 (c). The respondent’s obtaining the estate’s funds by false pretenses and her opening up the

470 Mass. 582, 24 NE 3d 566 (2015)-IN THE MATTER OF DWYER-JONES

At page 1
IN THE MATTER OF SUZANNE T. DWYER-JONES. SJC-1 1516 October 6, 2014.

At page 3 Mass. 1315 (1997) (proceedings to determine incapacity "conducted in same manner as disciplinary hearings"), and § 13 (6), as amended, 435 Mass. 1302 (2002) (with some exceptions, petitions for

At page 5
referring the matter to the Board pursuant to [S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in *589 453 Mass. 1315 (2009),] for the taking of further evidence that his or her disability has been removed and may immediately direct the lawyer’s reinstatement to active status upon such

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 562 (2018)-In the Matter of Steven R. Weiner

At page 1
into his IOLTA account and retained those funds in that account . That conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). Between at the latest J anuary 1, 2005, and June 1, 2016, the r espondent failed to keep a check register for his IOLTA acc ount that listed every transact ion in chronologica l order with a

At page 1 omission violated Mass. R . Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B).
Between at the latest J anuary 1, 2005, and June 21, 2017, the respondent failed to

At page 1 1.15(f)(1)(E). The matter came before the Boa rd of Bar Overseers on a stipula tion of the parties and an agreed recommendation for disc ipline by public reprimand. On J uly 9, 2018, the Board of Bar

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 13 (2016)-In the Matter of Deborah A. Anthony

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The respondent further admitted that a h earing committee, the board, and the Supreme Judicial Court would conclude that she had violat ed Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c), (d), (g), and (h) and 8.1(a) and (b).

14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 220 (1998)-In the Matter of Brian G. Doherty

At page 1
(Bankr.D.N.H. 1993). The United States District Court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcycourt in 1994, a disciplinary committee considered the respondent’s actions in the case inJanuary 1996, and the respondent finally disgorged the funds in February 1996. The respondent’s conduct was found to have violated N.H.R. Prof. Conduct 1.3, 1.15(a)-(c), and 8.4(a) as well as N.H. Supreme Court Rule 50(2)B. Rule 50(2)B requires attorneys "todeposit all cash property of clients in clearly designated separate trust accounts ." In re

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 766 (2011)-In the Matter of Ewuniki Damali Sanders

At page 6 her operating account in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1) (hold trust funds in tru~:t account). By the time that the respondent had spent the entire amount of the retainer, slw h0cl

At page 6 . in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (hold trust funds in trust account) and 8.4 (c) ::mel (h) {fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or dishonesty and engaging in conduct thnt 2dvcrsl·h· r:lkc!s on

16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 390 (2000)-In the Matter of Faith Thompson

At page 1
The respondent’s neglect of her clients and her clients’ cases, her abandonment of her law practice, her failure to communicate with clients concerning her abandonment of their cases,her failure to protect the clients’ interests or to return client files until after Bar Counsel hadreceived several complaints, constitute conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3,1.15(b), and 1.16(a)(2) and (d), as well as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(d). Count Two of the petition for discipline arose from BarCounsel’s receipt in late November and early December 1999 of three notices of dishonoredcheck from the bank in which the respondent maintained her IOLTA account. The respondentmaintained a commingled account, in that she issued checks from her IOLTA account to paypersonal and business expenses. In addition, she did not deposit proceeds from personal injurysettlements into her IOLTA account, but cashed settlement checks and distributed theproceeds in cash to her clients. She also failed to maintain adequate records of her handlingof client personal injury settlements. The respondent’s conduct in this matter violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (d), (e) and (f).In addition, the respondent did not timely respond to Bar Counsel’s inquiries, and did not

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 502 (2011)-In the Matter of Daniel Joseph Kelleher

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misuse of settlement funds, with actual deprivation resulting and continuing, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), (c) and 8.4(c) and (h).
The respondent’s failure to promptly deliver to his client the funds that he was entitled to

16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 13 (2000)-In the Matter of Irene S. Bavelsky

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The respondent’s conduct in intentionally using not less that $230,000.00 of her clients’ funds with the intent to deprive her clients of the use of those funds at least temporarily, resultingin actual and continuing deprivation, violated S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon One DR 1-102(A)(4) andCanon Nine, DR 9-102(A) and (B), and Rules 8.4(c) and 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules ofProfessional Conduct. The respondent was temporarily suspended from practice on ———-October 5, 2000. On

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 138 (2009)-In the Matter of Michael J. Conley

At page 1
month. As amended, it alleges six counts of misconduct by the respondent, Michael J. Conley.Briefly, those counts allege that:

  1. Conley failed to comply with the requirements of administrative suspension orders asrequired by SJC Rule 4:01, § 17, as amended, 426 Mass. 1301 (1997); and in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (c) , 426 Mass. 1389 (1998); and 8.4 (d) , 426 Mass. 1429 (1998);and abandoned client files without notifying those clients how to obtain their files inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 (a), 426 Mass. 1322 (1998); and 1.15 (b) (3), 426 Mass.1363 (1998) [BBO Pet. for Disc., p. 2];
  2. As an administrator or executor of several estates, he failed to timely notify clients thathe had received at least $766,414.00 on their behalf in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a), 1.4 (b), 426 Mass. 1314 (1998); 1.15 (b) , and 1.15 (c); converted at least$532,000.00 for his personal use in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), and failed tocarry out his duties as an estate administrator and executor in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.1, 426 Mass. 1308 (1998); 1.2 (a), 426 Mass 1310 (1998); and 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313(1998).

At page 1 . Conley transferred a client’s property to a trust without adequately informing the clientof the transfer in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8 (a), mortgaged the property withoutthe client’s consent and converted the resulting $20,000 loan, later sold the property,and converted about $238,000 from the closing proceeds in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15 (a), 1. 15 (b) (3), and 8.4 (c) 4. On behalf of his mother’s estate, Conley filed a wrongful death suit against theadministratrix of an estate of which Conley was a named coadministrator, therebycreating an impermissible and unwaivable conflict with the interests of his clients inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 (a) and (b), as amended, 426 Mass. 1330 (2000).

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 62 (2017)-In the Matter of Ronald L. Brandt

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of client funds and failure to refund unearned fees violated Ma ss. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 1.15(d), 1.16 (d), 1.16(e), 8.4(c) and 8.4(h).
The respondent’s failure to provi de competent representation an d to perform services with

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 130 (2004)-In the Matter of Paul M. Doherty

At page 1
The respondent maintained an IOLTA account used for the deposit of client and other trust funds. The respondent commingled client and personal funds by depositing personal funds tothe IOLTA account and retaining earned fees in the account. This conduct violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(a). The first matter began in October 1998, when the respondent began representing a client in a

At page 1
By March 31, 2001, the respondent had inadvertently withdrawn and spent the client’s funds held to pay the Medicare lien. This conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and 1.15(a), (b),and (d). In violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a) and 1.3, the respondent had also failed to takeany action of substance to determine the proper amount of the Medicare lien or to settle it.The respondent’s failure promptly to pay Medicare and the other providers violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.3 and 1.15(b). The client visited the respondent’s office on several occasions over the course of the following

At page 1 ear for information regarding the bills and was told that no bills could be paid until theamount of the Medicare lien was resolved. Despite the delay in settling the lien, therespondent did not deposit the funds he was supposed to be holding for the client in aninterest-bearing account, in violation of the requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) and(e). In about April 2002, the client consulted a caseworker at a community action program

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 221 (2012)-In the Matter of Carl N. Donaldson

At page 11
addition, the hearing committee concluded that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (1) (trust property to be held separately from attorney’s) and 8.4(c) (dishonesty, deceit,

At page 11
The hearing committee determined that the. r~spondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e) (5) (trust funds to be held in individual account with interest payable as directed by client)

At page 12
October 15, 2010, the respondent agreed to p~y O’L~ughlin $500 1.15(d) (2) (itemized bill, notice of amount and date of withdrawal, and balance, at or before withdrawal from trust

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 297 (2013)-In the Matter of Glenn H. Haese

At page 3
not immediately received the settlement funds. The board concluded that the respondent had vioiated Mass. R.’ Prof. C. 1.15(b} (hold trust funds separate from the lawyer’s personal funds); 1.15(c) (prompt notice and delivery of trust funds to persons entitled to receive); 1.15(d)(2)

At page 3 billing and notices to client on withdrawal from trust account) , and 1.15(f)( l)(C) (no

At page 5
thereby violating Mass. R Prof. C. 8.4(c), and also had violated a number of the provisions of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, concerning the handling of trust funds, as well as Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16( d) (refunding advance payment of fees not yet eamed).

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appears that Pepe is still owed almost $20,000, exclusive of interest. The hearing committee determined that the respondent had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b ), 1.15( c), 1.15( d)(l)-all

At page 6
circumstances presented, the $75,000 that the respondent received as an award or payment of attomey’s fees should be. deemed "trust funds" governed by rule 1.15. The board did conclude that the respondent’s conductviolated rule 8.4(c).

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violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1. 15(b) (2) (no personal funds in IOLTA account [here, the loan proceeds, see note 2, supra]), and 1.15(e)(3) (prohibiting withdrawal from IOLTA accmmt by check made payable to cash); rule 1.15( c), by failing to notify Pemy ofreceipt of the settlement

At page 7
already had been pledged as security to the commercial lender, and by failing to notify the lender that the respondent had impaired or reduced the collateral securing the loan; and ri1le 1.15(b ), by conve1iing the contingent fee in which Penry had an interest. As with count 3, the board

At page 15
loan proceeds that were the subject of counts 3, 4, and 5, qualified as "tlust propetty” or "trust funds" within the meaning of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, and the respondent had violated many

At page 16
clearly a viable argument that the attorney’s fees held by the res-pondent, in the circumstances presented in counts 3 and 4, did constitute "trust funds" for the purposes of rule 1.15. See Matter

489 Mass. 1007 (2022)-IN THE MATTER OF GANNETT

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that regard. On October 31, 2012, Lee Bank lent $1 15,000 to Amaral Enterprises, LLC (Amaral), pursuant to a promissory note and a mortgage on certain commercial property owned by Amaral. That same day , Lee

At page 4
*101 1 As the board determined and the single justice agreed, the evidence established that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015), by withdrawing trust funds knowing his right to the funds was disputed and failing to restore the funds until the dispute was resolved;

At page 4 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), by failing to notify promptly a third party , Lee Bank, upon receipt of funds in which the bank had an interest, and failing to promptly deliver the funds it was entitled to receive; and Mass. R.

427 Mass. 797, 696 NE 2d 523 (1998)-In the Matter of Markey

At page 2
finding of guilt the established plea colloquy as set forth in *799 Mass. R. Crim. P . 12 (c), as amended, 399 Mass. 1215 (1987); G. L. c. 278, § 29D; and relevant Federal and Massachusetts case law .799 On August 18, 1997, the Commission filed in this court the notice of formal charges and the Judge’s answer

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 198 (2016)-In the Matter of Barry D. Greene

At page 6
IOLTA account by depositing the money from the lease payments in that account. SeeR. Prof. C. 1.15. Appropriate sanction. As the conduct is admitted, the sole·

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 287 (2013)-In the Matter of Kirk Y. Griffin

At page 2
to provide compliant trust account records for his IOLTA account, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f) (1); that his improper management of his IOLTA account resulted in a $1,909.09 overdraft on that account; that his improper management of his IOLTA account renders

At page 2
Falanga’s business, subject to a claim of $100,000 by the respondent for legal fees and expenses. See petition, ~~20, 21; Exh. A-7; copies of two checks (#10157 and #10158) referred to in Exh. A-7, dated October 17, 2012, payable to Robert Manning, Esq., who is

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 64 (2002)-In the Matter of Donald H. Barnes, Jr

At page 1
The respondent’s commingling and negligent misuse of client funds, and his failure to keep adequate records of those funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a). The respondent was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 1968. He has no prior discipline. He

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 280 (2008)-In the Matter of Michael A. Fitz

At page 2
After the payment to successor counsel, the amount of the loan from the client was reduced to $8000. Because $10,000 had already been remitted to the mortgage lender, the $2000payment to successor counsel was paid from undisbursed fees remaining in the IOLTA account.The respondent could not identify the precise supporting deposits for the $2000 disbursementbecause he failed to maintain complete records of his receipt, maintenance, and dispositionof trust funds in the IOLTA accounts and failed to prepare and maintain all records requiredby Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). In May 2006, approximately one year after making the loan, the client contacted the

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in entering into a business transaction with the client on terms that were not transmitted in writing to the client, and as to which the client did not consent inwriting, is in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(a). The respondent’s conduct in remitting $2000to successor counsel from undisbursed fees in his IOLTA account, and his failure to maintainall required trust account records, is in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (e). In aggravation, the respondent has been disciplined on four prior occasions. He received a

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 396 (2011)-In the Matter of Daniel Peter Gibson

At page 4
dram shop settlement funds due to either the in surer or the widow was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c) and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’ s conduct in failing to hold in escrow approximately $657,232.50 of the dram shop settlement funds, his entitlement to

At page 4 hich was disputed by the insurer, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii) and 8.4(h).

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 275 (2017)-In the Matter of James P. Long

At page 4
to the minor beneficiaries of the Shiel trust violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 (diligence); rule 1.2 (a) (seek client’s lawful objectives); rules 1.15 (b), 1,15 (c), 1.15 (d) (1), 1.15 (e) (3), 1.15 (f) (1) (c), One of the hearing committee’s findings based on the evidence presented was that

At page 6 the trust violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (trust property to be held separately in trust account, apart from lawyer’s own funds, and safegnarded); rule 8.4 (c), and rule 8.4 (h).

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 296 (2020), 484 Mass. 1050 (2020)-In the Matter of Robert S. Leo

At page 2
Overseers (board).3 See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (4), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). A h earing panel of the board, as the fact finder, heard the testimony of four witnesses, including

At page 3
The hearing panel served as the fact finder. Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), we are required to accept those findings if supported by

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 705 (2011)-In the Matter of Michael L. Pierce

At page 1
that the escrowed funds could be released were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(b) and (c), and 8.4(c) and (h).

At page 2 of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and 1.16(d).

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 64 (2005)-In the Matter of Anthony Raoul Bott

At page 2
By failing to notify the client that he had received $115,000 in settlement of her claims against the association, and failing to promptly deliver to her the funds she was entitled toreceive, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). By endorsing and negotiating the settlement check without the client’s authorization, the

At page 2
By commingling his personal funds with funds he was holding on behalf of the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) and (d). By intentionally converting to his own use the settlement funds received on the client’s

At page 2 ehalf, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (c), and 8.4 (c), and (h). The respondent executed an affidavit of resignation. On March 23, 2005, the Board of Bar

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 33 (2002)-In the Matter of Harley H. Anderson

At page 1
The respondent’s actions in intentionally converting the funds of the trust with intent to deprive the trust or the beneficiaries of the funds at least temporarily and with actualdeprivation resulting, as well as his further actions in refusing to account for the funds andignoring the beneficiaries’ demands for an accounting, constitute dishonesty, fraud, deceit,misrepresentation and conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law, in violationof Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c),(h); failure to segregate, safeguard, and account for trust funds inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b); and failure to communicate in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.4(a),(b). On April 10, 2002, the respondent submitted his affidavit of resignation from the practice of

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 23 (2014)-In the Matter of Paul J. Bennett

At page 1
complete and accurate information in his Trust Account Compliance Certificates; and allowed his client trust account to be unreconciled for a significan t period, all in violation of New Hampshire Rule of Professional C onduct 1.15, and New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 50. The respondent also stipulated that he failed to adequate ly train and supervise his non-

At page 1
handling and maintenance of his cl ient trust accounts, in violation of New Hampshire Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3, and that by violati ng rules 1.15 and 5.3, he also violated New Hampshire Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a). On June 4, 2014, bar counsel filed a petiti on for discipline with the Supreme Judicial

639 NE 2d 705, 418 Mass. 649 (1994)-In the matter of Hurley

At page 4
Board. In the interest of removing any doubt which may exist, however , we note that S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 5 (2), as amended, 41 1 Mass. 1315 (1991), provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he Board shall act only with the concurrence of a majority of the Board who are present and

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 466 (2014)-In the Matter of Robert S. Wolfe

At page 1
chronological check register or individual client matter ledgers , and failed to reconcile his trust account every sixty days in violation of Mass. Prof. C. 1.15( f)(1),(B),(C),(E) and (F). On multiple occasions during the repr esentation, the client requested that the

At page 1 an accounting, in violation of Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.5(c) and 1.15(d)(1 ). The respondent did, in fact, incur in excess of $10,000 in co sts and expenses in connection with his

At page 2
individual client matter ledgers , and failed to reconcile his trust account every sixty days, in violation of Mass. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1),(B), (C),(E) and (F). Due to the respondent’s failure to maintain complete records for the funds deposited into his IOLTA account, between May 29, 2009, and September 9, 2009, the respondent negligently misused

At page 2 9,247.80 in funds belonging to the client in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The respondent’s misuse of the c lient’s money was not intentio nal and the client was never actually deprived of these funds. On mu ltiple occasions during the respondent’s

At page 2
respondent provide an accounting setting forth the manner in which the $20,000 payment had been applied. The respondent never supplied the client with an accounting, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1).
On September 22, 2009, the bankruptcy co urt denied the ba nkruptcy trustee’s

At page 2
gave rise to the respondent’s 2012 adm onition. Since his admonition in 2012, the respondent has maintained his trust account in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.
Also in mitigation, the respondent provided other legal services to the client that were not compensated; refunded $7,000 in funds advanced by the client; and has now accounted

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 144 (2014)-In the Matter of Michael J. Fenton

At page 2
receipt and disposition of the estate’s funds along with the records required to be kept by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent receiv ed bar counsel’s corres pondence in due course but intentionally failed without good cause to respond to bar counsel. The respondent also

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to k eep the third son’s share of the proceeds from the sale of the house in a properly designated trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (lawyer shall hold trust property in a trust account separate from the lawyer’s own property). The respondent’s intentional misuse of the third s on’s funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 239 (2002)-In the Matter of Allan Garfinkle

At page 1
The respondent’s endorsement of a client’s settlement check without the knowledge of his client was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s intentional misuseof client funds with continuing deprivation was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and8.4(c) and (h). In the second matter, the respondent represented a client with respect to an automobile

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misuse of client funds with continuing deprivation was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c) and (h). In the third matter, the respondent represented two individuals with regard to personal injury

At page 2
The respondent’s signing of releases and endorsement of settlement checks without the knowledge or consent of his clients was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). Therespondent’s failure to notify clients as to the receipt of funds and failure to promptly deliverto clients funds which they are entitled to receive, with temporary deprivation resulting, wasin violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(h). In the fourth matter, the respondent neglected a bodily injury claim filed against the MBTA.

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct of failing to return a client’s file and failing to account for a retainer was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 1.16(d) and (e). In the sixth matter, in March of 2000, a client retained the respondent to represent her with

At page 3
The respondent’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and 1.4. The respondent’s misrepresentations of fact regarding the status of his effortswas in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). The respondent’s failure to account for or refundan unearned fee was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 1.16(d). The respondent’scontinuing failure to comply with the Court’s order of payment was in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 8.4(d) and (h). In addition to all of the above, the respondent failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel and failed

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1 (2008)-In the Matter of Barry C. Abelson

At page 1
The special hearing officer concluded that Abelson’s inadequate record keeping, failure to reconcile the IOLTA account, and his transfer of personal funds into the account violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a); and that his depositing of trust funds into an account that he knew

At page 2 R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), and 8.4 (c) and (h).5 The special hearing officer also found that Abelson’s failure to thoroughly represent his clients, and his failure to remit funds as set forth on HUD-1

At page 2
account and that the placement of such funds in such an IOLTA account, rather than in individual interest bearing trust accounts violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e).7 The special hearing officer concluded that Abelson’s knowing misuse of those funds, with actual

At page 2 eprivation resulting, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) and (b) , and 8.4 (c) and (h). b. Count four . Abelson was retained to defend a title action in Land Court. He failed to notify

At page 2
property was sold, and he arranged to have his possessions removed. He discarded some files in a large container, and when it was full, left boxes of files stacked next to the container.Several days later, bar counsel went to the premises and observed client files left outside,strewn across the yard. The special hearing officer concluded that Abelson’s failure tosafeguard client files violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a). 2. Discussion

At page 4
The special hearing officer found otherwise. 5 Mass. R. Prof. R. 1.15 (a), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04, provides: "a lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyers possession in connection with a

At page 4 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04, provides:

At page 5
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessaryfor the representation." Rule 1.2 (a) states: "a lawyer shall seek the lawful objectives of his or her client throughreasonably available means permitted by law and these rules. …" Rule 1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act withreasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. A lawyer should represent the client zealously withinthe bounds of the law." 7 Mass. R. Prof. R. 1.15 (e), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04, provides: "each lawyer who has a law office in this Commonwealth and who holds trust funds shall deposit suchfunds, as appropriate, in one of two types of interest-bearing accounts, either a (i) pooled account (‘IOLTAaccount’) for all trust funds which in the judgment of the lawyer are nominal in amount, or are to be held for ashort period of time, or (ii) for all other trust funds, an individual account with the interest payable as directed bythe client.. . . .”

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 631 (2011)-In the Matter of Samson Mparaganda

At page 1
the evidence and that a heari ng committee, the board and the Supreme Judicial Court would conclude that he had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). On September 12, 2011, the Board of Bar Overseer s voted to recommend that th e affidavit of resignation be accepted and that the respondent be disbarred. The Court so ordered on October 5, 2011.

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 315 (2019)-In the Matter of Neil Joseph Ju

At page 2
expenses and to return the client’s files upon request and at t he termination of the representation violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), and 1.16(d) and (e).

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 623 (2005)-In the Matter of Linda W. Solmonson

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to promptly notify the client of the arbitrator’s decision and of her receipt of the insurer’s check and her failure to maintain reasonable communication with theclient concerning the status of her claim were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a), 1.4(b)and 8.4(h). Her failure to promptly deliver to the client the funds to which the client wasentitled were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) [as in effect through June 30, 2004] and8.4(h). Her failure to provide the client with an accounting of her receipt and disbursement ofthe client’s funds and her withdrawal of funds to pay her own fees and costs withoutproviding an accounting were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.15(b) [as ineffect through June 30, 2004], 1.15(c) [as in effect through June 30, 2004] and 8.4(h). Herfailure to provide the client with a written statement disclosing the outcome of the matterwas in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(c). Her failure to hold the client’s funds in a trustaccount from mid-November of 2002 through early January of 2003, was in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(d) [as in effect through June 30, 2004] and 8.4(h). Her failure to hold theclient’s funds in an individual interest-earning trust account was in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(e)(ii) [as in effect through June 30, 2004] and, on and after July 1, 2004, 1.15(e)(5)(ii)[as amended effective July 1, 2004], and 8.4(h). Her failure to hold the client’s funds in atrust account from January 6, 2005, onward was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) [asamended effective July 1, 2004] and 8.4(h). In mitigation of her misconduct in this matter,the respondent provided the client with her funds due from the arbitrator’s award in August of2005. In the fourth matter, the respondent filed a personal injury action for a client against two

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 723 (2012)-In the Matter of Kevin P. Reynolds

At page 2
deprive the client of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c), and 8.4(c) and (h).
By failing to respond to his client’s te lephone calls and messages, the respondent

475 Mass. 1013, 62 NE 3d 38 (2016)-IN THE MATTER OF DIVIACCHI

At page 2
Modifying the language provided in the forms appearing in Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (f), the contingent-fee agreement stated the following: "Client is responsible *1015 for any amount owed to prior or other counsel not associated with the undersigned. CLIENT IS T O RECEIVE A CREDIT FOR A NON-REFUNDABLE

At page 2
the provisions and wording he had added; and he did not obtain her informed consent in writing to the modifications he had made."1015 Diviacchi entered his appearance in the Federal litigation on May 8, 2012 and filed an amended

At page 5
findings of the hearing committee, as adopted by the board, shall be upheld if supported by substantial evidence,' see S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. **1315** (2009), and the hearing committee's ultimate findings and recommendations, as adopted by the board, are entitled to deference,

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 20 (2010)-In the Matter of Robert Babchuck

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in failing to maintain required records for his IOLTA account and to properly reconcile the account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). The respondent’s failure tohave in place measures giving reasonable assurance that his employee’s conduct wascompatible with his professional obligations and failure to make reasonable efforts to ensurethat her conduct was compatible violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3(a) and (b). By failing topromptly remove his earned fees from the IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). By failing to safeguard trust funds and hold trust funds in a trust account and separate from

At page 2 he respondent’s own property, and by failing to promptly pay trust funds due to thirdpersons, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (2), 1.15(c), and 1.15(e)(5).By failing to promptly identify and record mortgage discharges, the respondent violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3. By failing to promptly conduct a full and complete audit of his IOLTAaccount after learning that his office manager had misappropriated approximately $18,000from the account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 1.15(d) and (f), and8.4(h). The respondent’s appropriation of trust funds for his own use when he knew that atleast some of the funds were likely due to third parties violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), and8.4(c). The respondent was admitted to practice in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on June 10,

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 74 (2003)-In the Matter of Lee Castignetti, Jr

At page 2
By removing the funds from the BankBoston account in violation of the preliminary injunction and to defeat the attachment and by failing to abide by the court’s order to deposit the fundswith the court or with opposing counsel, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), (d),and (h) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; conduct prejudicialto the administration of justice; and conduct that adversely reflects the fitness to practicelaw). By commingling Vantage’s funds with his personal funds in his personal bank account,the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) (lawyer shall hold property of clientsseparate from the lawyer’s own property). On July 8, 2003, the parties submitted a stipulation to the Board of Bar Overseers. The parties

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 516 (2004)-In the Matter of Joseph Paul Sullivan, Jr

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of client funds with intent to deprive the estate of the funds, at least temporarily, and with actual deprivation resulting was in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c) and (h). This matter came before the Board on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary violations and a

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 64 (2003)-In the Matter of Mory K. Brenner

At page 3
The respondent’s failure to pay all liens following the closing constituted a failure to provide competent representation to a client in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, failure to handle aclient matter with reasonable diligence in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, failure topromptly disburse escrowed funds in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (b), andmisrepresentation in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). The respondent’s failure to turn over the parents’ file upon his discharge constituted a

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 471 (2005)-In the Matter of Matthew J. McCarthy

At page 1
The respondent’s commingling and negligent misuse of client funds, without intent to deprive and with no deprivation resulting, and his failure to maintain adequate records of those fundsviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) of the rule in effect prior to 2004 (now 1.15[b] and [f]). The respondent was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 1996. He has received no prior

859 NE 2d 423, 448 Mass. 151 (2007)-IN THE MATTER OF GROSSMAN

At page 4
and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law); and that the respondent had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) (lawyer shall safeguard and keep separate client funds and shall notify client on receipt of funds), all of

: Supreme Judicial Court, 2011-IN RE MATTER OF PUDLO

At page 1
accounting of the fee to Barbuto. The third count alleged that by August 1, 2008, the respondent had yet to maintain any of the IOL TA records required by the July 1, 2004, amendment to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).

At page 3
with a written itemized bill on or before the date that an attorney withdraws his fees from a client trust account. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii) and (d)(2), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004). Nevertheless, under the pre-2004 rules in ef fect at the time of the respondent’s violation, the respondent

At page 5
Mass. 769 (1981), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a), 426 Mass. 1315 (1998) (charging excessive fees); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) (failure to render promptly full accounting of funds received); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d), 426 Mass. 1369 (1998) (failure to refund

At page 5 nearned portion of client’s advance payment); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) (ef fective July 1, 2004) (failure to maintain required records of funds in IOL TA accounts).

At page 5
426 Mass. 1314 (1998) (keep client informed, respond to reasonable inquiries, explain matters for client decisions); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(b), 426 Mass. 1315 (1998) (communicating basis for fee where lawyer has not regularly represented client); S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4), as appearing in 382 Mass. 769 (1981), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (engaging in conduct

At page 5
[3] The hearing committee found no mitigating or aggravating factors. [4] Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) ("lawyer shall hold property of clients … separate from the lawyer’s own property"; "[c]omplete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of [client funds] shall be kept

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 383 (2011)-In the Matter of Paul A. Gargano

At page 6
1.5(b) by failing t6 explain to his client the basis for his fee in the eviction matter, (2) Mass; R. Prof. c. 1.15 (b) (2) (ii) by .failing to place in escrow the $13,000i which the respondent had

At page 6 disputed their ded~ction, and (3) Mass. R. ~rof. C. 1.15(c)&(d) by failing to account_ for the $3,000 retainer, which _he deducted

477 Mass. 1015, 75 NE 3d 584 (2017)-IN THE MATTER OF HASS

At page 1 477 Mass. 1015 (2017) 75 N.E.3d 584

At page 2
(1998). It also found that the respondent failed to notify ELF that the settlement proceeds had been received, and failed to promptly deliver funds to ELF , in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (1998). A majority of the panel recommended a three-month term suspension. Both the

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Michael D Tracey

At page 1
into his own account a check payable to the Commonwealth. The fourth count charged him with commingling and recordkeeping violations. His conduct violated numerous disciplinary rules, among them Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) (hold trust funds separately from lawyer’s own funds); 1.15(c) (promptly notify and deliver funds to client s); 1.15 (f)(1)(C) (recordkeeping rules to safeguard property); 8.4(b)

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 601 (2010), 456 Mass. 1021 (2010)-In the Matter of William H. Shaughnessy

At page 1
, 442 Mass. 1012, 1013, 1015 (2004). The suspension was later extended for an additional one year and two days,after a finding of contempt. See Matter of Shaughnessy , 446 Mass. 1013, 1013-1014 (2006). In

At page 2
1 Section 18 of S.J.C. Rule 4:01 was replaced in its entirety effective September 1, 2009. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18, as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). Though the relevant provisions of the rule have not changed, we refer to the version of the rule in effect at the timespertinent to this case.

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 317 (2014)-In the Matter of Nathaniel D. Pitno

At page 1
1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), and 8.4(c) and (h).
In another case, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (d) and 8.4(c) and (h) by intentionally misusing a client’s retainer and failing to account adequately for the

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 578 (2009)-In the Matter of Joseph Paul Sullivan, Jr

At page 1
Bar Counsel opposed the petition on the ground that it is premature. Tr. 69:8. More specifically, Bar Counsel expressed concerns that the petitioner did not present a detailedplan for returning to the practice of law that should have addressed such issues as supervisionor monitoring of the petitioner’s work, obtaining professional liability insurance, andparticipation in courses in legal education given the petitioner’s absence from the practice oflaw since June 2000. Bar Counsel also found troubling the petitioner’s admission that hecurrently is not familiar with record-keeping requirements of Rule 1.15 of the MassachusettsRules of Professional Conduct given that his indefinite suspension in 2004 was for hisintentional misuse of client funds. Tr.45:19–23. After considering the evidence and testimony,the panel recommends that the petition for reinstatement be denied for the reasons set forthbelow. II. Standard

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 558 (2001)-In the Matter of Edward J. Sylvia, Jr

At page 1
Between March of 1996 and April of 1999, pursuant to former Canon Nine, DR 9-103 and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f), Bar Counsel received nine notifications regarding overdrafts or dishonoredchecks drawn on the respondent’s IOLTA account. Two of the dishonored checks weresubsequently discovered to have been caused by bank error. In other instances where adishonored check was payable to a client or the account was overdrawn, the respondentpromptly paid the client or corrected the overdraft using his own funds. Commencing at least as of March of 1996 through at least April of 1999, the respondent

At page 1
The respondent’s mismanagement and inadequate record keeping of his IOLTA account is conduct in violation of Canon Nine, DR 9-102(A),(B)(3),(4) and, after January 1, 1998, Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(a). The respondent also failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel’s investigation, thus requiring that

997 NE 2d 425, 466 Mass. 1016 (2013)-Matter of Patch

At page 2
After a hearing, the single justice ordered that the respondent be suspended indefinitely . See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 12A, as appearing in 425 Mass. 1315 (1997). In his memorandum of decision, the single justice explained the reasons for his order , stating in part:

At page 2
conditioned upon the board’s satisfaction that [he] has addressed his emotional issues." See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (4), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). Bar counsel appeals, pressing her claim that the respondent should be disbarred, not indefinitely suspended.[ 3 ]

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 626 (2013)-In the Matter of Robert D. Stewart

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in failing to mainta in the clients’ funds in a trust account and converting the funds to his own use violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c). His failure to

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 435 (2007)-In the Matter of Charles E Marion

At page 1
From about July 2004 through September 2006, the respondent at times deposited personal funds to the IOLTA account and failed timely to withdraw all his earned fees from theaccount. The respondent thereby commingled trust funds with his own funds in the account,in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (2). During that period, the respondent failed to comply with other requirements of Rule 1.15. On

At page 1 ccasion, the respondent withdrew client funds for fee payments from his IOLTA account byelectronic transfers to a personal account that were not attributed to a particular client in acheck register or otherwise, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4). In addition, therespondent failed to keep required records for the IOLTA account, as follows: In violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), the respondent failed to maintain a checkregister showing in chronological order the date and amount of each deposit; the date,amount and payee of each disbursement; the identity of the client matter to which eachdeposit and disbursement pertained; and the balance after each deposit anddisbursement;

At page 1 n violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C), the respondent failed to maintain achronological ledger for each client or third person for whom he received trust fundsshowing each related receipt and disbursement; the identity of the client matter forwhich each sum was deposited or disbursed; and the balance held for the client or thirdperson; In violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D), the respondent failed to maintain achronological ledger for his funds deposited to the account to accommodate reasonablyexpected bank charges showing each deposit and expenditure of his funds and thebalance remaining;

At page 2 account records into full compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and document his compliance. The respondent failed to bring his records into full compliance with Rule 1.15

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 12 (2008)-In the Matter of Laura B. Alderman

At page 1
By cashing the client’s retainer check and intentionally expending his retainer for personal purposes unrelated to the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), and(d), and 8.4(c). By remitting clients’ funds to the client that were misappropriated from the firm’s

At page 1 onveyancing account, the respondent intentionally misused trust funds in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and (d), and 8.4(c). In the second matter, the respondent’s law partner conducted a real estate closing as

At page 2
purposes, instead of paying the taxes, the respondent intentionally misused trust funds with actual deprivation resulting, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and (d), and 8.4(c). In the third matter, the respondent conducted a real estate closing in December 2005, as

At page 2
By intentionally using settlement funds to pay unrelated business and personal expenses with actual deprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), and (d),and 8.4(c). In the fourth matter, in September 2005, the respondent was retained to represent the client

At page 2
By failing to deposit the client’s retainer in a trust account, by intentionally misusing the client’s funds for her own business or personal purposes, and by failing to promptly deliver tothe client a refund, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), and (d), and8.4(c). In the fifth matter, the client retained the respondent in January 2006, to represent her in

At page 3
By failing to deposit the client’s retainer into a trust account, by intentionally misusing the client’s funds for her own personal purposes, and by failing to promptly refund the retainer tothe client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), and (d), and 8.4(c). In the sixth matter, the client engaged the services of the respondent in September 2005, to

At page 3
By failing to deposit the client’s retainer in a trust account, by intentionally misusing the client’s funds for her own purposes, and by failing to promptly deliver to the client a refund,with actual deprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), and(d), and 8.4(c). In the seventh matter, the respondent filed a chapter 13 voluntary joint petition for

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 215 (2007)-In the Matter of C. David Grayer

At page 5
arrangement, and without obtaining their consent thereto, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(e). By failing to keep complete records of the receipt, maintenance, anddisposition of the money paid by the clients, and by failing to comply with the clients’ requestfor an accounting of the funds they had paid to him, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a) and 1.15(b). By failing, after the termination of the representation, to return anyunearned portion of the clients’ fees, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d). Bydepositing, in June 2003, the clients’ $10,000 retainer into an account in which he washolding personal funds, before the funds were earned as fees, the respondent violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and 1.15(d). In the third matter, a client retained the respondent in April of 2004 to handle a civil rights

At page 5
By delegating the matter to an attorney with whom he had no formal affiliation, and failing to advise the client that Fitch was not affiliated with his firm, the respondent violated of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(b) and 1.6(a). By dividing with Fitch the fees paid to him by theclient, without informing the client of the arrangement, and without obtaining his consentthereto, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(e). By failing to keep complete recordsof the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of the money paid to him by the client, and byfailing to comply with the clients’ request for an accounting of the funds he had paid to him,the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and 1.15(b). By depositing the $10,000 retainer funds, before those funds were earned, into an account

At page 6 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and 1.15(d). By failing to refund the unearned portion of the client’s retainer promptly after the termination of the representation, Grayer violated Mass.

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of James Hayes

At page 7
would have been a remote possibility unless LaMarche were found in contempt of Probate Court orders.
In contravention of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(3), t he agreement gave the respondent permission to pay his legal fees and reimburse disbursements from the lottery funds even without notice to the client or his knowledge or authorization. It gave the respondent “sole discretion”

At page 14
In the course of bar counsel’s investigation, the respondent could not produce records that complied with the accounting requirements of Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct and that would justify his exorbitant fees. The hearing committee rejected his explanation that his records had been destroyed in multiple alleged computer failures , which

At page 15
client to engage in fraud, conspiring with the client to impede the ex-girlfriend’s access to evidence, and a failure to comply with the accounting and trust fund rules of Mass. R. Prof .C. 1.15(d) and (f) and 1.16(e). Count Four alleged that the respondent’s attempts to cause LaM arche to withdraw his complaint to the Office of Bar Counsel violated rules of the Supreme Judicial Court as well as the Rules of Professional Conduct.

At page 17
and the resulting balance (Rule 1.15(d)(2) as in effect prior to July 1, 2015); misrepresentations to successor counsel and bar counsel (Rule 8.4(c)); and failure to provide his client his file upon request (Rule 1.15(d)(1) and 1.16(e) (as in effect prior to July 1, 2015). The hearing committee agreed that bar counsel had proven all of the above rules violations. Also on Count Three, the committee concluded that the respondent int entionally misused

At page 17 lient funds with the intent to deprive or with actual deprivation in violation of Rules 1.15(b) and 8.4(c), as in effect at the time. The committee concluded that the clearly excessive fee constituted a misuse of client funds. (Hearing Report, para. 251). In addition, the committee concluded that the respondent violated Rule 1.5(a) by charging and collecting a clearly excessive

At page 17
14 Although bar counsel had alleged the violations of Rule 1.15(b) and Rule 1.5(a) as alternative theories, the hearing committee determined that the theories were “not mutually exclusive.” (H R, ¶ 225). The final count of the Petition, Count Four, arises from the respondent’s effort to

At page 22
charging of a clearly excessive fee violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a) and 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) as well as Rule 1.15(b). We agree with and adopt the hearing committee’s legal conclusions in this regard. On appeal, the respondent challenges only two of the hearing commit tee’s

At page 24 violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 and 1.15. (Respondent’s Brief on Appeal, p. 40). The argument ignores the numerous additional rules violations.

At page 24
For starters, the respondent’s excessive fees amount to intentional misuse of client funds with actual deprivation.17 The conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c). Although admittedly the exceptional case, the Supreme Judicial Court and the Board have held that a fee is

At page 25
the benefit of his client or the client’s children . Because the funds were in a trust account, they were governed by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and their misuse violates that rule in addition to the rules concerning fees and deceit.

At page 30
and Rules 8.4(c) and (h); failing to provide his client the required notices prior to withdrawing his fees from a trust account in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15; and failing to maintain an IOLTA account that complied with the accounting rules of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.

At page 33
provided something of value, even if his billing practices violate the Rules of Professional Conduct and even if the billing involves an element of dishonesty or deceit. Doing so violates both Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a) (excessive or unlawful fee) as well as 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). By contrast, intentional misuse of client or trust funds is pure theft 19 and is covered by a different rule, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). Nothing of

At page 34 value is given. Such conduct violates a separate Rule of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.15(f), which specifically arises when a lawyer fails to protect trust or client funds.

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 41 (2016)-In the Matter of David M. Blumenthal

At page 1
The respondent’s failure promptly to remit all funds due client s and third parties from IOLTA account #1 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and (d)(1) as then in effect. The respondent’s issuance of checks without supporting funds and cr eation of negative account

At page 1 alances with respect to individual clients violated Mass. R. P rof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C) as then in effect. His failure promptly to withdraw all his earned fees and expense reimbursements

At page 1 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) as then in effect. Through June 30, 2004, the respondent’s failure to maintain complete account records violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) as then in effect. From and after July 1, 2004, his failure to reconcile this acc ount, failure to account and failure to

At page 1 aintain required account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1) (B)-(F) as then in effect. In one case, the respondent had represented a client in 2005 in a cash purchase of real

At page 2
Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3 and 1.4(a) and (b) as then in effect. His failure promptly to remit or return the funds due the client violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) as then in effect. In addition, in the spring of 2008, the respondent entered into an arrangement to act as

At page 2
and 1.4(a) and (b) as then in effect. By failing promptly to r emit all premiums due the title insurer, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) as t hen in effect. By failing to reconcile his IOLTA account #2 and maintain required account records, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(F) as then in effect. By fail ing to supervise the paralegal’s

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 468 (2004)-In the Matter of Myra Jones Romain

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of client funds with intent to deprive the client of the funds, at least temporarily, and with actual deprivation resulting was in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c) and (h). In addition to all of the above, the respondent failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel and failed

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 98 (2004)-In the Matter of Margaret T. Connolly

At page 2 mortgagor, in violation of law, was a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and 8.4(h). Therespondent’s negligent misuse of funds and her failure to keep complete records of herreceipt, maintenance, and disposition of client funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) The respondent received a public reprimand with conditions for accounting probation for one

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 278 (2006)-In the Matter of Carl N. Donaldson

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in failing to provide competent representation and failing to act diligently violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3. The respondent’s conduct in falselyrepresenting to the client that he had contacted the finance company violated Mass. R. Prof.C. 8.4(c). The respondent’s failure to keep the client reasonably informed about the status ofhis case and to explain the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client tomake informed decisions violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a) and (b). The respondent’s failureupon termination of his services to provide an accounting or to refund the unearned portion ofthe fee, and to return the file to his client, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d), as appearing in426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective through June 30, 2004, and 1.16(d) and (e). In the second count, the respondent represented a client in an action against her former

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in failing to provide competent representation to the client and in failing to act with reasonable diligence resulting in the dismissal of her cause of actionviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3. The respondent’s conduct in misrepresenting to theclient that he had filed a motion to reconsider with the court, and that a hearing wasscheduled on March 16, 2004, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). The respondent’s conduct infailing to promptly withdraw or to return his client’s file and unearned legal fee, violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c). In the third count, the respondent undertook to represent a client who had been convicted of

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in failing to act with reasonable competence, diligence and communication in representing the client violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4. Therespondent’s failure to render a full accounting or to pay over the unearned balance of theretainer due the client violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c), as appearing in 426 Mass.1301, 1363 (1997), effective through June 30, 2004. In fourth count, the respondent was retained to represent a client in a drug-related offense in

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in failing to act with reasonable competence and diligence in representing the second violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4. The respondent’s failureto render a full accounting or to return the unearned portion of his fee violated Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(b) and (c), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective through June 30,2004. The respondent has made restitution to the clients for the unearned portion of his fees. In

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 791 (2012)-In the Matter of Robert W. Shimer

At page 2
not an IOLTA account. The failure to hold th ese funds in an IOLTA account violated Pa. R. Prof. C. 1.15(l).
Starting in 2002, the respondent drafted monthl y account statements for Tech Traders

15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 170 (1999), 429 Mass. 1013 (1999)-In the Matter of John F. Doyle

At page 1
from the results reached in similar cases. This case has some of the features of Matter of Ogan, 424 Mass. 1015 (1997), in which we rejected the boardis recommendation of a four-year term suspension and ordered disbarment; Matter of Nickerson , 422 Mass. 333 (1996), in which

At page 2
5Remorse and cooperation do not necessarily warrant a level of discipline less than disbarment. See Matter of Ogan , 424 Mass. 1015, 1016 (1997). "Typical" mitigating evidence historically has not been given substantial weight. See Matter of Saab , 406 Mass. 315, 327 (1989). That is not to say, however, that these considerations can play no

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 97 (2007)-In the Matter of Wilfred J. Daley, III

At page 2
The respondent’s failure promptly to notify his client that he had received funds in her behalf and his failure promptly to turn the funds over to her violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a) and (b)(lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, promptlycomply with requests for information, and explain a matter to the client) and Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15 (a) and (b) as in effect prior to July 1, 2004 (lawyer shall hold client’s propertyseparate from the lawyer’s own property and promptly notify a client of his receipt ofproperty in which the client has an interest). The respondent’s commingling client funds withhis own funds and his conversion of the ex-wife’s funds to his own use violated Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15 (a) and (b), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004, and 8.4(c) and (h) (lawyer shall notengage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, or any otherconduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.) The respondent’s false representations regarding the amount of money he had received on his

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to account for his receipt and disbursement of the ex-wife’s funds upon her request for an accounting violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 (lawyer shall act withreasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4(a), and 1.15(c), in effecton and after July 1, 2004 (lawyer shall promptly notify a client of his receipt of trust propertyin which the client has an interest). The respondent’s failure without good cause to comply with the terms of his suspension from

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 523 (2009)-In the Matter of Berton D. Ree

At page 2
By failing to have a written contingent fee agreement, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(c). By converting client funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). Byfailing to keep client funds in a trust account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b)(1). By making distributions from his IOLTA account that created a negative balance onbehalf of the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). Bymisrepresenting to the client the amount of the settlement, the respondent violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and 1.4. By failing to respond to the client’s requests for information,the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4. By signing the client’s name to the settlementcheck without authorization, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). Byintentionally failing without good cause to respond to bar counsel’s requests for information inthe course of investigation, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(b) and 8.4(g). Byasking the client not to testify and give information to bar counsel, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(f) and 8.4 (d) and (h). By offering to pay the client $4,000 to not appearfor his deposition and to drop his complaint with bar counsel, the respondent violated S. J. C.Rule 4:01, § 10, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(a) and (f) and 8.4(c), (d), and (h). By failing toprovide a written statement to the client at the conclusion of the contingent fee case that setforth the outcome, the recovery, and the method of distribution and to account for theproceeds of the settlement, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(c), last sentence,and 1.15(d). The third matter involved the respondent’s representation of the seller in the proposed sale of

At page 3
On September 8, 2008, the buyer forwarded a letter to the respondent, along with a copy of the court order, requesting the return of the deposit. This letter was followed by severaltelephone calls to the respondent demanding the funds. The respondent never returned any ofthe funds. By converting the escrow funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). Byfailing to keep the funds in a trust account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b)(1). By violating the terms of the escrow agreement, the respondent violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 8.4(c). On December 9, 2008, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline. The respondent failed to

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 220 (2015)-In the Matter of Richard Ira Goldman

At page 1
checks payable to himself or to cash, unrelated to any real estate transaction, with temporary deprivation resulting, in violation of Mass R. Pr of. C. 1.15(b) and (c) a nd 8.4(c) and (h).
The respondent made full restitution to all payees or parties that were temporarily

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 277 (2009)-In the Matter of Roland D. Hughes

At page 1
The respondent failed to contact the insurer to resume negotiations concerning the lien, and he failed promptly to turn over to the insurer the funds due it. The respondent failed to keeprecords for his IOLTA account as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, and he did not reconcilehis accounts every sixty days. Several months after the respondent received and negotiatedthe check, the health insurance company contacted the automobile insurer to determine thestatus of the settlement and learned that the settlement check had been sent to therespondent. Upon learning that the settlement check had been negotiated, the health insurer sent to the

At page 2
knowledge or consent, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). By failing to keep required records for the IOLTA account and to reconcile his IOLTA account at least every sixtydays, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). This matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on the parties’ stipulation of facts and

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 552 (2001)-In the Matter of Maureen J. Sullivan

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in commingling and intentionally converting trust funds, with the intent to deprive the client of use of the funds at least temporarily and with actualdeprivation resulting, was conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d) and 8.4(c) and(h). The respondent’s conduct in placing the client’s funds in a bank account that was not aclient trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)(d) and (e). In the second matter, in September 2000 the respondent entered an appearance on behalf of

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 316 (2011)-In the Matter of Chaz Robert Fisher

At page 3
The respondent failed to ma ke and maintain required reco rds for his trust accounts in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), as in effect through June 30, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), (D) and (e), as in effect from and after July 1, 2004. From July 1, 2004,

At page 3 hrough the fall of 2006, the respon dent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2), as in effect on and after July 1, 2004, by failing pr omptly to withdraw all hi s earned fees from his IOLTA

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 354 (2008)-In the Matter of David J. Hopwoo

At page 3
Conclusions of Law The hearing officer found that the respondent had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), as ineffect before July 1, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), as in effect on and after July 1,2004, by failing to refund the unearned retainer and to render an accounting on demand; thathe had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and 8.4(h) by intentionally misusing the retainerbefore it was earned; that he had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) by sending letters falselyindicating that he was sending the Avalon files to Daly; that he had violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.16(d) by failing to hand over his client files and to refund the unearned portion of theretainer after discharge; and that he had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(b), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g)by intentionally failing without good cause to cooperate with bar counsel’s investigation. The Respondent’s Appeal

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 420 (2008)-In the Matter of Scott A. Lathro

At page 2
The respondent was admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth on December 16, 1977. In aggravation, the respondent received an admonition in 2000 for failing to credit a client witha $1,000 payment for costs and expenses and to provide the client with an accurateaccounting of funds received from the client in violation of Rule 1.15(a). In addition, in theprior case the respondent failed to promptly return portions of the client’s file that the clienthad paid for, in violation of Rule 1.16(e)(3), and failed to adequately communicate with theclient in violation of Rule 1.4. Admonition No. 00-02, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 448 (2000). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and a joint

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 582 (2010)-In the Matter of Joseph B. Shanahan. Jr

At page 3
convincing evidence.6 d. Sanction . Under S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17 (8), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), my finding that the respondent has violated rule 4:01, § 17, requires me to extend the timebefore which the respondent may apply for reinstatement by a specific term. Imposition of thesanction under rule 4:01, § 17 (8) is not conditioned on a finding of contempt.

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 377 (2002)-In the Matter of W. David Marcello

At page 1
In addition, the respondent acknowledged that he had handled a criminal case on behalf of a client whom he had not regularly represented without explaining the basis of his fee in writingas required by Pennsylvania RPC 1.5(b). The respondent had received $3,000 as a fee from theclient’s father, at least $2,000 of which was required to be kept in a trust account until it wasearned. The respondent had spent the funds immediately for his personal benefit, therebyviolating RPC 1.15(a). The respondent’s client committed suicide approximately seventeenmonths after the respondent had been retained. The respondent failed to provide anaccounting to the client’s father for his time and failed to refund the unearned portion of thefee, thereby violating RPC 1.15(b) and 1.16(d). Finally, the respondent acknowledged that he had represented a trust in two civil matters,

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 270 (2019)-In the Matter of Paul P Hayes Jr

At page 1
On December 6, 2018, bar counsel fil ed a petition f or discipli ne setting forth the above misconduct and alleging that the respondent had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2) by paying personal expenses directly fro m his IOLTA account, Mass. R. Pro f. C. 8.1(b) and 8.4(g) by

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 331 (2016)-In the Matter of Yuri Levinto

At page 2 Prof. C. 1.15(c) and 8.4(c) and (h) as in effect before July 1, 2015.

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 390 (2006)-In the Matter of Richard W. Hynes

At page 1
For conduct on or after July 1, 2004, the respondent’s commingling of client funds with personal or business funds and his intentional misuse of settlement funds with intent todeprive and actual and continuing deprivation resulting were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b)-(d) and 8.4(c) and (h). For conduct before to July 1, 2004, the respondent’s conductwas in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(d), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997),effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04, and 8.4(c) and (h). On July 10, 2006, the Board voted to recommend that the affidavit of resignation be accepted

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 229 (2020)-In the Matter of Thomas E Giblin

At page 2
From at least February 1, 2017, through July 31, 2019, the respondent failed to keep records in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 for the IOLTA account. He f ailed to maintain a check register with a running balance and a client identifier for each

At page 2
reasonably believed that the sum of $610,000 was “nominal in amount” within the meaning of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(6)(i). The respondent failed to deposit those funds into a separate interest- bearing account with the interest accruing to the client and ex –

At page 2
By failing to keep a check register with a client identifier for each transaction and
running balance, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). By failing to keep individual client matter ledgers, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

At page 3 1.15(F)(1)(C). By failing to keep a register for bank fees and expenses, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D). By failing to reconcile his bank statement with

At page 3 retain the reconciliation reports, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).
By failing to keep the $610,000 proceeds from the sale of the real estate in an interest-

At page 3 earing trust account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(6).

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 579 (2019)-In the Matter of Donna M Sowa

At page 1
respondent asserted in mitigation that at the time of the misco nduct, she suffered from a substance abuse problem. The respondent’s m isconduct violated Mass. R. P rof. C. 1.15(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h).

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 362 (2016)-In the Matter of William F. Maloney

At page 2
By failing to account to the court-appointed attorney and guard ian, and to render an accounting as ordered by the court, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1), and 3.4(c). By failing to deposit the trust distributions he recei ved to an interest-bearing account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5), of the rules in effect before July 1, 2015. By failing to maintain proper IOLTA records, the respondent violat ed Mass. R. Prof. C.

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 684 (2006)-In the Matter of Timothy J. Shea, II

At page 2 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) as it then existed (lawyer shall hold client’s property separate from lawyer’s own property), and after July 1, 2004, 1.15(c). By his failure to return the client’s

At page 3
By failing to failing to account for his use of the funds his client gave him to pay for a trademark application, and by failing to refund any monies to his client after he wasdischarged, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and (d)(1) (lawyer shall promptlyrender a full written accounting of client’s property upon request) and 1.16(d). On March 24, 2005, the client filed a complaint with the Office of the Bar Counsel about the

At page 4 prior to July 1, 2004) and 1.15(d) (as it existed prior to July 1, 2004) (lawyer shall not commingle client funds with personal funds).

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 654 (2005)-In the Matter of Susan A. Watts

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misuse of estate assets, with intent to deprive the estate or the beneficiary of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (b) as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98through 6/30/04, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s preparation and attempt to obtain the beneficiary’s signature to a false First

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to discharge her duties as administratrix promptly and timely, including her failure to render a timely, complete, and accurate accounting for the dispositionof estate assets, failure to file timely the estate tax return and pay the estate tax, and herfailure timely to distribute the estate assets violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, and 1.15(a),(b) as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04. Therespondent’s failure to maintain a complete set of estate bank records and further failure toobtain and provide a complete copy of those bank records to the beneficiary’s representativeupon request violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, C. 1.4, and 1.15 (a). This matter came before the Board on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary violations and a

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 228 (2005)-In the Matter of Robert A. Faneuil

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misappropriation of client funds for personal and business purposes unrelated to the clients resulted in actual deprivation and constituted conduct inviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and 1.15 (a) and (b) as appearing in 426 Mass.1301, 1363 (1997) effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04. On November 4, 2005, the respondent filed an affidavit of resignation pursuant to Supreme

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 129 (2015)-In the Matter of Anthony R. DiFruscia

At page 3
The respondent, at all relevant times, faile d to keep records of the estate funds and other client funds that he held in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C), (D) and (E); and he commingled client funds with his own funds, in vi olation of Mass. R. Prof. C.

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 71 (2020)-In the Matter of Brian Paul Cassidy

At page 2
IOLTA ac count.
This conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d)(2) (fail ure to provide client a notice in writing on or before the date of withdrawal of fees from IOLTA account); 1.16 (d) (failure to refund

At page 2 nearned fees at the termination of the representation); and 1.15 (f)(1)(B), (C), and (E) (required trust account records).

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 164 (2004)-In the Matter of Leonard A. Glionna

At page 1
The respondent’s commingling and inadequate recordkeeping was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a). The respondent’s failure to deposit funds to be held long term in escrow to anindividual interest-bearing account was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e). Therespondent’s negligent misuse of client funds, without intent to deprive and with nodeprivation resulting, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) and Mass. R. Prof.C. 8.4(h). In aggravation, the respondent had a prior admonition on two files. In the first case, the

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 275 (2013)-In the Matter of John P. Gallagher

At page 2 and 1.15(c); his knowing failure without good cause to respond to bar counsel’s request for information violated Mass. R. Pr of. C. 8.1(b) and 8.4(d) and (g); his failure to comply with

At page 2
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c) and 8.4(d) and (h); and his failure timely to withdraw his earned fees from the IOLTA account viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b).

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 72 (2001)-In the Matter of G. Shepard Bingham

At page 2
The respondent’s distribution of a portion of disputed funds without mutual instruction or court order was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b). The respondent’s failure todistribute to William the undisputed portion of the funds held was in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b). During the time that the respondent held the funds, the respondent also did not maintain his

At page 2 OLTA account in accordance with the requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondentdid not withdraw fees promptly when earned, but withdrew fees piecemeal on an "as needed"basis. The respondent deposited his own personal funds into the account and paid personalobligations, in the same amounts, from the account. The respondent allowed funds notnominal in amount to remain in the account for more than a short period of time. Inparticular, the respondent represented his sister and others in the sale of a condominium unit,deposited his sister’s share of the proceeds into his IOLTA account, and allowed that share toremain in his account for a substantial period of time, distributing the same to his sister atvarious times as she directed. The respondent’s conduct in allowing disputed sums to remain in his IOLTA account for a

At page 2 ubstantial length of time was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e). The respondent’sdepositing of personal funds and paying personal or office expenses directly from his IOLTAaccount, and the respondent’s withdrawal of fees piecemeal from his IOLTA account, ratherthan in full as earned, constituted commingling of client and personal funds in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a). The parties stipulated that the appropriate sanction was a public reprimand. On October 16,

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 263 (2016), 474 Mass. 1001 (2016)-In the Matter of Richard S. Weiss

At page 1
single justice of this court in 2013, and he was given leave to reapply for reinstatement on or after January 1, 2014. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (8), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). He filed a second petition for reinstatement on June

At page 2
detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of justice, or to the public interest." S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). See Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 456, 460 (1975). See also Matter

At page 2
committee, as adopted by the board, "shall be upheld if supported by substantial evidence," see S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), and the hearing committee’s ultimate "findings and recommendations, as adopted by the board, are entitled to deference, although they are not

880 NE 2d 352, 450 Mass. 533 (2008)-IN THE MATTER OF CROSSEN

At page 23
client relationship, see, e.g., Matter of McBride, 449 Mass. 154, 165 (2007) ; Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 480 (2005) ; Matter of McIntyre, 426 Mass. 1012, 1015 (1998), the concern behind those cases extends to all third parties who are manipulated by an attorney’s unethical behavior . Here, as we noted above, the

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Michael M McArdle

At page 5
into options for loan modification and foreclosure avoidance . Tr. II:110- 111; Ex. 22, at BP 1286- 1291; Ex. 25, at BP 1314- 1315; Ex. 49, at 112. At some time between October 12, 2010 and August 2011, O’Brien retained the respondent to commence an adversa ry proceeding in he r

At page 6 Ex. 1, at BP 0 007-0010; Ex. 25, at BP 1315– 1318. Around August 2011, t hey entered into a written “ general r epresentation a greement ” requiring O’Brien to pay the respondent a $2,500

At page 6
complaint , but at the rate of $225 per hour . Tr. I: 237-238 ( respondent); Ans. ¶ 9 , Ex. 36 at BP 1553; Ex. 25, at BP 1315 -1318, 1319- 1322, 1323- 1326; Ex. 49, at 115.
9. On September 7, 2011, the respondent filed the adversary proceeding, Mary

At page 17
49. Had it been charged, we would also have found a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(3) , which provides: “A lawyer shall deposit into a trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are e arned or as

At page 19
required to segregate and hold O’Brien’s advance payments in a trust account and, as sta ted, w e conclude that his failure to do so would have violated rule 1.15(b) . We also conclude that his conduct would have violated rule 8.4(h) , based on the violation of rule 1.15(b) violation we

At page 27
receive ongoing representation , and they included some of the work the respondent sai d was covered by the retainer. See ¶ 70, above. See also Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, comment 2(A): “A flat fee is a fixed fee that an att orney charges for all legal services in a particular matter, or for a particular discrete component of legal services, whether relatively simple and of short duration, or complex and protracted.” (b) They were not classic retainers, either. See Matter of Sharif,

At page 42 We read this exception as requir ing compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, which requires
deposit of client s’ trust funds, including prepaid fees, into a trust account. The respondent did

At page 42
113. Turning to the federal regulations, “Mortgage Assistance Relief Service” is defined at 12 C FR § 1015.2 as follows:
Mortgage Assistance Relief Service means any service, plan, or program, offered

At page 42
Ex. 19, at BP 1255- 1256.
114. “Mortgage Assistance Relief Service Provider” is defined at 12 CFR § 1015.2 as follows: “any person that provides, offers to provide, or arranges for others to provide, any

At page 43
has executed a written agreement between the consumer and the consumer’s dwelling loan holder or servicer incorporating the offer of mortgage assistance relief the provider obtained from the consumer’s dwelling loan holder or servicer.
116. An e xception for attorneys appears at 12 CFR § 1015.7(b), as follows:
(b) An attorney who is exempt pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section is also exempt from § 1015.5 if the attorney: (1) Deposits any funds received from the

At page 43 is defined at 12 CFR § 1015.2 as follows: “a separate account created by a licensed attorney for the purpose of holding client funds, which is: (1) Maintained in compliance with all applicable state laws and regulations, including licensing regulations; and (2) Located in the state where the attorney’s office is located, or elsewhere in the United States with the consent of the consumer on whose behalf the funds are held.

At page 43
meaning of this regulation. H e did not satisfy the exemption from the prohibition in 12 CFR § 1015.5 on collecting advance fees because he received advance fees that he did not deposit into a trust account. ¶¶ 72, 74, 81, 85, above .

At page 45
count two of the petition for discipline. Count three of the petition c ites rule 8.4(c) and rule 1.15(b) , as stated above . Had the respondent been charged in count two with improperly depositing unearned fees into his operating account in violation of rules 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) , we

At page 45
123. Under count one, in ¶¶ 4 8-53, above, we concluded that the respondent’s misuse of O’Brien’s advance fee payments would have violated rules 1.15(b) and 8.4(h) , had they been charged . We found that deprivation resulted from the misuse because the respondent did not

At page 45
earned upon receipt constituted commingling and misuse of clients’ funds that would have violated rule 1.15(b) , had it been charged . And we again conclude that Bar Counsel has not proved dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation on the respondent’s part. He applied his fee agreements as written and as explained to his clients. Unlike count one, we conclude that the

At page 46
client trust funds, violated 16 CFR §§ 322.5 and 322.7 and Regulation O, 12 CFR §§ 1015.5 and 1015.7. We conclude that Bar Counsel has proved that the respondent violated those regulations.
125. Bar Counsel charge d that the respondent’s conduct violated 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531

At page 46
that some of the provisions for contingent fees and advance payments were illegal, in that they violated the regulations cited by Bar Counsel, and therefore violated rules 1.5 and 8.4(h) and would have violated rule 1.15, as stated in ¶¶ 1 19-123, above. They did not involve dishonesty, so no violation of rule 8.4(c) has been established.

At page 47
129. The respondent a dmitted that between 2011 and 2016, his firm did not maintain the records required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 for his client s’ funds IOLTA account. Tr. I:197 (respondent). We found, above, that retainers and monthly fees received under the FDCFA ’s

At page 47 account until earned. See ¶ 124; Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). Nevertheless , the respondent deposited, and treated as earned on receipt , some of those payments before they had been earned .

At page 47 accurate trust account documentation as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 for funds received from his approximately sixty active foreclosure defense client s. Ans. ¶ 67 (admits facts, but not violation) ; Ex. 7, at BP 0 334 (letter from respondent’s counsel) . He acknowledged that he did

At page 48
reconciliation s of trust accounts. Tr. III:90 -91 (S. McArdle). She could not recall reviewing
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Tr. III:95 (S. McArdle). For the following reasons, we find that Stephanie did not keep properly reconciled trust account records.

At page 48
testimony about what she did, and her description of a three -way reconciliation, did not conform to rule 1.15. Tr. III:79 -83, 87- 88, 139- 140 (S. McArdle). When the firm received an audit request in 2016, the respondent told Morgan Russell to ask Ste phanie what needed to be done,

At page 48
203-204 (S. McArdl e); Ex. 16 (response to Bar Counsel’s requests for information and documents). Based on the foregoing, and on Russell’s testimony, cited in ¶ 134, below, that her own reconciliations did not compl y with rule 1.15 until 2018, we find that the respondent di d not start to maintain properly reconciled trust accounts until 2018.

At page 49 check register. Tr. I:46- 47, 52 (Russell) ; see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). Russell came to learn the correct way to perform three- way reconciliations around 2018, when a nother title

At page 49
complet ed. Tr. I:54, 71- 73 (Russell). Her reconciliations of the clients ’ fund IOLTA account were not performed as often as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Tr. I: 59 (Russell). N ot all the reconciliations r esulted in a balanced reconciliation report. Tr. I:62, 64, 68, 70 (Russell); Ex. 16,

At page 49
likewise reject his excuse that corruption or loss of his firm’s computer records have prevented him from demonstrating compliance with the recordkeeping requirements of rule 1.15. See Tr. III:202 (S. McA rdle). The respondent’s own admissions, and the testimony of Stephanie

At page 50
$11,342.08. On that date, a deposit of $300,000, unrelated to BSI, was made into the account. Ex. 39 (Bar C ounsel’s spreadsheet summarizing activity in the clients’ fund IOLTA account), at BP 1615, lines 164, 165; Ex. 16, at BP 0748 (respondent’s spreadsheet summarizing activity in that account). Just after that, c heck no. 2813 to BSI, for $3,000, was issued on October 23; check no. 2984, for $2,000, on October

At page 51
unrelated disbursements, the balance in the account was down to $67.08. Ex. 39, at BP 1615, lines 164, 165, 173; Ex. 16, at BP 0748. The respondent would have us find that the entire $9,000 consisted of his money even though it was on deposit in a clients’ funds account and made up nearly the entire balance in that account when the

At page 52
It was one of the three pay ments to BSI , totaling $9,000, that depleted all but $2,342.08 of the $11,342.08 balance that was in the account before the $300,000 deposit. Ex. 39, at BP 1615, lines 163, 165, 168, 171. Again, t he respondent would have us find that the entire $9,000 consisted of his money even though it was on deposit in a clients’ funds account and made up nearly the entire balance in that

At page 53
whether the $2,000 of McKenna sale proceeds remain ed intact in the account. Ex. 39, BP 1613 to 1615, at lines 119 to 168; Ex. 16 at BP 0 747 to 0748. e. That the $2,000 of M cKenna sale proceeds did not represent earned fees is indica ted

At page 54
depleted all but $2,342.08 of the $11,342.08 balance that was in the account before the $300,000 deposit was made. Ex. 39, at BP 1615, lines 163, 165, 168, 171. As we have stated in ¶¶ 141 (i), 142(e), above, t he respondent would have us find that the

At page 54
disbursements, only $1,092.08 remained of the $11,342.08 balance that was in the clients ’ fund IOLTA account before the $300,000 deposit was made on October 17, 2014. Ex. 39, at BP 1615, lines 163, 171. By November 19, the $300,000 had been
transferred out, and an unrelated disbursement of $1,025 had been made, leaving the

At page 54 ccount balance at $67.08. Ex. 39, at BP 1615, line 173. c. The respondent attribute d the funding of the $4,000 check to credits available to him

At page 55
than two months after the $4,000 check was written: $780 deposited on January 28, 2015 (Ex. 39, at BP 1615, line 181, source unidentified) ; $800 in cash deposited on February 17, 2015 (Ex. 39, at BP 1615, line 184) ; $500 transferred from a private

At page 55 hecking account on March 5, 2015 (Ex. 39, at BP 1615, line 187) ; $1,300 deposited on March 10, 2015 (Ex. 39, at BP 1615, line 189) ; and a $100 transfer from the

At page 55 espondent’s operating account (Ex. 39, at BP 1615, line 191) .
f. Less than two weeks after the last of th ose deposit s, the account balance was only

At page 55 97.08. Ex. 39, at BP 1615, line 192. T herefore, before those deposits were made, the respondent di d not have sufficient funds in the clients ’ fund IOLTA account to

At page 57
date. Ex. 31, at BP 1422. Another $1,800, deposited in 2013, was insufficient to cover any of the BSI checks ; that $1,800 had been depleted by November 2014, when the account balance fell to $67.08. Ex. 39, at BP 1611, line 44 and BP 1615, line 173. There is no evidence that this money, presumptively client s’ funds because deposited into a n IOLTA account, constituted earned fees . See Tr. IV: 82 (Nolan) (unaware of

At page 60
deposited client s’ funds , identifie d as retainers , directly in to his operating a ccount , resulting in commingling in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). P etition , Ex. 37, ¶¶ 72, 78. Bar Counsel cites three exhibits: Ex. 13, consisting of nine checks payable to the firm during 2013 and 2014;

At page 61
account. Ex. 13, at BP 0 449. It appears to have been posted to an account ending in 1607 on 1/15/14. Th at was not one of the respondent’s trust accounts. Ex. 17, at BP 1233- 1237; ¶ 128, above. Locke was a foreclosure defense client . The two FDCFA ’s

At page 63 violation of rule 1.15 and misuse in violation of rules 8.4 (c) and (h)); Ans. ¶ 73, Ex. 36, at BP 1579- 1580. With respect to th ose two transactions and negative balances, we find as follows:

At page 64
operating account in to an IOLTA account . Petition, Ex. 37, ¶ ¶ 75, 76, 79 (presumably alleging commingling in violation of rule 1.15(b) (2)). Of th ose thirteen transfers, the petition identified four that exceeded $200: (A) $1,842.28 on September 27, 2017; (B) $1,000 on April 16, 2018;

At page 69
found that the respondent did not intend to cause deprivation. ¶ 1 47, above . The misuse did not target any particular client’s funds. ¶ 1 48, above . The misconduct violated rule 1.15, but it did not involve dishonesty, deceit, misrepresentation or fraud in violation of rule 8.4(c). We do

At page 69
161. Bar Counsel charge d that b y failing to keep client s’ funds in a trust account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) (trust funds to be kept in trust account) . Bar Counsel did not prove this charge as to the retainer checks alleged under this count . ¶ 1 49-150,

At page 69
162. Bar Counsel charge d that b y failing to keep earned fees separate from client s’ funds held in a trust account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2) (commingling personal funds in trust account prohibited) . The respondent testi fied that he kept earned fees in

At page 70 the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(3) (fees and expenses paid in advance to be deposited into trust account and withdrawn only as earned) . We conclude that Bar Counsel has

At page 70
trust property, and by failing to preserve those records for at least six years, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) (required records, retention for six years after conclusion of representation or distribution of funds) . We conclude that the respondent violated that rule by

At page 70
balances in his clients’ fund IOLTA account, and in individual clients’ accounts, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). That rule requires maintenance of individual client records and prohibits disbursements that would create a negative balance for any individual client. The respondent admitted infrequent, unintentional negative balances that he claims were cured promptly upon discovery. We conclude that the respondent violated the rule based on our findings that he misused trust funds (¶¶ 146, 151 ( a), (b), 1 55, above ); that negative balances occurred in two clients’ accounts (¶ 151 (a) , (b), above ); and that D e Los Santos’ $5,000 deposit

At page 72
but futile effort to defend the firm’s poor recordkeeping. The petition for discipline did not charge violations of the rules governing a lawyer’s obligation of supervision (Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.1, 5.3), but , as explained above, we may consider such violations – amon g them, the uncharged misconduct as to rules 8.4(h) and 1.15 that we found above in ¶¶ 48, 49 and 126 – as aggravating the misconduct that was charged, and proved. Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney , 448 Mass. 819, 825 n.6 (2007); Matter of Daniels , 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 102 (2007).

At page 75
collecting a clearly excessive fee); and 1.16(d) (failing to refund unearned fees at termination of relationship) .20, 21 We would have found violations of 1.15(b) (segregation of client f unds) and 8.4(h) (unfitness due to misuse of unearned fees paid in advance with deprivation resulting) had

At page 75
Counsel’s PFCs , i.e., 8.4(c) , (h). Nor did it charge such misuse under the rules requiring an attorney to protect and segregate client funds , 1.15(b) , (b)(1), (b)(3). Nevertheless, we have conclude d that the respondent understood he had been accused of misusing O’Brien’s payments to him by not keeping them in an escrow account (Tr. II:139

At page 77
Under count two , we concluded that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a) by entering into contracts calling for illegal or excessive fees ; would have violated rule 1.15(b) , had it been charged, and did violate 8.4(h) by depositing unearned retainers and advance fees into his

At page 78

28 AD 15 -03, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 749 (2015) (plus rule 1.15 notice and earned- fee commingling violations); AD 08-18, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 895 (2008) (1.5(c) violation and additional misconduct); AD 05 -13, 21 Mass. Att’y

At page 78
33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 52 2 (2017), which involved charging illegal advance fees in connection with foreclosure- related services, show s that disbarment can result from violations of rules 1.5 and 1.15, as here. Zak is distinguishable, as it involved multiple additional violations, including mort gage rescue scams based on misleading

At page 79
Under count three , we concluded that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(h) by negligent misuse of trust funds without deprivation; 1.15(b) and 8.4(h) , but not 8.4(c) , by intentional misuse of trust funds in issuing the $4,000 check to BSI; 1.15(b) by

At page 79 ommingling personal funds in a trust account; 1.15(f) by failing to maintain required trust account records; and 1.15(f)(1 )(C) by creating negative balances in individual client accounts.31

At page 79

31 We have rejected the charge that the respondent violated rule 1.15(b)(3) (deposit advance fees into trust account)
because retainer checks were not shown to have been unearned when deposited into non- trust accounts.

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 320 (2019)-In the Matter of Jonathan Keaveny

At page 1
January 1, 2019, after bar counsel initiated an investigation, the respondent brought his IOLTA account records into complianc e with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.

At page 1
investigation violated Mass . R. Prof. C. 8.1(b) and 8.4(g). Th e respondent’s failure to perform a three-way reconciliation of his IOLTA e account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). The respondent’s failure to maintai n a chronological check register with client identifiers for every

At page 1 failure to keep individual client matter ledgers violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s failure to keep a l edger for bank fees and charges with a list of every transaction

At page 1 nd running balance violated M ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D).

884 NE 2d 450, 451 Mass. 131 (2008)-In the Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney

At page 1
letters to insurers) a lien under G. L. c. 221, § 50, on a client’s potential recovery when the attorney knew he had no right to do so [146-147], as well as his violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 by failing to notify and inform his client promptly about his receipt of personal injury protection funds for

At page 8 PIP funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998),[ 2 2 ] and his payment of the medical bills without informing Fairfield and without obtaining his client’s permission violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4,

At page 8 of the prompt notification requirement in rule 1.15 (b), and that the attorney’s decision to pay these providers what was undisputably owed to them did not contravene any disciplinary rule.

At page 8 C. 1.15, as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).[ 2 4 ] In the case of Fairfield, who sustained "severe" injuries in a car accident, and who came into the attorney’s of fice in order to receive a distribution of funds on

At page 8
receive a greater portion of the PIP funds for his undisputed lost wages. In these circumstances, we conclude that the attorney violated rule 1.15 (b), as then in ef fect, as well as rule 1.4.147 5. Responding to information requests about legal fees. The final claim raised by bar counsel concerns the

At page 8
Although, in contrast to the board, we have concluded that the attorney’s failure to provide prompt notice or information about his receipt of PIP funds on behalf of Fairfield violated rule 1.15 (b), as then in ef fect, and rule 1.4 (a) and (b), we agree with the board that the appropriate level of discipline in this case is an

At page 10
and the legal fee to be charged is not a fee which is contingent on the successful collection of said funds." Bar counsel argues that this provision contradicts Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (b), 426 Mass. 1315 (1998) ("When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable

At page 10
when the rule is joined with another rule that sanctions more specific conduct, such as rule 8.4 (c), the problem of vagueness diminishes. [22] As in ef fect at all times relevant to the petition for discipline, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998), required a lawyer to notify a client "promptly" of the receipt of any funds in which the client had an interest. This provision currently appears in Mass. R. Prof.

At page 11
case, provides in relevant part: "How much time should elapse between the receipt of funds by the lawyer and notice to the client or third person for whom the funds are held depends on the circumstances." Comment [6] to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).

: Supreme Judicial Court, 2010-IN THE MATTER OF MURRAY

At page 3
her guardian. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 426 Mass. 1308 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), (d), (e), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998).[ 9 ] However , the hearing committee concluded that bar counsel had not presented suf ficient

At page 4
he did not know the exact amount he received. Therefore, the board concluded correctly that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), (d), and (e). Absent the presumption that is to be applied in the future, there is also substantial evidence in the record to

At page 6
Here, the board determined, see note 1, supra, that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1; 1.2(a); 1.3; and 1.15(a), (b), (d), and (e), by his failure to provide competent representation; to obtain the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available and permissible means; to act with reasonable

At page 6
of the client’s cash, and his failure timely to turn over the $2,040 to the client or her guardian, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), (d), and (e). The sanction for similar misconduct in previous cases has been a public reprimand. See, e.g., Matter of

At page 7
troubling. While the hearing committee determined correctly that this conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b), neither the hearing committee nor the board accorded suf ficient weight to this factor . That the respondent relied on advice of counsel in holding onto the funds for their potential evidentiary

At page 8
a presumption, one that can be rebutted, that unaccounted-for cash received from or on behalf of a client is deemed to have been commingled in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and that the client has been permanently deprived of the money . Our approach to the question does not dif fer from the allocation of

At page 8
funds, negligent misuse, or misuse with deprivation, "whether intentional or negligent," and that all are simply failures to comply with one or more provisions of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, is unavailing. Although the language of the rule makes none of these distinctions, but merely requires that funds be deposited in a trust

At page 9
recognize that the new rule is harsher than previous treatment for similar behavior , and will also result in far greater sanction where cash is involved than in other violations of Mass. R. Civ . P. 1.15, we conclude that, by its very nature, cash must be treated dif ferently than other client assets. Above all, we "must consider

At page 9
C. 1.2(a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998) (duty to seek client’s objectives through reasonably available, lawful means); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998) (duty of diligence); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b), (d), and (e), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) (duty to safeguard client’s property and maintain client funds in IOL TA account); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (engaging in conduct

At page 9
[2] Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, supra, was adopted on June 9, 1997, ef fective January 1, 1998; it was amended on September 5, 2003, ef fective as of July 1, 2004. See 440 Mass. 1337 (2004). All references to rule 1.15 here are to the version in ef fect at the time of these events, prior to the July 1, 2004, amendments. Although the text of the rule was modified in 2004,

At page 9 he substantive requirements of rule 1.15, e.g., to deposit promptly clients’ funds in a separate trust account, to notify the client in a timely manner of the receipt of funds in which the client has an interest, and to provide an accounting of those funds on request of the client,

At page 10
amount of cash hidden by the client or received by the respondent. This is precisely the problem that is likely to arise any time cash is involved, and that Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 is designed to avoid. See part 4, infra. [8] At that point, the elder services provider , the permanent guardian, and the nursing home were involved in a dispute with the

At page 10
in the Superior Court. See part 2, infra. [9] Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) (see note 2, supra ), provides in pertinent part:

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 310 (2010)-In the Matter of Robert M. Linnehan, Jr

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to deposit the settlement proceeds into a client trust account, his taking his fee in cash, and his failure to maintain any records of the receipt, maintenance,and disposition of the client’s funds was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1), (e)(4),and (f). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 590 (2010)-In the Matter of Tammy Shari

At page 2
The committee found that the respondent’s conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 (competence); 1.2(a) (pursue client’s lawful objectives through reasonably availablemeans); 1.3 (diligence); 1.4(a) (communicate with client and respond to reasonableinquiry); 1.4(b) (failure to explain matters to client for informed decision); 1.15(b)(1)(hold trust funds in trust account); 1.15(d)(1) (render full accounting on final distributionof trust funds); 1.15(d)(2) (billing, notice of withdrawal from trust account, statement ofbalance on withdrawal); 1.5(a) (clearly excessive fees); 8.1(a) (making knowingly falsestatement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter); 8.4(c) (conductinvolving fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or dishonesty); 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial tothe administration of justice); and 8.4(h) (conduct reflecting adversely on fitness topractice). In another matter, the respondent neglected a client’s personal injury claims. Retained on

At page 3
Third, there is the potential for confusion respecting the difference between advances paid by clients for attorney’s fees as opposed to advances paid by clients for costs andother expenditures to third parties such as experts. Unlike a fee advance, advances madefor costs and expenses are not intended ever to become the lawyer’s property becausecosts are meant to be paid to third parties on the client’s behalf. Somewhat anomalously,rule 1.15(b)(1) nonetheless permits a lawyer to commingle with her own funds costadvances that will never be hers, but she may not commingle fee advances that are intended to become hers. We are not suggesting that there is anything wrong with therule as written; we wish only to point out that the anomaly fosters understandableconfusion over the handling of both kinds of advances.

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1 (2009)-In the Matter of Peter A. Allen

At page 2
The respondent’s fee of $4,150 for the services was clearly excessive in the circumstances in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a). His failure to return the unearned portion of the fee, hisfailure to account for and return to the client the $500 filing upon discharge, and his negligentmisuse of a portion of the filing fee were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and (d),1.16(d). The respondent’s conduct in misplacing the client’s file constituted a violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3 and 1.15(a)(3). In the second matter, the respondent was retained to obtain a work visa and a green card for

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to seek his client’s objectives and lack of diligence violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1; 1.2(a); and 1.3. His failure to keep the client apprised of the status of his matterand respond to requests for information violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b). His failure toreturn to the client the unused USCIS filing fees violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and 1.16(d),and his negligent misuse of those funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, and 8.4(h). Therespondent’s request that the client agree to waive potential legal claims against him withoutadvising the client that he should have independent counsel constituted an attempt to violateMass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(a) and 1.8(h). In the final matter, the respondent was retained in December 2006 to obtain a green card for

At page 3
The respondent’s failure to seek the client’s objective, his lack of diligence, and his failure to keep his client informed and to respond to requests for information violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.4. His misrepresentations to the client about the remedies availableafter the petition was denied violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 and 8.4(c) and (h). Therespondent’s conduct in charging a fee that was excessive in light of the actual servicesviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a). His failure to return the unearned portion of the fee violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and 1.16(d). In mitigation, the respondent made restitution to the three complainants. During the relevant

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 118 (2001)-In the Matter of Brian W. Chance

At page 2
The respondent’s intentional misuse of client trust funds for personal and business purposes unrelated to the client matter, resulting in actual and continuing deprivation, violated ofRules 1.15(a), (d), and (e) and 8.4(c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. Therespondent’s failure to pay to or account for client trust funds violated Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3,1.4(a), 1.15(b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent’s failure tokeep client trust funds intact and in appropriate client trust accounts separate from his ownproperty violated Rules 1.15(a), (d), and (e) and 8.4(c) of the Massachusetts Rules ofProfessional Conduct. The respondent’s misrepresentations to clients and others violated Rule8.4(c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent’s failure towithdraw his appearance after being discharged by his client and his failure to timely returnhis client’s file and property upon demand violated Rules 1.16(a)(3), (d), and (e) of theMassachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. On August 6, 2001, the respondent submitted his affidavit of resignation from the practice of

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 110 (2011)-In the Matter of Laura Cannon-Ordile

At page 2
from the clients in a separate, interest-bearing trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5). In aggravation, the respondent had substantial experience in hand ling estates. Her

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 406 (2009)-In the Matter of Mary K. Nealon

At page 2
By failing to conduct a prompt and diligent search for heirs of the decedent, and by failing to secure her appointment as executor until more than two years had elapsed since thedecedent’s death, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3. By depositing morethan $274,000 in estate assets to an IOLTA account, and by holding the assets in the IOLTAaccount, rather than in an interest-bearing account with the interest payable to the estate,for more than one year, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5). By failing topromptly make estate distributions to the estate beneficiaries, the respondent violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, and 1.15(c). By failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness inselling the decedent’s house and completing the settlement of the estate, the respondentviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3. In the second matter, in June of 2004 the respondent agreed to represent two clients, a

At page 3
assets of the estate, and in preparing and filing a first and final account for the co-executors, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3. By failing to hold the estate assets in aninterest-bearing account with the interest payable to the estate, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5). By failing to promptly make estate distributions to the estatebeneficiaries, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). By failing to keep her clientsreasonably informed about the status of the estate matter and to promptly comply withreasonable requests for information, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a). In the third matter, in August of 2001, the respondent agreed to represent a California

At page 3
By failing to promptly surrender papers and property to which the client was entitled upon termination of her representation, and to promptly make available to a former client his filewithin a reasonable time following the client’s request, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(c) and 1.16(d) and (e). By failing to hold client funds in an interest-bearing account,the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5). The respondent was admitted to practice in Massachusetts on December 17, 1991, and had

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 170 (2013)-In the Matter of Stephen T. Davi

At page 1
From at least July 15, 2011, through April 2 013, the respondent failed to keep records for either IOLTA account in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent did not keep (1) check registers with chronological li sts showing for each transaction the client

At page 2
returned check. By Oc tober 4, 2013, the respondent had br ought his records for both IOLTA accounts into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent’s negligent misuse of client funds and his issuing funds that created a

At page 2 1.15(b)(1) and 1.15(f)(1 )(C). His failure to reconcile his IOLTA accounts and maintain

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 570 (2019)-In the Matter of Harland L Smith Jr

At page 2
account for and intentionally misusing his client’s $160,000, w ith temporary deprivation resulting, the respondent violat ed Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), 1 .15(d) 1.15(f)(l)(C), 1.15(f)(l)(F), and 8.4(c) and (h).

At page 3
family, and by commingling and inten tionally misusing the perso nal funds of the mother, with deprivation resulting, the r espondent violated Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(b), 1.15(c), 1.15(d), 8.4(c) and 8.4(h) . By misrepresenti ng to bar counsel the disposition of the sellers’

590 NE 2d 1157, 412 Mass. 569 (1992)-IN THE MATTER OF KNOX

At page 1 590 N.E.2d 1 157 IN THE MATTER OF PETER E. KNOX.

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 412 (2015)-In the Matter of Brett L. Malofsky

At page 2
By failing to deposit and maintain his clients’ funds in a trust account prior to November 27, 2013, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 1.15(e)(5). By not promptly paying to his clients the funds to which they were entitled, the respondent vi olated Mass. R. Prof.

At page 2 . 1.15(c). By misusing his clie nts’ funds for his own use, th e respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c). By issuing a check from his trust account that created a negative

At page 2 alance, the respondent violated Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). By depositing his personal funds into his IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(b)(2). By failing

At page 4
The respondent’s failure to deposit the daughte r’s retainer in a tr ust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 1.15(e)(5). The respondent’s misuse of the daughter’s funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c). By charging $2,750 to complete and file a petition,

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 663 (2013)-In the Matter of Daniel K. Webster

At page 1
From at least January 2009 through May 2010, th e respondent failed to keep records of funds for his IOLTA account as required by Mass . R. Prof. C. 1.15. Among other things, the respondent did not maintain a check register listing all transacti ons in chronological order with

At page 2
C. 8.4(c) and (h). His conduct in failing to keep trust funds in a trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1). His conduct in failing to main tain estate funds in a separate interest-bearing trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5 )(ii). His conduct in making distributions from

At page 2 1.15(f)(1)(C). His conduct in failing to cooperate with bar counsel’s inves tigation violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(b) and 8.4(g). His conduct in failing to keep a check register listing all

At page 2
transaction, a ledger for bank fees and expenses, and failing to prepare reconciliation reports violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C), (D ), and (E). His conduct in failing to deliver written notice of fee withdrawals with an itemized bill of services rendered, notice of the amount

At page 2 1.15(d).
The matter came before Court, Duffly, J., on a vote and recommendation of the Board of

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 12 (2010)-In the Matter of Jack McLean Atwoo

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to provide the client’s parents with an explanation of what the basis of his fee would be or how it would be determined was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(b)and 1.5(b). His failure to provide upon the request of the parents an accounting of his servicesrendered was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and 1.15(d)(1). In the second matter, the respondent began representing a client on a will contest in

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to provide the client with an explanation of what the basis of his additional fee would be or how it would be determined was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.4(b) and 1.5(b). His failure to provide upon the client’s request an itemized bill showing theservices rendered was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and 1.15(d)(1). In the third matter, in January of 2008, the respondent began representing a client on

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to provide the client with an explanation of what the basis of his fee would be or how it would be determined was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(b) and1.5(b). His failure to provide the client with an itemized bill showing the services renderedupon withdrawal of his fee from escrow and upon the client’s request was in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b), and 1.15(d)(1) and (2). In aggravation, the respondent had a disciplinary history of an admonition in 2006. Admonition

At page 3
1.4, failed to provide a client with file material within a reasonable time of request in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e) and failed to safeguard file material in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) (for conduct prior to July 1, 2004) and 1.15(b)(3). This matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and rules

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 702 (2006)-In the Matter of Gerald S. Shulman

At page 1
The respondent’s commingling of client funds with personal funds, and his failure to maintain the required records of those funds, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) (for conduct prior toJuly 1, 2004), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (f) (for conduct on or after July 1, 2004). The respondent received a public reprimand in 2002 for conduct unrelated to that involved in

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 242 (2007), 448 Mass. 151 (2007)-In the Matter of Jodie Grossman

At page 4
(dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law); and that the respondenthad violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) and (b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) (lawyer shall safeguardand keep separate client funds and shall notify client on receipt of funds), all of whichrelated to her intentional misuse and conversion of the escrow funds or her subsequentconcealment of her misconduct. With respect to its recommendation for discipline, the hearing committee acknowledged that

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 415 (2017)-In the Matter of Joseph S. Samra, Jr

At page 1
failed to maintain complete records of the receipt, maintenance and disposition of funds contained in the IOLTA account a s required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). The respondent failed to maintain an accurate check register with a running balance, accurate individual client ledgers

At page 2

The above misconduct was in viol ation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), 1.15(e) and 1.15(f)(B), (C), (D) , (E), and (F).

At page 3
payable to the to the client, t he respondent viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5) as in effect prior to July 1, 2015, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(6) as in effect as of July 1, 2015.

At page 3
In mitigation, the respondent hired an accountant and has set u p an IOLTA recordkeeping system that complies with Ma ss. R. Prof. C. 1.15. During the r elevant time, the respondent suffered from back injuries and w as taking prescription pain me dication. The respondent was

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 285 (2020)-In the Matter of Richard W. Kendall

At page 1
file, in vio lation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5( b), 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 8. 4(h), 8.4(c), 1.16(d) and 1.15A(b) and (c). After the client contacted Bar Counsel, the respondent failed without good cause to respond to Bar Counsel’s correspondence, and failed to appear at the Office

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 561 (2001)-In the Matter of Thomas J. Torrisi

At page 2
The respondent intentionally used the client’s funds for his own personal or business purposes with intent to deprive the client of his funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivationresulting. The respondent’s conduct was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 1.15 and 8.4(c)and (h). The respondent also misrepresented to his client and the insurer the status of amatter that was entrusted to him, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). On May 2, 2001, Bar Counsel filed a petition for discipline against the respondent for the

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 179 (2006)-In the Matter of Michael Leon Dash

At page 1
The respondent’s operation of a commingled trust account and his failure to maintain or cause his employee to maintain the account in conformance with regulatory requirements was aviolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (e). The respondent’s false statements to the insurance adjustor were a violation of Mass. R. Prof.

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 500 (2007)-In the Matter of Quang Joseph Nguyen

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to promptly deliver the escrow funds due the buyer and the respondent’s failure to account to the buyer for the escrow funds is conduct in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and (d) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). The respondent’s misuse of theescrow funds, with actual deprivation resulting and continuing, is conduct in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), (d) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). The second count of the petition involved the respondent’s representation of the plaintiff in a

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 373 (2017)-In the Matter of Dena L. Paolino

At page 1
2016, after bar counsel opened a complaint file, the respondent brought her IOLTA account records into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.
The respondent’s conduct in failing to perform a three-way reconciliation of the

At page 1 ccount violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). Her conduct in failing to keep an account ledger with a client identifier after every transaction and list of every transaction and running

At page 1 alance violated Mass. R. Prof. C . 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep individual client ledgers with a list of every transaction and running balance violated Mass.

At page 1 . Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep a ledger for bank fees and charges with a list of every transaction and running balance violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

At page 1 respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2).
On March 13, 2017, bar counsel fi led a petition for discipline, and the parties filed the

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 229 (2011)-In the Matter of Amy Michelle Donovan

At page 2
In the fifth matter, the respondent had been paid a retainer of $3,000 by the client who was seeking a divorce from his wife. As of the date of her administrative suspension, therespondent had an appearance on file in Middlesex Probate Court on behalf the client. Inviolation of the order, the respondent did not notify the client of her administrativesuspension or withdraw from the case. She also did not respond to the client’s inquiries aboutthe status of his matter. The client terminated the respondent’s services, demanded anaccounting of his retainer and a refund of the unearned portion. The respondent refunded$2,120 of the retainer, but failed to account for her fee. The respondent’s conduct violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d), 3.4(c) and 8.4(d) and (h). The respondent failed to reply to bar counsel’s letters requesting information on these

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 152 (2013)-In the Matter of Bruce Michael Cormier

At page 1
time and, instead, continued to use his existing New Hampshire IOLTA account in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(1).
In November of 2007, the respondent was reta ined by three clients whose brother had

At page 1
The respondent failed to promptly withdraw his one-third contingency fee from the account in violation of Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(b)(2). He also failed promptly to distribute to the

At page 2 remaining two clients their full sh are of the funds in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), although he made a partial distribution to one client in December 2009.

At page 2 The respondent failed to keep records re quired by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 for the IOLTA account. After March 9, 2009, he negligently misuse d a portion of his clients’ share of the funds

At page 2
drawn on that account to his wife and daughter for personal matters in violat ion of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). During that same time period, the respondent also withdrew cash from the account including by way of a check made payable to “cash” in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3). By failing to keep required trust ac count records, by issuing checks payable to cash,

At page 2 1.15(b) and (e)(5) and (f).

At page 2
respondent’s conduct. The respondent paid the clients in full on September 17, 2010. By failing to account for the funds, the responde nt violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d).
By failing to inform his clients of his dissipation of their funds and misrepresenting the reasons for his failure to remit to them the amounts owed in order to conceal his negligent misuse, the

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 10 (2016)-In the Matter of Karen J. Andrade

At page 1
entire retainer, written notice th at she had withdrawn the reta iner, a bill showing services rendered, and a balance statement violat ed Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2).

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 102 (2007)-In the Matter of Nora M. Daniels

At page 4
Count Two: The committee concluded that the respondent’s intentional misuse of another client’s trust funds to make payment to O’Brien before the Safety settlement check arrived,albeit without intent to deprive or actual deprivation, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b)and (d) (segregation, accounting and turnover of client funds) as well as 8.4(c) (dishonesty)and 8.4(h) (conduct reflecting adversely on fitness to practice). It concluded further that therespondent: (i) violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) by depositing trust funds (the PIP payment)into a non-IOLTA account and by accumulating earned fees in the IOLTA account; (ii) violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b) and (d) by failing to maintain in her IOLTA account the $245.60O’Brien paid for Alford & Bertrand’s costs, by taking double payment from O’Brien, and byfailing to make timely repayment, conduct the committee found to constitute negligentmisuse of trust funds with temporary deprivation resulting; and (iii) violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b) and 1.3 (diligence) by failing to pay Alford & Bertrand promptly. The committee rejected Bar Counsel’s charge under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a) that the

At page 4
knowingly failing to disclose Safety’s payment of funeral expenses when she requested aMedicare lien waiver, and violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 by failing to discuss the waiver withO’Brien. It rejected Bar Counsel’s charge under Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) that the respondent’sfailure to disclose the Maine property was intentional. Client Funds Violations (Count Three)The committee concluded that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e) (certain funds must be deposited into an interest-bearing account) by failing to deposit estate funds in theamount of more than $54,000 into an interest-bearing account for more than two and a halfyears. The committee also concluded that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b) and (d) and 8.4(h) by negligently using trust funds for purposes not related to the client,by depositing unearned retainers in non-IOLTA accounts, and by allowing earned fees toaccumulate in the IOLTA account. The committee rejected Bar Counsel’s charge that thisconduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c).

550 NE 2d 856, 406 Mass. 787 (1990)-In the Matter of McKnight

At page 5
that David was eligible for services. See 21 Code Mass. Regs. § 21.02 (1987), a regulation of the Department of Mental Health applicable to the Department of Mental Retardation pursuant to 1 15 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.03 (1) (1987). It had also designated him a first priority applicant. 21 Code Mass. Regs. §

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 464 (2019)-In the Matter of Adam M. McNamara

At page 1
trust funds and by failing to deliver such funds to his client in a prompt fashion, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), 1.2, and 1.3. In a second matter, the respondent represented a creditor in a District Court collection action beginning in 2011. In May 20 13, the respondent obtained a default judgment against the

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 499 (2008)-In the Matter of Robert G. Naughton

At page 2
The respondents’ conduct in charging clearly excessive fees as trustees is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a). Their conduct in charging fees and administrative expenses to theagricultural trust that were in fact the obligations of the other six separate trusts is conductin violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) as in effect prior to July 1, 2004. Theirconduct in using income from the agricultural trust to fund an endowment at the University ofMassachusetts, in breach of the terms of the trust and in violation of their obligations asfiduciaries, and their failure to disclose the existence of this endowment in their accountings,is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) as in effect priorto July 1, 2004. In mitigation, the respondents paid all fee surcharges and other costs assessed by the Probate

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 513 (2006), 447 Mass. 345 (2006)-In the Matter of Robert N. Lupo

At page 4
b. Hearing committee: count two. The hearing committee determined that the respondent violated rule 8.4 (c) and rule 8.4 (h) when he acquired his aunt’s house for $170,000 knowingthat the house was worth "substantially more." The hearing committee also concluded that therespondent’s conduct in having his aunt sign the deed conveying her house to him, where theterms of the transaction were not fair and reasonable to his aunt and were not fully disclosedin a manner she could reasonably understand, and where she was not given an opportunity toseek the advice of independent counsel, violated rule 1.8 (a) and rule 8.4 (h). Finally, thehearing committee concluded that the respondent’s refusal to account for his handling anddisposition of his aunt’s funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998).(26) As to the factors in mitigation or aggravation, the hearing committee found no mitigating

At page 7
We reject the respondent’s argument that this case is like Matter of Wise, 433 Mass. 80, 80, 92 (2000) (six-month suspension appropriate for attorney whose actions in connection withsingle matter were "marked by a conflict of interest," and "motivated by selfishness andanger," but caused no harm), or Matter of Pike, 408 Mass. 740, 745-746 (1990) (six-monthsuspension for attorney’s single incident of misconduct, his representation of both landlordand tenant in lease negotiation, affirmed, although "there had been a recommendation of asuspension of one year, the court would have followed it"). Here the record reveals a patternof misconduct, some incidents of which occurred during bar counsel’s investigation. See Matterof Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 327 (1989) ("consideration of the cumulative effect of severalviolations is proper"). The two-year suspension recommended by the board would be markedlydisparate from the discipline imposed in similar cases. See, e.g., Matter of Luongo, 416 Mass.308, 311-312 (1993) (indefinite suspension for attorney who commingled funds as to workintentional, although temporary, deprivation of client’s use of funds, associated withnonlawyer, and failed to cooperate with bar counsel’s inquiries); Matter of Voros, 11 Mass.Att’y Discipline Rep. R. 287 (1995) (indefinite suspension for attorney who misrepresented hislegal expertise, net worth, and financial viability of partnership in which he engaged withclient whom he failed to inform of conflict of interest). Cf. Matter of Segal, 430 Mass. 359,368 (1999) (two-year suspension for experienced real estate attorney who made falsestatements and material omissions regarding improper loans); Matter of McIntyre, 426 Mass.1012, 1015 (1998) (two-year suspension for mishandling of client funds). Here, therespondent’s conduct was far more egregious than conflicted representation. His conflictedconduct is characterized less by a divided loyalty and more by a motivation to subjugate theinterests of his clients to his own. As to restitution, the respondent asserts that the appeal panel incorrectly determined that he

At page 10
connection with his conduct in inducing the sisters to sign a listing agreement on June 3,1998. The hearing committee concluded that the respondent did not violate the charged rulesbecause independent counsel was present by virtue of Pendergast’s presence and activeinvolvement in the meeting. The hearing committee noted that even if the respondent’sconduct at the June 3, 1998, meeting did constitute a violation of charged disciplinary rules,the "recommended sanction would not be altered." (26) At the time of the hearings and effective until July 1, 2004, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998), provided: "Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client orthird person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Exceptas stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyershall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the clientor third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shallpromptly render a full accounting regarding such property." See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, asappearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 412 (2020)-In the Matter of Richard J. Reilly, Jr

At page 2
disbursed funds to the Ryans and the other clients named in the Addendum. The respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.2(a), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.15(b), 1.15(c), 3.3(a)(1), 8.1(a), 8.4(c) and 8.4(h) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct.

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 363 (2009)-In the Matter of Neil Madden

At page 1
From November of 2005 through at least December of 2007, the respondent failed to maintain the following account records required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f): a) a check register showing in chronological order the date and amount of eachdeposit; the date, amount and payee of each disbursement; the identity of theclient matter to which each deposit and disbursement pertained; and the balanceafter each deposit and disbursement;

At page 2
to maintain the account records and perform the reconciliations required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f), he was still unaware that the $5,000 check from the buyer had been returned forinsufficient funds. However, no funds of other clients were misused when the transfer wasmade because the additional $5,000 withdrawn from the IOLTA account was covered by therespondent’s own funds in the account that he had not withdrawn. The dispute wassubsequently settled and the respondent distributed the deposit funds as agreed by theparties. By failing to maintain the required account documentation records, the respondent violated

At page 2 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(A) By failing to maintain a trust account check register that recorded all deposits and records of

At page 2 isbursements and the current balance, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(B). By failing to maintain the required individual client records and subsidiary ledgers, the

At page 2 espondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). By failing to prepare and retain reconciliation reports on a regular and periodic basis but no

At page 2 ess frequently than every sixty day, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). By failing to retain reconciliation contemporaneous documentation and records of

At page 2 ransactions, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(F). By failing to promptly withdraw earned fees from his IOLTA account, the respondent violated

At page 2 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and a joint

429 NE 2d 1150, 385 Mass. 48 (1982)-In the Matter of Gordon

At page 1 429 N.E.2d 1 150 IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD K. GORDON.

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 121 (2007)-In the Matter of Eugene W. Downing, Jr

At page 2
The respondent’s misappropriation of the client share of the settlement funds, with actual deprivation resulting, is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c) and (d). The respondent’s intentional misrepresentation to the client’s controller on October 6, 2005

At page 2
The respondent’s misuse of the client’s funds with actual deprivation resulting, is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c) and (d). Count Three

At page 2
the respondent deposited trust funds for multiple clients. It was not an IOLTA account as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5) and the respondent did not maintain records for thisaccount in compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). The client account was also acommingled account from which the respondent made disbursements both to clients and to orfor his own personal or business purposes. Commencing in or before November 2004 and continuing through December 2005, at least ten

At page 3
The respondent’s commingling of business and personal funds in the client account in and after November 2004, his failure to maintain pooled trust funds in an IOLTA account, and hisfailure to maintain required records for his client account, is conduct in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(b), (e)(5) and (f). The respondent’s misuse of trust funds with actual deprivation resulting, is conduct in

At page 3 iolation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c) and (d). On February 12, 2007, the Board voted to recommend that the Supreme Judicial Court accept

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 423 (2015)-In the Matter of Timothy M. Mauser

At page 2
his negligent misuse of those funds, without intent to deprive and no deprivation resulting, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The respondent’s failure to timely return his clients’ file upon request was conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e). Th e respondent’s failure

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 249 (2014)-In the Matter of John Edward McCabe

At page 1
and failing to promptly deliver to his client funds that she was entitled to receive, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c).

At page 2
By commingling personal and client funds in his IOLTA account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). By intentionally using his client’s funds for his own personal and business use, the

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 473 (2017)-In the Matter of Glen R. Vasa

At page 1
satisfied. The respondent’s failu re to disburse to the insurer funds that he knew it was entitled to receive violated Mass. R. P rof. C. 1.15(c) and 8.4(d). By know ingly misusing settlement proceeds to which a third party was entitled, with continuing deprivation, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c), (d), and (h).

At page 1
proceeds with continuing deprivation, the respondent violated M ass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s failure to disbur se promptly the settlement funds belonging to each of those client s violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1 .15(c) and 8.4(h).

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 302 (2020)-In the Matter of Kenneth M Levine

At page 8
the misuse was both intentional and with the intent to deprive the client of the funds, and the client actually was deprived of those funds. Bar counsel alleged that the respondent’s conduct, as the petition described more fully, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) and (c) ("Safekeeping Property); 3.3 ("Candor Toward the Tribunal"); 8.1 (a) and (b) ("Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matte rs"), and 8.4 (c), (d) and (h) ("Misconduct"). On March 4 , 2020, the respondent delivered an affidavit of resignation , including two

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 468 (2015)-In the Matter of Emile E. Mora

At page 4
instances, 6 and three instances of intentional misuse without deprivation, 7 all in violation of Mass. R. Prof. R. 1.15(b) (requirement to hold trust property separate from lawyer’s ovvn property), 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation ), and 8.4(h)

At page 4
committee’s discussion or sanction: Mass. R. Prof. C.l.l5(c) (prompt notice and delivery of tmst property); 1.15( e )(ii) (failure to maintain client trust funds in separate~ interest -bearing account); 1.3 (diligence); 1.1 (competence); 1.2(a) (seek lawful objectives of client); 1.4

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 612 (2005)-In the Matter of William Alan Snider

At page 2
9. The Respondent did not answer the grievance complaint.10. On May 27, 2003, the Grievance Panel filed its written determination of probable cause with the Petitioner. The Grievance Panel concluded that there wasprobable cause that the Respondent violated Rules 1.15 and 8.4 of the Rules ofProfessional Conduct and Practice Book §§2-27 and 2-32(a)(l). 11. In light of the Grievance Panel’s findings of probable cause, the grievance

436 Mass. 650, 767 NE 2d 15 (2002)-Matter of Abrams

At page 2
respondent ef fected full restitution using funds provided by the business associate. These activities are suf ficient to establish violations of S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) (failure to safeguard and segregate trust account funds, deliver funds when due, render full

At page 3 appearing in 425 Mass. 1315 (1997). W e recognized that the "fundamental requisite of due process" on temporary suspension is "an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 374 (2020)-In the Matter of Michael O’Reilly

At page 1
account, instead of a separate interest-bearing account in the client’s name, even though he understood that the funds were not nominal and would be held for longer than a short period of time, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(6).

At page 1
paid $8,333 to the client’s guardian. In 2016, and in violation of the Court Order, the respondent then withdrew $8,333 of the settlement funds and paid it to himself, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), 3.4(c), 8.4(c), 8.4(d) and 8.4(h). From 2016 to 2018, the respondent disbursed, without court authority, t he remaining

At page 2
At all relevant times, the respondent failed to keep accurate and complete records of his IOLTA account, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f).

At page 2 his IOLTA account and withdrew parts of the fee in smaller accounts over time, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii). He also withdrew part of this fee in cash, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4). On November 18, 2020, the respondent submitted an affidavit of resignation as a

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 163 (2017), 477 Mass. 1019 (2017)-In the Matter of Barry D. Greene

At page 2
the hearing committee found that, by commingling personal and trust funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 827 (2012)-In the Matter of Steven P. Strojny

At page 4
each sixty days and his failure to keep a balanced individual client ledger, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(c) and (e). The respondent’s failure to promptly deliv er trust funds to the borrower that the bo rrower was entitled to re ceive, and the subsequent negligent misuse of

At page 4 hose funds with deprivation resu lting, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c ) and 8.4(h).
This matter came before the board on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary violations

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 734 (2007)-In the Matter of Stephen Turo

At page 1
Commencing at least as of February 2005, the respondent’s IOLTA account became commingled when he failed to promptly remove all of his earned fees from the IOLTA account.The respondent’s commingling of personal and clients’ funds in the IOLTA account violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). The respondent also withdrew accumulated fees by writingnumerous checks in payment for personal obligations, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(e)(4). Commencing at least as of February 2005, the respondent further failed to maintain complete

At page 1 ecords of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of clients’ funds in the IOLTA accountand failed to prepare and maintain the account records required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (f)as follows: a. The respondent failed to prepare and maintain a check register for the IOLTAaccount that specified for each deposit and withdrawal the identity of the clientmatter for which funds were deposited or disbursed, in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(f)(1)(B);

At page 1 client or third person for whom funds were maintained in the IOLTA accountdocumenting each receipt and disbursement,, the identity of the client matter forwhich funds were deposited or disbursed, and the balance held for the client orthird person, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)C); c. The respondent failed to prepare and maintain a chronological ledger for his

At page 1 unds deposited in the IOLTA account for bank charges and fees, documenting eachdeposit and expenditure of his funds and the balance remaining, in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D); and d. The respondent failed to prepare and maintain reconciliation reports at least

At page 1 very sixty days showing the required reconciliation of check registers, individualledgers, and bank statements for the IOLTA account, in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).

At page 2
of his IOLTA account. Despite receipt of three bounced check notices and multiple communications from bar counsel, the respondent ignored his obligations to safeguard clientfunds, and did not correct his record keeping to conform it to the requirements of the Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15 until after October 2006. The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and a joint

At page 2 ecommendation for discipline. On February 12, 2007, the Board voted to accept the parties’stipulation and to impose a public reprimand. While it accepted the stipulation in thesecircumstances, the Board indicated that, in the absence of a fully litigated proceeding, itwould not treat this particular case as precedent regarding the appropriate sanction forviolation of the revised record-keeping rule, Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15, which became effective onJuly 1, 2004. 1 Compiled by the Board of Bar Overseers based on the record of proceedings before the Board.

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 617 (2012)-In the Matter of Charles McKim Mitchell

At page 1
By failing to hold trust property separate from his own property, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b).
Failure to Provide Diligent Representation

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 459 (2002)-In the Matter of John F. Sheehan

At page 1
The respondent’s intentional misuse of client funds, with intent to deprive the client of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a) and 8.4(c), (h). The respondent’s settlement of the client’s personal injury claimwithout her knowledge or consent constituted conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a)and 8.4(c), (h). This matter came before the Board on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary violations and a

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 466 (2010)-In the Matter of Richard C. O’Reilly

At page 2
— Communication (a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding therepresentation);(f) Rule 1.15 (b) — Segregation of Trust Property (a lawyer shall hold trust property

At page 2 eparate from lawyer’s own property);(g) Rule 1.15 (c) — Prompt Notice and Delivery of Trust Property to Client or Third

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 549 (2009)-In the Matter of Peter George Skouras, Jr

At page 2
The respondent’s conversion of the client’s funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). The respondent’s failure to hold the funds in an individual account with the interest payable asdirected by the client violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5). The respondent’s failure promptlyto pay off and discharge the seller’s mortgage violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3 and1.15(c). His failure to deposit and maintain all funds held for the client in a trust accountviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (e)(5). The respondent’s issuance of the mortgage payoff check when he knew that there were

At page 2 nsufficient funds in the IOLTA account to cover the check and his creation of a negativebalance with respect to the client’s funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(c) and 8.4(c).His failure to account for his application and disposition of the funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(d)(1). Count II

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 329 (2006)-In the Matter of Julia A. Fullwoo

At page 1
Commencing at least as of November 2003 and continuing until Soforenko left the law firm in November 2005, the respondent and Soforenko failed to maintain complete records of thereceipt, maintenance, and disposition of clients’ funds in the IOLTA accounts. Between July 1,2004 and November 2005, the respondent and Soforenko failed to prepare and maintain foreach account records required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 after specific record-keepingrequirements went into effect on July 1, 2004. On January 26, 2004, the law firm’s bank notified the respondent that it had dishonored a

At page 1
By no later than January 2004, the respondent became aware that Soforenko’s record keeping for the IOLTA accounts was not in conformance with the Massachusetts Rules of ProfessionalConduct. The respondent did not take steps to reconcile the IOLTA accounts, and she did notput in place procedures to assure that proper record-keeping procedures would be followed bythe firm in the future. The respondent continued to delegate to Soforenko responsibility formanaging record keeping for the firm’s IOLTA accounts. The respondent was thereforeresponsible for Soforenko’s ongoing violations of the record-keeping requirements of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15. In April 2006, both IOLTA accounts were closed. The respondent addressed her record-keeping

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to maintain complete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of trust account funds between November 2003 and June 30, 2004 violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004. The respondent’s failure to maintaincomplete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of trust account funds betweenJuly 1, 2004, and November 2005 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) as follows: a. The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain check registers that showed the current

At page 2 alance in each IOLTA account after each deposit or withdrawal and that specified for eachdeposit and withdrawal the associated client matter violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B); b. The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain a chronological ledger for each client or

At page 2 hird person for whom the law firm received trust funds documenting each receipt anddisbursement of the funds of the client or third person, the identity of the client matter forwhich funds were deposited or disbursed, and the balance held for the client or third personviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)C); c. The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain a chronological ledger for funds of the

At page 2 aw firm deposited in each IOLTA account for bank fees and charges, documenting eachdeposit and expenditure of the law firm’s funds in each account and the balance remaining,violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D); and d. The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain reconciliation reports at least every sixty

At page 2 ays showing the required reconciliation of check registers, individual ledgers, and bankstatements for the IOLTA accounts violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). The respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Commonwealth on July 30, 1998. She had no

At page 2
The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and a joint recommendation for discipline. On August 15, 2006, the Board voted to accept the parties’stipulation and to impose a public reprimand. While it accepted the stipulation in thesecircumstances, the Board indicated that, in the absence of a fully litigated proceeding, itwould not treat this particular case as precedent regarding the appropriate sanction forviolation of the revised record-keeping rule, Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15, which became effective onJuly 1, 2004. 1 Compiled by the Board of Bar Overseers based on the record of proceedings before the Board.

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 148 (2010)-In the Matter of Stephen J. Durkin

At page 1
From November 5, 2006 to August 15, 2007, the respondent maintained an IOLTA account, but he did not maintain either a personal or business account in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(2). The respondent deposited personal funds into his IOLTA account in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and issued checks from his IOLTA account to pay his own obligationsin violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(2). On ten occasions between April 25, 2007, andAugust 15, 2007, the respondent wrote a check knowing that he did not have sufficientpersonal funds in the IOLTA account to cover the check and that the check would bedishonored or covered as an overdraft by the bank. This conduct was dishonest and violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(b), (c), and (h). The respondent’s records for his IOLTA account did not comply with the requirements of Mass.

At page 1 . Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent did not keep check registers with a client identifier of everytransaction, a list of every transaction, and a running balance after every transaction;individual client ledgers for each client matter listing each transaction and running balance foreach client matter; and ledgers of his personal funds in the account to cover reasonablyexpected bank charges. The respondent also did not perform a three-way reconciliation of hisIOLTA account at least every sixty days. The respondent was administratively suspended on April 26, 2007 for failure to pay his

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 35 (2008)-In the Matter of Anne L. Berger

At page 1
During this time period, the respondent failed to prepare and maintain the following account records required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f): a. the respondent’s failure to maintain a check register recording in chronological order thedate and amount of each deposit; the date, amount and payee of each disbursement;the identity of the client matter to which each deposit and disbursement pertained; andthe balance after each deposit and disbursement violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B);

At page 1 . the respondent’s failure to maintain a chronological ledger for each client or thirdperson for whom she received trust funds showing each related receipt anddisbursement; the identity of the client matter for which each sum was deposited ordisbursed; and the balance held for the client or third person violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(C); c. the respondent’s failure to maintain a chronological ledger for her funds deposited tothe account to accommodate reasonably expected bank charges showing each depositand expenditure of her funds and the balance remaining violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(D);

At page 1 . the respondent’s failure to maintain reconciliation reports prepared at least every sixtydays showing the required reconciliation of check register, individual ledgers, and bankstatements violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E); e. the respondent’s failure to maintain account documentation including all bankstatements, canceled checks and other transaction records returned by the bank, andrecords of all deposits separately listing each deposited item and the client or thirdperson for whom the deposit was made violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(F).

At page 2 respondent failed to bring her records into full compliance with Rule 1.15. In about June of2007, the respondent began maintaining her IOLTA account and account records in fullcompliance with Rule 1.15. The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and a joint

444 Mass. 1013, 830 NE 2d 1083 (2005)-IN THE MATTER OF JACKMAN

At page 2
ascertain whether monitoring necessary). See Matter of Dodd, 15 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 167 (1999) (practice limited to representation of municipality); Matter of Elias, 10 Mass. Att’y Discipline *1015 Rep. 78, 79 (1994) (on reinstatement, petitioner required to "limit his practice to civil cases in the district courts and to

At page 2
that no more than 10% of his active cases can be in areas of law involving personal injury or civil tort liability").1015 Conclusion. We vacate the order of the single justice imposing a three-year suspension, and remand the

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 867 (2012)-In the Matter of Susan J. Turner

At page 1
The Rhode Island Disciplinary Rules applied to this matter. By failing to promptly turn over to the client the funds due him, the responden t violated R.I. Disc. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d). By

At page 2 violated R. I. Disc. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). By intentionally misusing the client’s funds, the respondent violated R. I. Disc. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). By intentionally misrepresenting to the client

At page 2
By failing to keep trust funds in an intere st-bearing trust account, the respondent violated R. I. Disc. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). By intentiona lly misusing trust funds, th e respondent violated R. I. Disc. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c).

At page 3
of her fee to the client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(b). By failing to maintain an IOLTA account in Massachusetts , the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(1). By failing to deposit and maintain the retainer in a Massachusetts IOLTA account and retain it in the

At page 3 ccount until it was earned, the resp ondent violated Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.15(b). By converting the unearned portion of the retainer , the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). By failing

At page 3
the date and amount of the withdrawal, an item ized bill or accounting and the balance left in trust, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2). By failing after she was discharged to promptly to return to the client the client ’s file and the unearned portion of the fee, the

At page 3 upon demand by the client, the resp ondent violated Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.4(a) and 1.15(d)(1). By failing without good cause to reply to bar couns el’s requests for information, the respondent

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 722 (2010)-In the Matter of Kim E. Zadworny

At page 2
respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and 8.4(d). By failing to promptly render an account of her guardianship to the probate court and the executor, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d), 3.4(c), and 8.4(d). By filing a false first and final account in theprobate court and by making intentionally false representations in the account, therespondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) and (d). By making intentionally false statements to bar counsel and by not producing a copy of her

At page 2
By failing to deposit the ward’s funds in an interest-bearing account when the funds were not nominal in amount, and when she intended to hold the funds for an extended period of time,the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5). By failing to file an account of herguardianship, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d), 3.4(c), and 8.4(d). By failingto promptly turn over the remaining assets in her possession to the administrator, therespondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). By charging and collecting a clearly excessivefee, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a). In addition, the respondent’s record-keeping for her trust accounts and IOLTA accounts was

At page 2
By failing to prepare and maintain a proper check register that recorded receipts and disbursement of client funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(B). By failing tomaintain individual ledgers for each client matter, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(C). By failing to reconcile her trust accounts at least every sixty days, the respondentviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(E). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and rule

34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 309 (2018)-In the Matter of Edward G. McCormick

At page 1
conduct, the respondent violate d Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1; 1.3; 1. 4(a) and (b); 1.5(a); 1.7(a) and (b); 1.15(c) and (d); 3.4(c); 5.7(a) and (b); and 8.4(d) and (h).

333 NE 2d 429, 368 Mass. 447 (1975)-In the Matter of Hiss

At page 5
the victim of the law rather than its acknowledged transgressor — preferring death even to such certain infamy ."[ 1 7 ] Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 90-91 (1915) . Honest men would suf fer permanent disbarment under such a rule. Others, less sure of their moral positions, would be tempted to commit

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 341 (2010)-In the Matter of Craig J. Martin

At page 1
The respondent acted as closing attorney representing lenders in real estate transactions. He admitted in the affidavit that sufficient evidence existed to prove by a preponderance of theevidence that he intentionally misappropriated real estate settlement funds over a period oftime, that he repeatedly used funds from subsequent closings to pay off mortgages or otherobligations owed on earlier closings, that the net result was that the balance in his IOLTAaccounts was not less than $670,000 short of the amount that should have been on deposit,and that he did not have adequate funds available to pay off mortgages on recent closingsthat had gone to record. The respondent further admitted that a hearing committee, theboard and the Supreme Judicial Court would conclude that he had violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(b) and (c) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). On November 15, 2010, the Board of Bar Overseers voted to recommend that the affidavit of

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 43 (2014)-In the Matter of Richard Michael Brown

At page 2
From and after January 1, 2011, th e respondent also failed to keep records of funds for his IOLTA account as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Among other things, the respondent did not keep a chronological check register show ing each deposit and disbursement with client identifiers and with a calculation of the bala nce after each transaction, he did not maintain

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in failing to mainta in client funds in a trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and (e)(5) and 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s intentional misuse of client funds violated 8.4(c) and (h). The resp ondent’s conduct in failing to send statements to

At page 2
respondent’s conduct in making distributions fr om his IOLTA account that created negative balances on behalf of clients violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep a chronological check register showing all transacti ons in the IOLTA account

At page 2
ledger of his personal funds, failing to prepare re conciliation reports, and failing to keep deposit records with client identifiers violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C), (D), (E), (F)(ii) and (iii).

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 220 (2002)-In the Matter of John L. Gizzarelli, Jr

At page 1
The respondent did not file any answer to the petition for discipline. Upon his default, the Board of Bar Overseers found that he had committed the following offenses: Failure to seekthe lawful objectives of a client, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a) and (c); lack of diligence, Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.3; failure to keep a client informed, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b); improperwithdrawal without protecting a client, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(b), (c), and (d); failure tosegregate client’s funds (both before and after the adoption of the Massachusetts Rules ofProfessional Conduct), DR 9 102(A) and (B) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a); conversion andfailure to return client funds when due, Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b),Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h); and failure to cooperate with BarCounsel, Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(g), S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3. The Board recommended that the respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 241 (2001)-In the Matter of James A. Gibbons

At page 3
advising her that he had done so or that settlement funds had been received on her behalf was also conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.15(b) and hismisrepresentation to Bar Counsel that the client had been paid, and his submission of areceipt of payment in support of his false statement, was conduct in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 8.4(c),(h). The respondent has no prior discipline. No clients complained and restitution was made in full,

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 330 (2016)-In the Matter of Charles R. Levin

At page 1
respondent further admitted that a hearing committ ee, the board and the Supreme Judicial Court would conclude that he violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 625 (2009)-In the Matter of Michael G. Wilsker

At page 1
From and after January 1, 2006 the respondent maintained an IOLTA account at TD Banknorth. He opened another IOLTA account at the bank on July 1, 2007. The respondentfailed to keep records of funds in his IOLTA accounts as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.Among other things, the respondent did not keep proper check registers in violation of Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), individual client ledgers in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(C), individual ledgers for bank charges in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D),and he did not reconcile the account at least every sixty days in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(E). In February 2006, the respondent represented a buyer in a real estate closing. The respondent

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to maintain the escrow funds in a trust account and his intentional misuse of escrow funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1) and 8.4(c) and (h). Therespondent’s conduct in disbursing checks from the IOLTA account that created a negativebalance for an individual client matter violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The parties stipulated to a suspension from the practice of law for nine months, with two

At page 1 onths of actual suspension and seven months suspended for one year. As conditions of thesuspension, the respondent was required to take and pass the MPRE; to attend a trust accounttraining program; to maintain records in accordance with the requirements of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15; and to provide all reconciliation reports, plus other account records as requested, tobar counsel for one year. On October 19, 2009, the Board of Bar Overseers voted to accept the parties’ stipulation and

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 346 (2012)-In the Matter of John Anthony Gianino

At page 2 C. 1.15(d)(1). By failing promptly to reply to the daughter’s inquiries, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof C. 1.4(a).

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 449 (2015)-In the Matter of Francesco Mercuri

At page 1
From November 2012 through at least June 201 5, the respondent failed to maintain the following account records required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f): a) check register, b) chronological ledger for each client or third person, c) chronological ledger of his funds

At page 2
for his own personal or business purposes with deprivation resulting, th e respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c), (d) and (h), as in effect prior to July 1, 2015.

At page 2
and reconciliation reports on a regul ar and periodic basis but no le ss frequently than every sixty days, and account documentation, the respondent vi olated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B), (C), (E) and (F), respectively, all as in effect prior to July 1, 2015.

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 281 (2010)-In the Matter of Paul E. Kelleher

At page 2 escrow or turn over the funds promptly to prior counsel violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and a joint

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122 (2016)-In the Matter of Paul C. Dick

At page 1
By intentionally misusing client funds with continuing depriv ation, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15( b) and 8.4(c) and (h).

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 402 (2014)-In the Matter of Denis T. Teague

At page 2 and 1.15(d)(2). The respondent agreed not to contest the alleged facts and ru le violations in any bar discipline or reinstatement proceeding.

920 NE 2d 862, 455 Mass. 872 (2010)-Matter of Murray

At page 1
requested to do so by the successor guardian; and was ultimately unable to account for a portion of the total funds he received, all in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (b), (d), and (e); further , there was substantial evidence in the record to support the board’s conclusion that the attorney did not misuse the

At page 4
*878 her guardian. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 426 Mass. 1308 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (b), (d), (e), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998).[ 9 ] However , the hearing committee concluded that bar counsel had not presented

At page 5
he did not know the exact amount he received. Therefore, the board concluded correctly that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (b), (d), and (e). Absent the presumption that is to be applied in the future, there is also substantial evidence in the record to

At page 6
Here, the board determined, see note 1, supra, that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1; 1.2 (a); 1.3; and 1.15 (a), (b), (d), and (e), by his failure to provide competent representation; to obtain the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available and permissible means; to act with reasonable

At page 7 violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (b), (d), and (e). The sanction for similar misconduct in previous cases has been a public reprimand. See, e.g., Matter of

At page 7
troubling. While the hearing committee determined correctly that this conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) and (b), neither the hearing committee nor the board accorded suf ficient weight to this factor . That the respondent relied on advice of counsel in holding onto the funds for their potential evidentiary

At page 9
a presumption, one that can be rebutted, that unaccounted-for cash received from or on behalf of a client is deemed to have been commingled in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 and that the client has been permanently deprived of the money . Our approach to the question does not dif fer from the allocation of

At page 9
funds, negligent misuse, or misuse with deprivation, "whether intentional or negligent," and that all are simply failures to comply with one or more provisions of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, is unavailing. Although the language of the rule makes none of these distinctions, but merely requires that funds be deposited in a trust

At page 9
recognize that the new rule is harsher than previous treatment for similar behavior , and will also result in far greater sanction where cash is involved than in other violations of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, we conclude that, by its very nature, cash must be treated dif ferently than other client assets. Above all, we "must consider

At page 10
involving dishonesty , fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or "other conduct that adversely reflects on [the lawyer’s] fitness to practice law"). [2] Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, supra, was adopted on June 9, 1997, ef fective January 1, 1998; it was amended on September 5, 2003, ef fective as of July 1, 2004. See 440 Mass. 1337 (2004). All references to rule 1.15 here are to the

At page 10 the substantive requirements of rule 1.15, e.g., to deposit promptly clients’ funds in a separate trust account, to notify the client in a timely manner of the receipt of funds in which the client has an interest, and to provide an accounting of those funds on request of the client,

At page 10
amount of cash hidden by the client or received by the respondent. This is precisely the problem that is likely to arise any time cash is involved, and that Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 is designed to avoid. See part 4, infra. [8] At that point, the elder services provider , the permanent guardian, and the nursing home were involved in a dispute with the

At page 10
in the Superior Court. See part 2, infra. [9] Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) (see note 2, supra ), provides in pertinent part: "(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate

899 NE 2d 805, 453 Mass. 1001 (2009)-IN THE MATTER OF OSAGIEDE

At page 1
Conduct, including Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4, 426 Mass. 1314 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (c), as amended, 432 Mass. 1301 (2000); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) and (h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998). The

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 824 (2008), 451 Mass. 131 (2008)-In the Matter of An Attorney

At page 18
Bar counsel argues that this provision contradicts Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (b), 426 Mass. 1315 (1998) ("When the lawyer has not regularly repre sented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a

At page 21
about his receipt of $8,000 in PIP funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) , and his payment of the medical bills without informing Fairfield and without obtaining

At page 21
not so long as to run afoul of the prompt notification requirement in rule 1.15 (b), and that the attorney’s decision to pay these providers what was undisputably owed to them did not

At page 21
Determination of what is "prompt" will depend on the facts of each case. Cf. comment [6] to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) . In the case of Fairfield,

At page 21

  22 As in effect at all times relevant to the petition for discipline, Mass. R. Prof. C. **1.15**

(b), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998), required a lawyer to notify a client "promptly" of a receipt

At page 21 R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).
23 Rule 1.4 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, 426 Mass. 1314

At page 22
lost wages. In these circumstances, we conclude that the attorney violated rule 1.15 (b), as then in effect, as well as rule 1.4.

At page 23
failure to provide prompt notice or information about his receipt of PIP funds on behalf of Fairfield violated rule 1.15 (b), as then in effect, and rule 1.4 (a) and (b), we agree with the board

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Richard William Gannett

At page 6
evidence established that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 ( b) (2) (ii), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015), by withdrawing trust funds knowing his right to the funds was

At page 7
disputed and failing t o restore the funds until the dispute was resolved; Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), by failing to notify promptly a third party, Lee Bank, upon receipt of funds in which

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Robert Weinstein

At page 1
evidence and that if the matter were litigated he could be found to have violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (segregation and protection of trust funds), 1.15 (f)(1)(E) (trust account records), and 8.4(c) (dishonesty, deceit, misrepresentation, or fraud).
This matter came before the Board at its meeting on June 14, 2021 on the respondent’s

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 390 (2008)-In the Matter of Thomas G.J. Kalperis

At page 1
The respondent did not make a reasonable effort to ensure that his firm had in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that his bookkeepers’ record keeping was compatiblewith the respondent’s professional obligations under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, and, in particular,that they maintained the records as required by Rule 1.15 from and after July 1, 2004. Therespondent’s IOLTA account was not properly reconciled every sixty days, the check registerlacked client identifiers and was not maintained contemporaneously with running balances,the respondent did not maintain individual ledgers for each client matter, and there was noledger for the respondent’s personal funds in the account to cover bank charges. On or about October 31, 2006, a check drawn on the respondent’s account was dishonored for

At page 1
Between December 15, 2006, and July 2, 2008 bar counsel instructed the respondent on six occasions to bring his account records into compliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Therespondent did not do so until about August 2008. The respondent’s conduct in failing to perform a three- way reconciliation of the account

At page 1 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep anaccount ledger with a client identifier after every transaction and list of every transactionand running balance violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s conduct infailing to keep individual client ledgers with a list of every transaction and running balanceviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s conduct in failing to keep a ledgeror other records of his personal funds for bank fees and expenses violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(D). The respondent’s conduct in failing to provide adequate guidelines fornonlawyer assistants and his failure to ensure that their conduct was compatible with hisprofessional obligations violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3(a) and (b). On November 5, 2008, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline and the parties filed the

624 NE 2d 538, 416 Mass. 521 (1993)-IN THE MATTER OF ANDERSON

At page 2
recommendations of the hearing committee; it is free to evaluate the facts of each case and recommend a different sanction. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8, as amended, 41 1 Mass. 1315 (1991).[ 3 ] See, e.g., Matter of Palmer , 413 Mass. 33, 37 (1992) (board "rejected the hearing committee’s recommendation that [the

At page 4
discipline in a section entitled "Mitigating or Aggravating Factors." [3] Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 8 (3), as amended, 41 1 Mass. 1315 (1991), provides in part: "The Board may adopt the findings of fact submitted by the hearing committee or the panel or revise such findings which it determines to be erroneous…."

479 Mass. 1016, 95 NE 3d 226 (2018)-IN THE MATTER OF MORAN

At page 3
(failure to seek client’s lawful objectives); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998) (lack of diligence); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004) (failure promptly to deliver funds to third parties). See Matter of Bottomly , 2 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 19, 22 (1980) (beneficiaries harmed by

At page 3
client trust account and accounting violations. The respondent failed to hold personal funds of his clients, and funds belonging to their estates, in trust accounts, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004). Admonition No. 05-20, 21 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 712 (2005). He

At page 3 ailed to disclose to his clients the payments he made to himself, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004), and failed to keep required trust account records. The respondent

At page 6
[2] See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a), as appearing in 459 Mass. 1301 (201 1). [3] See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) (2), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004). [4] See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).

At page 7 Mass. 1313 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), (d) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1389 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. 8.4 (d), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998).

At page 7 [8] See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (1), (e) (5), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004). [9] See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 3.4 (c), 8.4 (d).

At page 7 [11] See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. [12] The board correctly concluded that the testamentary gifts were "substantial," where they had a collective value from one estate of at

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 167 (2015), 470 Mass. 582 (2015)-In the Matter of Suzanne T. Dwyer-Jones

At page 5
See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 13 (4) (a), as appearing in 425 Mass. 1315 (1997) (proceedings to determine incapacity "conducted in same manner as disciplinary hearings") and § 13 (6) , as amended,

At page 12
matter to the Board pursuant to [S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009),] for the taking of further evidence that hi s or her disability has been

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 221 (2016)-In the Matter of David M. Hass

At page 5
The committee also unanimously determined that the that the respondent violated rule 1.15(c) [a lawyer shall give prompt notice of receipt of trust funds to a client or third person who has an interest in such funds, and promptly deliver such funds to the client or third person entitled

At page 7
majority of the committee discredited the respondent’s explanations, and found that his conduct violated rules 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.15 (c). These findings and conclusions are complicated by Bar Counsel’s argument that the respondent made "intentional misrepresentations that induced third

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 732 (2006)-In the Matter of Joel F. Soforenko

At page 1
Commencing at least as of November 2003 and continuing until the respondent left the law firm in November 2005, the respondent failed to maintain complete records of the receipt,maintenance, and disposition of clients’ funds in the IOLTA accounts. The respondent failed tomaintain records required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 after specific record-keeping requirementswent into effect on July 1, 2004. On January 26, 2004, the law firm’s bank dishonored a check in the amount of $312,000

At page 1
In April 2006, after the respondent left the firm, the law firm closed both IOLTA accounts. The respondent opened his own law practice, addressed his record-keeping problems, andbegan maintaining his trust accounts in accordance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent’s failure to maintain complete records of the receipt, maintenance, and

At page 1 isposition of trust account funds between November 2003 and June 30, 2004 violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004. The respondent’s failure to maintaincomplete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of trust account funds betweenJuly 1, 2004, and November 2005 violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f) as follows: a. The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain check registers that showed the current

At page 1 alance in each IOLTA account after each deposit or withdrawal and that specified for eachdeposit and withdrawal the associated client matter violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B); b. The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain a chronological ledger for each client or

At page 2 law firm deposited in each IOLTA account for bank fees and charges, documenting eachdeposit and expenditure of the law firm’s funds in each account and the balance remaining,violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D); and d. The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain reconciliation reports at least every sixty

At page 2 ays showing the required reconciliation of check registers, individual ledgers, and bankstatements for the IOLTA accounts violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). The respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Commonwealth on December 21, 1979. He had

At page 2
The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and a joint recommendation for discipline. On August 15, 2006, the Board voted to accept the parties’stipulation and to impose a public reprimand. While it accepted the stipulation in thesecircumstances, the Board indicated that, in the absence of a fully litigated proceeding, itwould not treat this particular case as precedent regarding the appropriate sanction forviolation of the revised record-keeping rule, Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15, which became effective onJuly 1, 2004. 1 Compiled by the Board of Bar Overseers based on the record of proceedings before the Board.

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 377 (2020)-In the Matter of Paul W Pappas

At page 1
directly from his operating account. No client was deprived of their funds. During this same period, the respondent also deposited to and maintained personal funds in his operating account. This conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b).

At page 1
respondent did not perform three- way reconciliations of his IOL TA account, in violat ion of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).

At page 1
from retainer funds he was holding for a client without sending that client an itemized bill of services rendered, notice of the amount withdrawn and a balance of the client’s funds left in the account. This conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d)(2).

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 529 (2009)-In the Matter of Joyce Richar

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in lending $100,000 from the trust to her sister at below market rate and in not taking sufficient steps to collect the balance due on the note from her sisterafter four years violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 1.7(b), 1.15(b)(1), and 8.4(h). In March 2007, a beneficiary of the trust filed a request for investigation with the Office of

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 536 (2002)-In the Matter of Ward L. Thrasher

At page 2
violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5. The respondent’s occupancy of one unit rent-free in the Estate property while simultaneously acting as attorney and fiduciary for the Estateconstituted a conflict of interest in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7(b). The respondent’sfailure to file an appropriate account of his handling of the Estate’s assets is in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a). This matter came before the Board on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary violations and a

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 242 (2015)-In the Matter of Elizabeth Guerrero

At page 1
By intentionally using the escrow funds for personal and professional obligations unrelated to the clients’ matter, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c). By failing to deposit the escrow funds into an in dividual interest-bearing account, the respondent

At page 1 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5).
By failing to maintain a chr onological check register, and individual client ledgers, and

At page 1 records at least every sixty days , the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f). By making withdrawals in cash from her IOLTA account, th e respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 73 (2011)-In the Matter of Daniel S. Braese

At page 1
the material facts set forth in the information by a preponderance of the evidence and that the facts were sufficient to establish violations of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.4(a) and (b), 1.15(c) and (d), and 8.4(b), (c), and (h). On Dece mber 8, 2011, the county court (Botsford, J.)

28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 172 (2012)-In the Matter of Gregory John Curcio

At page 2
By depositing client funds into his personal checking account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b).
By failing to respond to his client’s telephon e calls and emails regarding the status of

At page 2
deprive the client of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c), and Mass R. Pr of. C. 8.4(a)-(d) and (h). By failing to refund the unearned legal fees, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 196 (2014), 468 Mass. 1002 (2014)-In the Matter of Glenn H. Haese

At page 2
the clients the amounts due to them out of personal funds. The board found that the respondent’s conduct violat ed Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004), by failing to keep the retain er funds in his trust account until they were

At page 2 arned; Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), as appeari ng in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004), by failing to pay the clients promptly the funds to which they were entitled; Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c), by

At page 3
funds were delayed by accounting issues, and con cealing that he had withdrawn their funds from the trust account; and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f )(1)(C), by issuing checks from his trust account that created a negative ba lance for a client matter.

At page 3
The board concluded that the re spondent knowingly and intentionally conve rted the client’s funds, causing temporary deprivation, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c). It also concluded that respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d), 426 Mass. 1369 (1998), by failing

At page 3 romptly to return the client’s unearned retainer ; Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), by failing promptly to pay the client funds to which it was entitled; Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2), by failing to provide

At page 3
R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3), as a ppearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004), by issuing a check on his trust account payable to "cash"; and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C), by issuing checks from his trust account that created a negative balance for a client matter.

At page 4
settlement check without authorit y, and converting the f ee in which the attorney had an interest; Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2), by depositing mone y received from the lender into his trust account; and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3), by maki ng a withdrawal from his trust account by an

At page 4
already been pledged for anothe r loan, knowing he would be unlik ely to repay the loans; and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2), by depositing fund s received from the attorney into his trust account. 3. Discussion. On appeal, the respondent raises essentia lly three issues. He claims that his due

At page 7
FN2. The board neither adopted nor rejected the hearing committee’s ruling that with respect to counts three and four the respondent’s conduct also violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (c), and (d)(1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 ( 2004), which concern a lawyer’s obligations

At page 7
of counts three, four, and five qualified as "trust property" or "tru st funds" within the meaning of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 was unnecessary in this case.

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 29 (2002)-In the Matter of Stuart R. Abrams

At page 2
The respondent’s misconduct in those matters through December 31, 1997, violated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6); Canon Seven, DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3); and Canon Nine, DR 9-102(A)-(C). From and after January 1, 1998, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a) and (d);1.3; 1.4; 1.5(a); 1.15(a)-(e); 1.6(a); 1.7(a) and (b); 1.8(b); 1.9(a); 1.16(a)(1), (c), (d) and (e);and 8.4(a),(c), (d) and (h). In addition, the respondent violated S.J.C. Rule 4:01, §§ 3(1), 10and 17. On March 11, 2002, the Board voted to recommend the respondent’s disbarment upon his

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 23 (2005)-In the Matter of Elaine E. Baltas

At page 3
By failing to promptly disburse the funds she was holding in connection with the settlement of her client’s personal injury matter, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, and Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) as to conduct occurring before July 1, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c)as to conduct occurring on and after July 1, 2004. By failing to promptly respond to herclient’s requests for information, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a). By failing topromptly account to her client for the funds that she was holding, the respondent violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) as to conduct occurring before July 1, 2004. By failing to reconcileher accounts at least every sixty days after July 1, 2004, the respondent violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). The respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Commonwealth on December 15, 1992. In

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 461 (2002)-In the Matter of William C. Sheridan

At page 16
the affidavit in question. E. NHRPC 1.15(b) Subsequent to the dismissal of the Hogan case, Sumski sent Attorney Sheridan a check made

At page 16
the money to pay his unpaid fees. Michels alleges that Attorney Sheridan’s conduct violated NHRPC 1.15. NHRPC 1.15 requires an attorney to hold client’s property separate from the

At page 16
Based upon the record presented at trial, the Court finds that Attorney Sheridan’s actions violated NHRPC 1.15. F. Failure to Pay Proper Attention to Details

At page 20
proceeding. Other than the violation of NHRPC 1.15 in In re Hogan, all of the remaining violations involved NHRPC 1.1.

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 529 (2011)-In the Matter of Donald C. Kupperstein

At page 1
depository that the account was a trust account, and failed to keep adequate records of the client funds in the account. This conduct violat ed Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (d), and (e) as then in effect.

At page 1 1.15. He did not keep individual ledgers for trus t funds he received and disbursed for each client matter, nor did he mainta in a ledger for personal funds in the account. He also failed

At page 1 R. Prof. C. 1.15(b), (e)(2) a nd (e)(5), and (f)(1)(B-E).
In November 2002, the responde nt represented a wife in a divorce trial. The court

At page 2
the account.
The respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (d), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004, by depositing the client’s trust funds into an account that was not properly designated as a trust account. The respondent’s negligent misuse of the clie nt’s funds violated Mass. R.

At page 2 rof. C. 1.3 and 1.15(a), as in effect prior to July 1, 2004.
The superior court set a trial in the civ il case against the husband for January 2008.

At page 2
respondent and retained new coun sel to represent her. The re spondent did not account for his time in the case and did not refund the unearned portion of his fee. This conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1) and 1.16(d).
In connection with another matter involving a different client, the respondent received

At page 3 The respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (e) by failing to keep the client’s funds separate from his own funds an d by depositing the client’s funds into an

At page 3 Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 8.4(c) by intentionally misusing the client’s funds to pay his own business and personal expenses and by transfer ring a portion of the client’s funds into

At page 3
least every two months the res pondent’s IOLTA and other trust ac counts and to report to bar counsel whether the respondent is in co mpliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.
On August 8, 2011, the board voted to ac cept the stipulation and recommend the

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 42 (2007)-In the Matter of Philip Colby Brown

At page 1
Commencing at least in March 2004 and continuing through November 2006, the respondent failed to maintain complete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of clients’funds in the IOLTA account. By June 2006, the respondent had approximately $5,000 in theIOLTA account that he could not attribute to any fee or expense or distribution connected to aclient. The respondent failed to maintain records required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 afterspecific record-keeping requirements went into effect on July 1, 2004. On February 1, 2006, the respondent acted as a settlement agent at a residential real estate

At page 2
current balance in the IOLTA account after each deposit or withdrawal violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B): b. The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain a chronological ledger for each clientor third person matter for which he received trust funds, documenting each receipt anddisbursement of the funds of the client or third person, the identity of the client matterfor which funds were deposited or disbursed, and the balance held for the client or thirdperson in that matter violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C): and c. The respondent’s failure to prepare and maintain reconciliation reports at least everysixty days showing the required reconciliation of the check register, individual ledgers,and bank statements for the IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).

At page 2 y disbursing proceeds for a closing and by going to record in advance of receiving funds fromthe lender, in violation of the Good Funds Statute, the respondent failed to providecompetent representation to a client, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1. By failing topromptly issue title policies and to obtain and record mortgage discharges for closings whichhe handled, the respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness inrepresenting a client, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3. By failing to promptly disbursefunds from closings dating back to 2004 and 2005, the respondent failed to act withreasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, and failed to promptly deliver toa third person funds that the third person was entitled to receive, in violation of Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.3 and 1.15(c). The respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Commonwealth on December 28, 2001. He had

At page 2
In mitigation, the respondent’s neglect and failure to keep proper records did not result in actual financial harm to any person, although there was the potential for harm. In June 2006the respondent attended a trust account education program conducted by the Boston BarAssociation, in cooperation with the Office of Bar Counsel, and sought assistance with hisbookkeeping from two certified public accountants. The respondent brought his record keepinginto conformance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, fully distributed the funds he held in hisaccount to the clients and third parties entitled to them, secured the title policies for theapproximately thirty closings he had handled, and obtained and recorded the missingmortgage discharges. The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts and a joint

36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 67 (2020)-In the Matter of Louis J Caccavaro Jr

At page 1
(diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (ke ep client s informed/explain matters so clients can make informed decisions), and 1.15(c) (failure to notify of receipt of funds/disburse promptly). In Count Two , the respondent represented a personal injury client who was involved in a car accident ; the

At page 1
account , the writing of numerous checks to his wife from his IOLTA account , and his failure promptly to remove his wife’s money, in violation of rules 1.15(b) and (f)(1)(B)- (E) (IOLTA segregation, record and reconciliation requirements) .

32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 503 (2016)-In the Matter of Douglas W. Sears

At page 2
handling of a client’s trust property upon request by the clien t, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1). By withdrawing funds from his IOLTA accou nt to pay his fees without delivering to his client in writing (i) an itemized bill or oth er accounting showing the services

At page 2
balance of the client’s funds in the trust account after the wi thdrawal, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2). The respondent’s failure to reconcile his IOLTA account and maintain required records for the account violated Mass. R. Pro f. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(E).

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 386 (2003)-In the Matter of William Francis Scannell, Jr

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to promptly pay, negotiate or otherwise resolve the liens, thereby causing his clients to be subject to potential personal liability, constituted neglect of a legalmatter entrusted to him in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3. The respondent’s failure tonotify the chiropractor of receipt of the funds and his failure to pay funds to the chiropractorthat the chiropractor was entitled to receive were in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). In addition, from January 1999 to October 2002 the respondent maintained an IOLTA account

At page 2 ut generally failed to reconcile his account, failed to promptly withdraw earned fees fromthe account and did not maintain an acceptable check register or individual client ledgers.The respondent’s conduct constituted commingling of earned fees and client funds andinadequate record keeping, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a). Finally, between January 8, 2002, and May 28, 2002, the respondent failed to respond to

33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 389 (2017)-In the Matter of Philip A. Parry

At page 1
seller. In addition, he did not reconcile the account at least every 60 days as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).

At page 2
deposited it to the conveyancin g account, resulting in the negl igent misuse of client or trust funds held in connection with unrelat ed closings violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 and 1.15(b).
The respondent’s failure to reconcile the conveyancing account at least every 60 days

At page 2 iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).
The matter came before the Boa rd of Bar Overseers on a stipula tion of facts and a

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 780 (2007)-In the Matter of Lewdorsey Williams

At page 1
The respondent represented the sellers of real estate pursuant to a purchase and sale agreement dated January 17, 2006. On March 29, 2006, the sale of the property closed. At theclosing, the respondent, the sellers and the buyers executed an escrow agreement. Theagreement named the respondent as escrow agent and provided that the sellers were todeposit with the respondent the sum of $54,500 from their net sale proceeds to be heldsubject to certain terms and conditions as detailed in the agreement. The agreement did notspecify the type of account in which the escrow funds were to be held. The respondent wasunaware that the escrow funds were trust property within the meaning of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a)(1) and were required to be held in a trust account. On March 31, 2006, the respondent deposited a check from the settlement agent representing

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct of commingling trust property in a business account that he and others controlled, without the knowledge and permission of the buyers to the escrowagreement, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) In aggravation, the respondent had a prior public reprimand for neglect and other misconduct

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 177 (2010), 455 Mass. 722 (2010)-In the Matter of Thomas M. Finneran

At page 9
, 429 Mass. 1013 (1999); Matter of Kennedy , 428 Mass. 156 (1998); Matter of Ogan , 424 Mass. 1015 (1997); Matter of Nickerson , 422 Mass. 333 (1996). 15 See, e.g., Matter of Labovitz , 425 Mass. 1008 (1997); Matter of McCarthy , 18 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 380

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 334 (2008)-In the Matter of Francis J. Harney

At page 2
The respondents’ conduct in charging clearly excessive fees as trustees is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a). Their conduct in charging fees and administrative expenses to theagricultural trust that were in fact the obligations of the other six separate trusts is conductin violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b) as in effect prior to July 1, 2004. Theirconduct in using income from the agricultural trust to fund an endowment at the University ofMassachusetts, in breach of the terms of the trust and in violation of their obligations asfiduciaries, and their failure to disclose the existence of this endowment in their accountings,is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) as in effect priorto July 1, 2004. In mitigation, the respondents paid all fee surcharges and other costs assessed by the Probate

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 599 (2009)-In the Matter of Amy E. Valletta

At page 2
By failing to obtain a reasonable return on Smith’s funds, comply with VA regulations, obtain and restore promptly all the benefits due Smith, file probate accounts, and make alldisbursements for Smith on a timely basis, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and1.3. By failing to hold Smith’s funds in a segregated account with interest payable for Smith’sbenefit, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5). By failing to reconcile her IOLTAaccount and maintain required account records, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(f)(1)(B)-(E) and (F)(iii). In aggravation, the respondent received an admonition in 2006 for failing to act diligently and

At page 2 eek the client’s lawful objections in a divorce case. Admonition No. 06 23, 22 Mass. Att’yDisc. R. 899 (2006). In mitigation, during part of the relevant time period, the respondent hadto attend to serious family illness that created stress and distracted her full attention fromher law practice. The respondent took the necessary steps to administer her fiduciary funds incompliance with Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on the parties’ stipulation of facts and

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 21 (2002), 436 Mass. 650 (2002)-In the Matter of Stuart R. Abrams

At page 2
These activities are sufficient to establish violations of S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15, 426 Mass. 1363 (1998) (failure to safeguard and segregate trust account funds, deliverfunds when due, render full accounting for funds, hold funds in individual account withinterest payable as directed by client), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), (g), and (h), 426 Mass.1429 (1998) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; failure tocooperate in bar counsel’s investigation; conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practicelaw). The failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in the representation andfailure to keep his client reasonably informed violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313(1998), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4, 426 Mass. 1314 (1998). The attempt to compel thewithdrawal of the bar discipline complaint and the solicitation of the withdrawal through abusiness associate violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (a), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (violating orattempting to violate Rules of Professional Conduct through the acts of another); Mass. R.Prof. C. 8.4 (c), (d), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to administrationof justice); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (h); and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 10, as appearing in 425 Mass.1313 (1997) (prohibiting withdrawal of complaint as condition of settlement, compromise, orrestitution). 2. Client B. The matter concerning client A arose while bar counsel was investigating

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 112 (2009)-In the Matter of William J. Chignola, Jr

At page 2 respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(1) and (2). By depositing and retaining non-trust funds to the IOLTA account, the respondent violated

At page 2 ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). By failing to reconcile his IOLTA account and maintain allrequired account records, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B)-(F). The respondent had no history of discipline. He paid $20,000 to Smith as a refund of the

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 443 (2002)-In the Matter of Joseph M. Rizzari, Jr

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to take action to reinstate the case after its dismissal constitutes neglect of a legal matter and failure to act with diligence and promptness, in violation ofMass. R. Prof. C. 1.3. The respondent’s commingling, inadequate record keeping, andnegligent misuse of the client’s funds, without intent to deprive but with deprivation resultingat least after the lawsuit was dismissed, and his failure to transfer escrow funds held long-term to an individual client account, was conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(d),and (e). In a fifth matter (Count Five), a client in 1999 retained the respondent to file a personal

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 423 (2019)-In the Matter of John E. Mahoney

At page 1
deliver accountings for each trust and by failing to render a f ull written accounting of his client’s entire trust portfolio, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4( a) and 1.15(d)(1).

At page 1
register with a client identif ier for every transaction, a list of every transaction and a running balance, in violation of Mass. R. Prof . C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The responden t failed to keep an individual client ledger for each client matter, i n violation of Mass. R. Prof. C . 1.15(f)(1)(C). The res pondent failed to

At page 1 eep a ledger for his bank f ees and expenses, in violation of M ass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D). The respondent failed to perform th ree-way reconciliations of the a ccount, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.

At page 1
1.15(b)(2) and made withdrawals from his IOLTA via cash withdra wals in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4).

At page 2
negative balance with resp ect to funds being held on his client ’s behalf, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(c). The respondent was admitted t o the bar of the Commonwealth on December 16, 1997 and had

21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 128 (2005)-In the Matter of Jon F. Conant

At page 2
The respondent’s conduct in continuing to use the IOLTA account for closings when he knew that it had a substantial deficit, thereby knowingly misusing the proceeds of one closing tocover a payment relating to an earlier closing, with intent to deprive the proper recipients atleast temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting, was in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.2(a), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997),effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s falsecertification on the HUD-1 statement that funds were remitted to pay off the mortgage isconduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s intentionalmisrepresentation to the seller regarding the status of the loan proceeds and the payoff of theoutstanding mortgage is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). Therespondent’s intentional misrepresentation to the title insurer and the buyers that theproperty was transferred free and clear of liens is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s affidavit of resignation was filed with the Board of Bar Overseers on April

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 671 (2008)-In the Matter of Douglas Edward Sylvia

At page 1
Commencing at least as of January 2006 and continuing through May 1, 2007, the respondent failed to maintain complete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of clients’funds in the IOLTA account, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(f). During the same timeperiod, the respondent failed to prepare and maintain a check register as required by Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B); failed to prepare and maintain a chronological ledger as required byMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C); and failed to prepare and maintain reconciliation reports atleast every sixty days as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). In addition, by payingoperating expenses directly to creditors from his IOLTA account the respondent violated Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4). As a result of these deficiencies in the respondent’s record-keeping, the respondent made an

At page 1 rror as to the balance of his IOLTA account. On January 17, 2007, the IOLTA account wasoverdrawn in the amount of $95.05. Thereafter, the respondent brought his IOLTA accountinto compliance and has kept IOLTA account records as required by the Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. On February 11, 2008, the parties filed a stipulation and jointly recommended a public

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 137 (2004)-In the Matter of Andrew R. Fanaras

At page 1
The respondent regularly deposited personal funds into his IOLTA account and regularly issued checks from the account to pay his own personal and business expenses. His record keepingfor his IOLTA account was inadequate. His check register was not current and he did notregularly reconcile his accounts. The respondent’s commingling of personal funds in his IOLTAaccount and his use of the account to pay his own personal and business expenses violatedMass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (d). His failure to maintain adequate records of his receipt andmaintenance of client funds violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a). In the second matter, the respondent was retained in or around June 2001 to advise a client

27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 372 (2011), 460 Mass. 1022 (2011)-In the Matter of Paul A. Gargano

At page 1
hearing committee found that Gargano violated a number of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct including Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (b), 426 Mass. 1315 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), (c), and (d), 426 Mass. 1363 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.1, 426 Mass. 1381

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 522 (2013), 466 Mass. 1016 (2013)-In the Matter of Thomas F. Patch

At page 2
After a hearing, the single justice ordered that the respondent be suspended indefinitely. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 12A, as appearing in 425 Mass. 1315 (1997). In his memorandum of decision, the single justice explained the reasons for his order, stating in part:
"There is no reason to depart from the presum ptive sanction in this case. However, I had an

At page 2
conditioned upon the board’s satisfaction that [he] has addressed his emotional issues." See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(4), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). Bar counsel appeals, pressing her claim that the respondent should be disbarred, not indefinitely suspended. [FN3]

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 222 (2010)-In the Matter of John Michael Gerar

At page 1
From 2006 through 2008, the respondent maintained an IOLTA account and personal accounts. From approximately early 2007 until approximately July 30, 2008, the Internal Revenue Servicehad a lien against the respondent’s personal accounts. To avoid the lien, the respondentdeposited personal funds to his IOLTA account in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).The respondent also withdrew funds from his IOLTA account via cash withdrawals and checkspayable to cash in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2), and 1.15(e)(3) and (4). The parties stipulated to the facts and rule violations set forth above and agreed that the

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 662 (2008)-In the Matter of Walter E. Steele

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to notify MassHealth that he had received funds in which MassHealth had an interest and his failure promptly to turn over to MassHealth the funds it was dueviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) (prompt notice and delivery of trust property to thirdperson). The respondent’s failure to negotiate or attempt to negotiate a reduction or arelease of the lien with MassHealth violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1(duty to provide competentrepresentation), 1.2(a) (duty to seek lawful objectives of client), and 1.3 (duty to act withreasonable diligence). The respondent’s conversion of the client’s settlement proceeds violated Mass. R. Prof. C.

At page 2 .4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). The respondent’s failure to informthe client of his full obligation to MassHealth, that the respondent no longer held an amountsufficient to satisfy the lien in full, and that he had not taken and would not take any actionto reduce the lien violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b) (lawyer to keep client reasonablyinformed about status of matter and explain matter to extent necessary to enable client tomake informed decisions about representation). By falsely implying to the client that hecontinued to hold funds in escrow to pay the lien and that he had or would negotiate areduction or release of the lien, the respondent violated 8.4(c). By issuing checks to the clientfrom his IOLTA account that he knew would be dishonored, the respondent violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C) (lawyer shall not disburse funds from trust account that would createnegative balance with respect to any individual client) and 8.4(c). In April and May 2007, the respondent failed to provide information requested by bar counsel

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 508 (2007)-In the Matter of Judith Reuter O’Donnell

At page 3
purposes, she intentionally converted funds, in violation of R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.15(a) & (b), and 8.4 (c) & (h). She also commingled funds, a violation of R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) & (b). Herstatements to Stone were false representations of a material fact to a third party, violating R.Prof. C. 4.1(a), and involved misrepresentation and deceit, violating R. Prof. C. 8.4(c).Finally, O’Donnell’s false written statements (made through counsel) and false testimony aboutStone’s and Haney’s funds constituted violations of R. Prof. C. 4.1(a) and R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). The special hearing officer found that O’Donnell’s statements to Stone about the check being in

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 522 (2004)-In the Matter of Larry Michael Van Hoozer

At page 2
Count Three alleged that, in the same divorce matter, the respondent’s client paid substantial legal fees to the respondent for representing her in the divorce matter in Probate Court andthe civil suit against the husband. The client paid the respondent in cash and by check, butdid not retain complete records and is unsure of the total amount paid. The respondent didnot send the client itemized bills. After the client filed a complaint with Bar Counsel, BarCounsel wrote the respondent two letters asking that he provide an accounting of his fees.The respondent did not reply. The respondent’s failure to render a full accounting as to feespaid by the client is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b). Count Four arose from the respondent’s failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel. In March 2002,

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 424 (2003)-In the Matter of Gerald L. Shyavitz

At page 1
The respondent’s commingling of personal or business funds with trust funds, and his inadequate and improper record keeping, was conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C.1.15(a),(b). Count Two of the petition was based on the respondent’s representation of a client in a

At page 2
The respondent’s purposely depositing the six checks payable to medical providers and DOR to his own business account, without the payees’ knowledge or consent and without theirendorsement of the checks, is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). Therespondent’s commingling of trust funds with his own or his law firm’s personal or businessfunds, and his intentional misappropriation of funds due the client’s creditors with intent todeprive the creditors of the funds at least temporarily, and with actual deprivation resulting,is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). Count Three of the petition charged that, commencing in or before the year 1999 and

At page 2
The respondent’s commingling of trust funds with his own or his law firm’s personal or business funds, and his intentional misappropriation of funds due the clients or the client’screditors with intent to deprive the recipients of the funds at least temporarily, and withactual deprivation resulting, is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b) and Mass.R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). Count Four of the petition was based on the respondent’s representation of another client in a

At page 3
The respondent’s commingling of trust funds with personal or business funds, and his intentional misappropriation of the client’s PIP and bodily injury settlements, with intent todeprive the recipients of the funds at least temporarily and with actual deprivation resulting,is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c),(h). Count Five of the petition was based on the respondent’s representation of a client in a

At page 3
The respondent’s depositing a retainer check to a business account, rather than a trust account, and expending those funds, at least in part, before they were earned, constitutescommingling trust funds with personal or business funds and intentional misuse of trust fundswith actual deprivation resulting, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b) and Mass. R.Prof. C. 8.4(c),(h). The respondent’s failure to make prompt refund of a fee paid in advancethat had not been earned is conduct in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d). In mitigation, the respondent has made restitution in full to affected parties. In aggravation,

22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 550 (2006)-In the Matter of Alan Mason

At page 1
In addition, from and after 1994, the respondent maintained non-IOLTA accounts to hold and disburse funds of multiple banks or other lenders in his conveyancing practice. Therespondent’s use of those accounts violated DR 9 102(C) and, after December 31, 1997, Mass.R. Prof. C. 1.15(e), both requiring that such non-IOLTA accounts be established in a lendingbank for the exclusive use of that particular bank’s transactions. Count II. In 1995, the respondent was an obligor on two loans secured by mortgages on a

At page 2
The respondent’s deposit of his own sale proceeds into his IOLTA or conveyancing accounts and use of the accounts to shield the funds from the reach of creditors violated Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(a) and (c) (failure to safeguard funds; IOLTA violations) and 8.4(c) and (h) (dishonesty,fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; other conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice).His use of the sham trusts to conceal his assets and thereby defraud or frustrate his creditorsviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(a) (violating or attempting to violate the Rules of ProfessionalConduct through acts of others), (c) and (h). Count V. During 2000, the respondent identified a house in foreclosure as a target for one of

At page 3
The respondent’s conversion of the owner’s funds with resulting temporary deprivation of the owner; fabrication of documents sent to her lender; alteration of her deed; intentionalmisrepresentation of his true status in the transactions; and use of the sham trust, his IOLTAaccount, and the account in his mother’s name to conceal his interest and benefit from hiscreditors violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(a), (c) and (h). His commingling and failure tosegregate the owner’s share of the proceeds, failure to keep adequate records of the funds,failure to hold the owner’s funds in trust and at interest pending resolution of their dispute,failure to notify the owner of his receipt of funds in which she had an interest, failure timelyto remit the funds to which she was entitled, and failure to account adequately for the fundsviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a)-(e). Count VI. During the course of the bar discipline investigation, the respondent failed to

18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 121 (2002)-In the Matter of Mark S. Clark

At page 5
Conclusion One purpose of discipline is to protect the public and deter similar conduct byother lawyers. Matter of Kersting, 151 Ariz. 171, 726 P.2d 587 (1986). Anotherpurpose is to instill public confidence in the bar’s integrity. Matter of Horwitz, 180Ariz. 20, 29, 881 P.2d, 352, 362 (1994). Yet another purpose is to maintain theintegrity of the legal system. In re Fioramonti, 176 Ariz. 182, 187, 859 P.2d 1315,1320 (1993). Therefore, having considered Respondent’s misconduct, application ofthe Standards, including factors present in aggravation and mitigation, and aproportionality analysis, the Commission recommends a three (3) year suspension,restitution and costs of these disciplinary proceedings and upon reinstatement, two(2) years probation (LOMAP and EEP). RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of March, 2001._____________________________________

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 105 (2003)-In the Matter of Leonard J. Cuddy, Jr

At page 1
Failure to segregate, safeguard, and account for clients’ funds Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b). Conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 301 (2007)-In the Matter of Jeffrey L. Hoffman

At page 1
The respondent’s conduct in intentionally misappropriating trust funds for personal or business purposes and in failing to promptly deliver to a third party the funds that the third party wasentitled to receive, all with intent to deprive and actual deprivation resulting, was in violationof Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). The respondent’s conduct in forging or causing the forgery of a title insurance policy and then

477 Mass. 1019, 75 NE 3d 1120 (2017)-IN THE MATTER OF GREENE

At page 2 commingling personal and trust funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338 (2004).

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 326 (2019)-In the Matter of Henry E Knoblock III

At page 1
checking account, owned and controlled exclusively by him. It was not a "trust account" as defined in Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a)(2) and was not designated as such for purposes of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(2).

At page 1
The $15,000 entrusted to the res pondent constituted "trust prop erty" within the meaning of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a)(1). At no time did the re spondent transfer such funds from his personal checking account into his law firm’s IOLTA or other client trust account as

At page 1 equired by Rule 1.15(b). The resp ondent subsequently received funds from other investors which he also failed to segreg ate from his personal funds.

At page 2
acknowledged that bar counsel c ould prove by a pr eponderance of the evidence that he violated Rules 1.15(b), 1.15(c), 8.4 (c), and 8.4(h) of the Mass achusetts Rules of Professional Conduct.

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 326 (2007)-In the Matter of Gale Rosalyn Johnson

At page 3
Conclusions of LawThe special hearing officer concluded that the respondent’s intentional misuse of her three clients’ funds, with intent to deprive them of the funds at least temporarily and with actualdeprivation resulting, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b), as appearing in 426 Mass.1301, 1363 (1997), effective January 1, 1998, through June 30, 2004, and Mass. R. Prof. C.8.4(c) and (h). The respondent’s endorsement of Ward’s name on the settlement checkwithout his authorization, and her knowingly false statement to bar counsel concerning herfee agreement with Monkiewicz also violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). Factors in AggravationThe special hearing officer found in aggravation that the respondent had previously received

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 587 (2007)-In the Matter of Kathryn S. Ragan

At page 5
Count One – Conclusions of Law 28. The respondent’s conduct in commingling trust funds with personal funds, and indepositing and maintaining trust funds in an account that was neither an IOLTA accountnor an individual trust account, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (e), as appearingin 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04. 29. The respondent’s conduct in repeatedly and knowingly misusing Mr. Conte’s funds to paythe respondent’s personal or business obligations, constituted intentional conversion oftrust funds with actual deprivation to the client resulting, in violation of Mass. R. Prof.C. 1.15(a) and (b), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98through 6/30/04, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit ormisrepresentation) and (h) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice).

At page 6 violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a) and (b), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective 1/1/98 through 6/30/04, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(h). Having foundthat the respondent’s misuse of Mr. Conte’s funds was intentional, I must reject thisalternative charge.

At page 6 1. The respondent’s conduct in paying herself a legal fee that was disputed by the clientviolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301, 1363 (1997), effective1/1/98 through 6/30/04. The evidence shows that the respondent placed the disputedamount in escrow after being advised by bar counsel that Mr. Conte disputed the fee. Onthese facts, I do not find a violation of the charged disciplinary rules. Count Two – Findings of Fact

37 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2021)-In the Matter of Robert Michael Griffin

At page 22
"prompt" payment of unearned fees. Compare Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) (with respect to client trust funds held in IOLTA accounts, "[e]xcept as stated in this Rule or as otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client or third person on whose behalf a lawyer holds trust property, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive"). Nor does the Rule 1.16 (d) require immediate

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 23 (2001)-In the Matter of Timothy J. Arel

At page 1
(d) Rule 1. 1 5(a), failing to deposit a client’s retainer in a clearly designated trust account separate from his own funds, and Rule 1.15(b), failing to maintain appropriate recordsconcerning client funds in his possession; (e) Rule 1.16(d), failing to promptly return property, including funds, to a client upon the

At page 1
Timothy J. Arel is hereby disbarred for violating Professional Conduct Rules 1.1 (a), (b)(5), and (c)(4), 1.3(a), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 8.1 (a) and (b), and 8.4(a). He is orderedto notify the Committee on Professional Conduct of any other jurisdictions in which he islicensed to practice law of the issuance of the court’s order. Timothy J. Arel is hereby assessed all expenses incurred by the Committee on Professional

At page 4
behalf; e) Rule 1.15(a) by failing to deposit Ms. O’Hanley’s retainer in a clearly designated client trust account, separate from his own funds, in accordance with the Rules of the New HampshireSupreme Court;

At page 4 ) Rule 1.15(b) by failing to maintain appropriate records concerning the funds of Ms. O’Hanley that he was holding on her behalf as a retainer in the immigration matter;

26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 462 (2010)-In the Matter of James J. O’Malley, III

At page 1
respondent. The petition contained five counts, which may be briefly summarized as follows. Count I alleges that since at least late 2006, the respondent has failed to comply with rulesconcerning IOLTA accounts, including provisions requiring reconciliation of his IOLTA accountswith bank balances, maintaining appropriate check and chronological registers; has failed towithdraw promptly all his earned fee and expense disbursements; and has misused clientfunds in the account, at least temporarily – all in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(l)(B)-(E). Counts II and III allege improper accounting to two specific clients of settlement funds therespondent had received on the clients’ behalf, and, more significantly, the conversion or,alternatively, the negligent misuse of those funds. Each count charges the respondent withviolating, inter alia, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.15(b), and 8.4(c) (or alternativelyrule 8.4(h)), and rules 1.4, 1.5(c), 1.15(d), and U5(f)(l)(B)-(E). Count IV alleges that therespondent represented a client, Marguerite Kelly, and in the course of the misrepresentation,accepted a settlement of her claim without first informing her of the offer or obtaining herconsent, and thereafter, following Kelly’s refusal to accept the proffered settlement, and thenegotiation of an amended fee agreement between the respondent and Kelly, reneging onthat amended agreement, taking a larger fee than he had agreed to and failing to pay overpromptly certain funds due to Kelly, intentionally misrepresenting Kelly’s actions to the bankwhere the monies had been deposited, initiating a threat of criminal charges against Kelly inorder to gain an advantage, and thereafter filing a civil action against Kelly to establish hisright to the larger fee, pleading the original fee agreement without informing the court of theamended fee agreement, and disclosing in that action confidential information about his clientthat was not reasonably necessary to establish his claims or defenses. Count IV charges therespondent with violating a variety of rules, including Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.6(a), 8.4(a),(c) and (h), and rule 1.15. Finally, Count V charges the respondent with failing to cooperate inbar counsel’s investigation, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c), 8.1(b), 8.4(g) and (h), andS.J.C. Rule 4:01, §3(1). As set forth in the board’s information, the respondent did not file a timely answer to the

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 240 (2013)-In the Matter of Thomas F. Feeney

At page 2
From at least January 1, 2009, through Marc h 31, 2010, the respondent failed to keep records of funds for his IOLTA account as requ ired by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. Among other things, the respondent did not maintain a ledg er for each individual c lient matter listing all

At page 2
clients, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). His conduct in failing to keep trust funds in a trust account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1 ). His conduct in altering bank records and providing the altered records to ba r counsel in connection with an investigation into his conduct

At page 2
making distributions from his IOLTA account that created negative balances on behalf of clients violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). His conduc t in failing to keep an individual ledger for each client matter with a runni ng balance after each transa ction and failing to prepare

At page 2 econciliation reports violated Ma ss. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C), (E). His conduct in depositing personal funds into the IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b). His conduct in

At page 2 creditors directly from his IOLTA account viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3) and (4).

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 53 (2004)-In the Matter of Thomas F. Broderick

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to respond to the complainant’s requests for information about the basis for his fee, to maintain adequate records, and to provide the complainant with anaccounting of his fee violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) (a lawyer shall keep a client reasonablyinformed of the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests forinformation) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a) and (b) (lawyer shall maintain proper recordsregarding client’s funds and shall promptly render a full accounting upon request). The respondent’s failure to comply with S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17, after his suspension from the

17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 417 (2001)-In the Matter of William C. McPhee

At page 1
The respondent’s commingling and conversion of the settlement proceeds and retainer payments, misrepresentations to clients, wrongful endorsement of a check, failure to holdclient funds at interest, and failure to account for or keep required records of client fundsviolated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6), Canon Six, DR 6-102(A), Canon Nine, DR 9-102(A), (B)(3) and (4) and (C), and, from and after January 1, 1998, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a),(b), (d) and (e), Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h). Therespondent’s failure to execute a written fee agreement in the personal injury case violatedCanon Two, DR 2-106(C), and S.J.C. Rule 3:05(4). The respondent’s neglect and failure ofzealous representation in the estate case to the client’s detriment violated Canon Six, DR 6-102(A)(2) and (3), Canon Seven, DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3), and, from and after January 1, 1998,Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3 and 1.4. His conduct in charging and collecting a clearlyexcessive fee in the divorce case violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a). Further, in several additional divorce and criminal cases between 1997 through 2000, the

At page 1 espondent received flat fees from the clients, failed to take any action of substance in thecases, misrepresented the status of the cases to the clients, and, upon his discharge, failed torefund his unearned fees. The respondent’s neglect of those cases, cases, handling of caseswithout adequate preparation, failure of zealous representation with ensuing damage orprejudice, failure to pursue the clients’ lawful objectives, failure to act with reasonablediligence, and failure to maintain reasonable client communications violated Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(2) and (3), Canon Seven, DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3 and1.4. The respondent’s failure to refund the unearned fees in all the cases violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 1.16(d).

At page 2
By engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of his suspension order and by failing after his suspension to give required notice, withdraw his appearances, return clientfiles, close his fiduciary accounts, distribute and account for trust funds, remit his unearnedfees or file a timely affidavit of compliance, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b),Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(a)(1), (c) and (d), Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5(a), Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c), (d)and (h), and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17(1) and (3). By failing to cooperate in bar counsel’sinvestigation, the respondent violated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), Mass. R. Prof. C.8.4(d) and (h), and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3(1). Bar counsel commenced formal disciplinary proceedings by filing a petition for discipline

25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 167 (2009)-In the Matter of Peter B. Dion

At page 1
On November 10, 2008, the buyer notified the seller and the respondent that he was terminating the purchase and sale agreement and asked that the $5,000 deposit be returned.The respondent failed to repay any of the $5,000 to the buyer until after bar counsel filed apetition for discipline against the respondent on March 25, 2009. Thus, the respondent’sintentional misuse of escrowed funds resulted in actual deprivation. The respondent’s conductin this matter violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (c), and 8.4(c) and (h). In the divorce case, in November 2007, the wife paid the respondent $2,500 as a retainer and

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to communicate adequately with his client about the status of her case and his failure to reply to his client’s efforts to communicate with him violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 1.4(a). The respondent’s misleading statement that he had sent a check to refund theretainer and that he would send another check to replace one that had apparently been lostin the mail violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). By converting his client’s retainer to his own usebefore the funds had been earned, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and (d),and 8.4(c) and (h). By failing to refund the unearned portion of the client’s retainer after hewas discharged, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c) and 1.16(d). On July 29 and August 28, 2008, in the course of investigating the complaint of the

35 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 35 (2019)-In the Matter of Robert Brian Carmel-Montes

At page 8
Accordingly, the $29,000 payment was an advance fee retainer, which the attorney was required to hold in trust until earned. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(3) ("A lawyer shall .deposit into <1 trust account legal fees and expenses that have been.paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the

At page 11
Lastly, we conclude -based in part on his admission -that the respondent ~iolated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(l)(B), (C), (D), and (E). These rules set forth the record-keeping requirements for IOLTA accounts, in~luding for example that the account be reconciled every

20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 166 (2004)-In the Matter of Robert K. Gordon

At page 3
In all of the counts above, the respondent’s negligence in failing to maintain and safeguard client funds, resulting in multiple instances of misuse of those funds by the secretary withactual deprivation to clients; his conduct in commingling personal funds and fees with clients’funds; his conduct in delegating control of his IOLTA account to his secretary and failing tosupervise her management of the account; his failure to make or cause to be made promptdisbursement of trust funds due clients; his continued use of the IOLTA account in and after1999, despite knowledge of the misappropriations by his secretary and of the fact thatrestitution had not been made in full; and his inadequate and improper record keepingviolated Canon Nine, DR 9-102 (A) and (B) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (a), (b), (d), 5.3(b) and8.4 (a) and (h). In addition, in Count Two, the respondent’s conduct in endorsing the client’s insurance

At page 4
(A) (6), Canon Two, DR 2 110(A)(2), (3) and (4) and (B) (4), Canon Six, DR 6-101(A) (3), Canon Seven, DR 7-101(A)(1),(2), (3), Canon Nine, DR 9-102 (A) and (B) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1,1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.15(a),(b), (d)), 1.16(a), (d) and (e) and 8.4 (a) and (h). In Count Three, by not pursuing further negotiations to pay off the mortgage and thereby

At page 4
In Count Six, the respondent’s conduct in failing to pay funds withheld for the health insurance lien and in intentionally withholding information regarding the 1997 settlement andfinal disposition of the matter from the lien holder also violated Canon One, DR 1 102 (A) (4)and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b), 5.3(b) and 8.4 (c). The matter came before the Board of Bar Overseers on a stipulation of facts, disciplinary

29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 461 (2013)-In the Matter of Robert G. Moore

At page 2
By maintaining a greater than nominal amount of estate funds in his IOLTA account for more than a year, the respondent violat ed Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (e)(5).

At page 2
(b) written notice of the amount and date of the withdrawal and (c) a st atement of the balance after the withdrawal, the respondent viol ated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d)(2).

At page 3
By making withdrawals from his trust account by checks that were not pre-numbered, the respondent violated Mass. R. Pr of. C. 1.15(e) (3) and (4).

856 NE 2d 840, 447 Mass. 678 (2006)-IN THE MATTER OF DRISCOLL

At page 6
law. See id. (attorney disbarred after being convicted of thirty-five felonies, including conspiracy and bank fraud). See also Matter of Ogan, 424 Mass. 1015, 1016 (1997) (attorney disbarred after pleading guilty to one count of making false statement to federally insured institution where facts showed that attorney

24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 287 (2008)-In the Matter of Robert Michael Fuster, Sr

At page 1
The respondent’s failure to provide competent representation and act with reasonable diligence in the three cases violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 and 1.3, and his failure tocommunicate adequately with the clients violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b). Therespondent’s failure to segregate and safeguard the clients’ funds, account adequately for thefunds, and maintain adequate IOLTA records violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(a), (b) and (d)through June 30, 2004, and 1.15(c) and (d)(1) thereafter. The respondent’s failure tosupervise his employees adequately violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.1(a) and (b) and 5.3(a) and(b). His knowing failure without good cause to cooperate with bar counsel violated Mass. R.Prof. C. 3.4(c) and 8.1(b) and (g) as well as S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3(1). In aggravation, the respondent had a history of discipline consisting of a 2002 public

31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 29 (2015)-In the Matter of Louis G. Bertucci, III

At page 3
also delegated to the paralegal the responsib ility for insuring that the respondent’s IOLTA account records were maintained, reviewed and re conciled as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15. The respondent failed to make adequate efforts to ensure that he had in place measures

At page 3
obligations. The respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3 and 1.4(a) by failing to ensure that his client’s mortgages were promptly recorded. The respondent also violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b) and 1.15(f) by failing to safe guard his client funds, and by failing to insure that he maintained adequate records of hi s receipt and maintenance of client funds.

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Walter W Jabs Jr

At page 2
The respondent’s failure to perform a three-way reconciliation of his IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). The respondent’s failure to maintain a chronological check register with client identifiers for every transaction and a running b alance violated M ass.

At page 2 . Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B). The respondent’s failure to keep individual client matter ledgers violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C). The respondent’s failure to keep a ledger for bank fees

At page 2
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(F)(1)(D). The respondent’s conduct in depositing personal funds belonging to his family’s trust into his IOLTA account violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2). The respondent received a prior public reprima nd for unrelated misconduct. See Matter

38 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2022)-In the Matter of Barry Wisner Chapin

At page 1
the money intended for the international firms, both the client and the foreign firms experienced a loss. The respondent eventually filed a Chapter 7 Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy. He listed the client and three of the internatio nal firms in a creditor’s matrix. Subsequently, the client filed a claim against the respondent in Bankruptcy Court for $48,824.87. The respondent was discharged in bankruptcy and the client’s claim remains unpaid. This conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a)(3) and (4), 1.15A(b), 1.15(b), 1.15 (c), and 8.4(c) and (h).

19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 190 (2003)-In the Matter of Patrick S. Guarnieri

At page 1
In October of 2000, the respondent and his wife began divorce proceedings. In March of 2001, the respondent’s wife filed a complaint for contempt and in June of 2001, the MiddlesexProbate Court issued a judgment of contempt that ordered the respondent to pay the wifeapproximately $1,151. Thereafter, the wife filed a second complaint for contempt, allegingthat the respondent had failed to make temporary alimony payments in a timely manner. The respondent failed to appear for a contempt hearing in August of 2001 and, as a result, a

23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 443 (2007), 449 Mass. 154 (2007)-In the Matter of John C. McBride

At page 2
By January 26, 1995, Stallworth had discharged McBride. They agreed that of the 15,000thathadbeenpaidforhisworkonthecri